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ABSTRACT 
 
Why do belligerents intentionally kill legally protected civilians during armed conflict?  Such 
acts not only violate the human security of people protected by the civilian immunity norm but 
may also be war crimes. The violation of this pillar of international humanitarian law (IHL), the 
body of law tasked with regulating armed conflict, has been the subject of significant research 
and policy deliberation.  Many of the useful analyses produced by these efforts operate from 
common assumptions.  One is that a monolithic understanding of the distinction principle, the 
obligation for belligerents to distinguish between permissible and impermissible targets and a 
core component of the civilian immunity norm, exists among those who monitor and disseminate 
IHL.  Another assumption among scholars and practitioners concerned with deliberate civilian 
targeting is that a shared understanding of who is protected during armed conflict exists between 
those who monitor IHL and those who must abide by it.  Through the analysis of interviews 
conducted with IHL experts and belligerents who fought in a variety of conflicts on the African 
continent, this study reveals that neither of these assumptions is warranted.  It finds that not only 
is there a lack of consensus among belligerents as to whom they can permissibly target during 
armed conflict, but that there is still debate among IHL experts as to whom the law protects.  
Furthermore, this study finds that shared understandings of who is protected during armed 
conflict do not exist between experts and belligerents, so that belligerents claiming to abide by 
their particular interpretation of the distinction principle ostensibly target civilians deemed 
protected by IHL experts.  Thus this study offers new avenues for understanding violations of the 
civilian immunity norm and possibly reducing their occurrence. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
It's far more dangerous today to be a civilian than a soldier…~ Jan Egeland, former 
United Nations Emergency Coordinator1 
 
Do shared understandings of who belligerents can or cannot target during armed conflict exist?  
The civilian immunity norm obligates belligerents to distinguish between permissible and 
impermissible targets.  This obligation is known as the distinction principle.  The International 
Court of Justice cites the distinction principle as one of the “cardinal principles contained in texts 
constituting the fabric of [international] humanitarian law [IHL]”.2  The civilian immunity norm 
then prohibits belligerents from deliberately targeting the latter group, typically considered as 
consisting of civilians.  Yet according to a statement made by Staffan de Mistura, Special 
Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, in a press release regarding the UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s 2010 Mid-Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, an 
intensified pattern of assassinations and executions reinforced the widespread perception 
of Afghan civilians that they are becoming more and more the primary target in this 
period of conflict.3 
 
Civilians deliberately targeted by the Taliban include  
teachers, nurses, doctors, tribal elders, community leaders, provincial and district 
officials, other civilians including children, and civilians working for international 
military forces and international organizations.4   
 
                                                 
1. United Nations. 2005. “World must do more to protect civilians in armed conflict, Security Council told.” 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=14692&Cr=civilian&Cr1=conflict (February 20, 2009). 
2 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory 
Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. (1996) p. 257, paras. 78-79 
3 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. 2010.  “Afghan civilian casualties rise 31 per cent in first six 
months of 2010.”  http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1741&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID=9955 
(September 7, 2010). 
4 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2010).   
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According to the report, such instances of civilian targeting reflect violations of IHL.  If this is 
the case, could these IHL violations indicate a lack of understanding between relevant parties as 
to who can be targeted during armed conflict? 
If one surveys the literature on deliberate civilian targeting during armed conflict, one 
might answer this question in the negative.  Many scholars offer various explanations of the 
violation of the civilian immunity norm, assuming that relevant parties understand who this 
norm, and IHL which springs from it, protects.  Is this a sound assumption to make when trying 
to understand the issue of impermissible civilian targeting?   
This dissertation probes whether critical concepts in the civilian immunity norm are 
commonly understood by central actors in the civilian protection regime. It asks the following 
questions: Does a shared understanding of who is protected from the horrors of armed conflict, 
and who might not be, exist among central actors in the civilian protection regime?  In other 
words, do these actors’ conceptualizations of normative and legal obligations in armed conflict 
overlap?  More specifically, this project asks:  Do belligerents and legal experts share an 
understanding of who is considered a permissible civilian target?   If they do not, can normative 
explanations account for these differences or do these differences exist solely for strategic 
purposes?   
These issues are not just a matter of semantics.  How belligerents interpret the distinction 
principle not only possesses the utmost importance for the civilians with which they interact, but 
also carries significant implications for their own futures.  For instance, intentionally targeting 
civilians protected by IHL during armed conflict is a war crime.  According to the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention (AP), “Making the civilian population or 
individual civilians the object of attack when committed willfully and if they cause death or 
 3 
 
serious injury to body and health” is a grave breach of the AP and hence, a war crime.5  
Consequently, whether or not relevant actors commonly understand the distinction between 
permissible and impermissible civilian targets and how these understandings impact targeting 
decisions pose weighty questions worthy of meaningful consideration. 
I explored these questions through analysis of data gathered from semi-structured 
interviews with former belligerents from the African continent and IHL experts, as well as 
through historiography.  Interviews allowed me to probe deeper into how IHL experts, those who 
determine what IHL is and when it has been violated, and former belligerents, who arguably 
violate IHL, understand permissible civilian targets.  While the normative frameworks presented 
in this study are generally couched in system level language, “their operation requires the 
construction of agent level perception.”6  Since interviews are ‘‘attempts to understand the world 
from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their 
lived world to scientific explanations,’’7 they serve as useful tools if the research objective is to 
determine how different actors perceive and constitute concepts like permissible civilian targets.  
Interviews provide the researcher an efficient means to enter worlds in which they have little 
experience.8   
I conducted a multi-step qualitative analytical process after the completion of the 
transcription of the interview data.  The first step aimed to determine whether former belligerent 
narratives indicated adherence to some version of the distinction principle.  For those narratives 
that did, the next step entailed ascertaining whether intersubjectivity exists between the two 
                                                 
5 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Art. 85 
6 Hermann, Richard K. and Vaugh P. Shannon. 2001.“Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, 
Material Interest andPerception in Decision Making.” International Organization 55:3, 625-626. 
7 Kvale, Steinar. 1996. Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, Sage: Thousand Oaks, 1. 
8 Pouliot, Vincent. 2007. “’Sobjectivism’: Toward A Constructivist Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 
51:359, 370. 
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respondent groups on who is considered a permissible civilian target.  Intersubjectivity connotes 
“shared understandings of desirable and acceptable behavior.”9  These shared understandings 
“provide people with reasons why things are the way they are and indications as to how they 
should use their material abilities and power.”10  Intersubjectivity is based on a perception that 
although “each of us thinks his own thoughts; our concepts we share with our fellow men.”11  I 
separated former belligerent narratives that indicated intersubjectivity with IHL experts on the 
constitution of permissible civilian targets from those that did not, continuing my analysis with 
the latter group.  Here my goal was to determine which of the normative frameworks discussed 
in Chapter 2 best described each narrative.  The last step involved historical analysis to 
determine whether any lack of intersubjectivity between the two respondent groups manifested in 
the interview data also characterized previous understandings of permissible targets during 
armed conflict. 
A central finding in this project is that critical actors in the civilian protection regime 
distinguish between permissible and impermissible civilian targets differently.  This 
incongruence presents itself not only between the two groups but also within each group. Several 
of the belligerent narratives in which civilians are killed also claim to adhere to a particular 
understanding of the distinction principle, even when those very narratives reveal that doing so 
contradicts their interests. Thus, belligerents appear to violate the civilian immunity norm for 
non-strategic reasons; belligerent narratives indicate they violate the norm because they comply 
with a version of the norm that differs from those employed by norm proponents (consistent with 
a norm contestation framework).  This dissertation also demonstrates that such inconsistency is 
                                                 
9 Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. “A State of the Art on an Art of the State.” International 
Organization 40:4.  
10 Adler, Emanuel. 1997. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” European Journal of 
International Relations 3:3, 319, 322. 
11 Toulmin, Stephen. 1972. Human Understanding, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 35. 
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not solely a feature of current efforts to regulate armed conflict but shadowed the development of 
the distinction principle through time and space.  This finding differs from much of the relevant 
literature which assumes that actors share an understanding of who is a permissible civilian 
target during armed conflict.   In other words, this study offers insights into the civilian immunity 
norm’s constitutive effects, a prerequisite for it to capably exert its regulative effects (which 
occupies much of the literature’s focus).12  Thus, this study offers new hypotheses for future 
studies to test as a means of enhancing our understanding of civilian targeting.  It also suggests 
new theoretical insights on norm compliance and norm violation as well as suggestions for 
policies to curb such attacks. 
The case of children in armed conflict usefully illustrates the argument made here.  The 
association of childhood with innocence and harmlessness helps to explain why children are 
often unreservedly considered protected by the civilian immunity norm.13  The United Nations 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (UNOSRSG) for Children and 
Armed Conflict explains this perspective: 
Children are innocent and especially vulnerable. Children are less equipped to adapt or 
respond to conflict. They are the least responsible for conflict, yet suffer 
disproportionately from its excesses. Children represent the hopes and future of every 
society; destroy them and you have destroyed a society.14 
 
                                                 
12 A norm’s constitutive and regulative effects are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
13 Carpenter, R. Charli. 2006. Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians, 
London: Ashgate Press, 26; Brocklehurst, Helen. 2006. Who’s Afraid of Children: Children, Conflict and 
International Relations , Hampshire: Ashgate, 38; Hartle, Anthony E. 2002. “Atrocities in War: Dirty Hands and 
Noncombatants,” Social Research 69:4; Teichman, Jenny. 1986. Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied 
Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell;  Sjobeg, Laura. 2006. “Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why 
Gender Analysis Needs Feminism,” International Studies Quarterly 50; Primoratz, Igor. 2005.“Civilian Immunity in 
War,” Philosophical Forum, 36:1; Nusseibeh, Sari. 1992. “Can Wars be Just?: A Palestinian Viewpoint of the Gulf 
War,” in David Decosse (ed), But Was it Just?, New York: Doubleday. 
14 United Nations.  http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/issues.html, accessed on March 12, 2010. 
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Contrast this view of children with the following statement from the Sri Lankan government in 
response to widespread condemnation to an airstrike that targeted children in August 2006:  “’If 
the children are terrorists, what can we do?’"15  The United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) claimed these children were not terrorists, but were attending a first 
aid course.  The Sri Lankan response suggests that the government did not make individual 
determinations of the threatening status of the children deliberately killed, opting instead for a 
categorical determination of threat based on age.  This determination may have been influenced 
by the particular characteristics of the Sri Lankan conflict, namely the Tamil Tigers’ use of child 
belligerents.  Instead of youthfulness being the reason for protection, it formed the basis for the 
Sri Lankan government’s targeting decisions.  The government held on to this view in spite of 
wide opposition to the attack, opposition that might have materialized in the form of costs 
imposed on the government for maintaining its policy on children as “legitimate” targets.16 
For the Sri Lankan government, the link between age based innocence and harmlessness 
is severed.  For those maintaining this connection, confronting a situation in which children 
engage in threatening behavior can be extremely disconcerting and dangerous.   For instance, 
Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 
expresses the moral conundrum a UN peacekeeper faced during the Rwandan genocide when 
trying to protect Tutsis under fire from children: “Troops in the field will have ethical, legal and 
moral dilemmas. We’re talking about a 12 year old with an AK-47, for Christ’s sake.”17  The 
                                                 
15 Hugler, Justin. 2006. “Sri Lankan Army Warns Children Can be Targets,” The Independent. August 16, 2006. 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20060816/ai_n16643844, (accessed March 30, 2008). 
 
16 Hugler (2006). 
17 McGinnis, Sarah. 2010. “Fight for Human Rights Diluted, say Dallaire.” Calgary Herald. February 11. 
http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Fight+human+rights+diluted+says+Dallaire/2548568/story.html (March 10, 
2010).  
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peacekeeper wrestles with a Sophie’s Choice dilemma. Who should the peacekeeper avoid 
harming, the children or the Rwandans under his protection? The cognitive struggle revolves 
around a conflict between realities, training that conditions peacekeepers to protect children 
uniformly as a group and a situation in which members of that group endanger those in 
immediate need of protection.   
What the above discussion demonstrates are the complexities inherent with the civilian 
immunity norm’s distinction principle.  In one conflict (Sri Lanka), children died because 
belligerents categorically viewed them as permissible targets.  In anoother conflict (Rwanda), a 
UN peacekeeper instinctively hesitated in targeting children because he did not see them as 
permissible targets.   On the face of it, in both cases the belligerents incorrectly conceptualized 
the permissibility of targeting the children in question.  Based on the facts available, the children 
in the Sri Lankan case were likely impermissible targets while the children in the Rwandan case 
were likely permissible targets.  What explains the belligerents’ errors?  After all, AP I clearly 
states that civilians are permissible targets only if they directly participate in hostilities.  Such 
civilians retain their civilian designation, but lose the protections offered to them by the civilian 
immunity norm when they directly participate in hostilities.  This applies to children as well; 
children who directly participate in hostilities can be targeted under IHL. Meanwhile, civilians 
who do not directly participate in hostilities keep their civilian designation and the protections 
under the civilian immunity norm.  This is the distinction principle in codified IHL.  As clear as 
this may seem at first glance, problems arise because this critical phrase, direct participation in 
hostilities, is vague enough to generate different interpretations of its meaning.  Children in 
armed conflict are one source of such contending views, as the above discussion illustrates.  
However, these differing views of the permissibility of child targets is not simply anecdotal; this 
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study reveals that such differences currently exist in the opinions of IHL experts and belligerents 
on whether children in armed conflict are permissible targets.  And children are not the only 
point of contention among actors in the civilian protection regime when it comes to the matter of 
permissible targets. 
For example, when asked how they understood the term civilian within the context of 
their protection missions, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff often 
referred to women and children collectively.  This is surprising considering UNHCR often 
operates in contexts with females and children directly participating in hostilities, as well as male 
civilian victims who did not directly participate in hostilities when they were killed.  They also 
employed an identity based distinction between permissible and impermissible civilian targets, 
much like the Sri Lankan government and the UN peacekeeper did, rather than the act based 
distinction (direct participation) encapsulated in the AP. 
An examination of the relevant literature reveals that scholars also do not interpret the 
distinction principle consistently with IHL.  For example, the terms civilian and noncombatant 
are often used interchangeably despite the different protections these labels confer.18  
Noncombatants as a legal term applies to members of armed forces like wounded soldiers, 
prisoners of war and medical personnel.  Civilians are included as one among many types of 
noncombatants.   
                                                 
18 For example, Igor Primoratz:  “The immunity of civilians, or noncombatants, from deadly violence in war is 
enjoined by the centerpiece of the jus in bello prong of just war theory, the principle of distinction.” (Primoratz 
(2005) at 41).  Richard Price: “Two central concepts from [the laws of war and international humanitarian law] that 
are relevant to [the issue of landmines] are civilian discrimination and unnecessary suffering.  Discrimination (or 
noncombatant immunity) is one of the oldest notions of the just war doctrine.” (Price, Richard. 1998. “Reversing the 
Gun sights: Transnational Civil SocietyTargets Land Mines.” International Organization 52:3, 628.  Michael Byers: 
“The Geneva Conventions are aimed at protecting… civilians (who are technically referred to as ‘non-combatants.’” 
(Byers, Michael. 2005. War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict. NY: Grove Press,115). 
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Not only do scholars employ legal terminology incorrectly, their datasets occasionally 
lump civilian and combatants together in a fashion inconsistent with IHL.  Presumably, the 
purpose of tracking these numbers is to document the number of impermissible civilian targets 
killed. One such dataset is that compiled by the Iraq Body Count.  The Iraq Body Count (IBC) 
tracks the number of civilians violently killed since the commencement of hostilities in Iraq in 
2003, and according to its website, has been used by researchers, policymakers and practitioners.  
It includes in its definition of civilian “members of Iraqi military or paramilitary/militia forces in 
our database, namely when they are killed — i.e. summarily executed — after capture.”19  
Additionally, 
Excluded from IBC are those aged 18 and over who, at the point of death, were reported 
as initiating deadly violence or being active members of a military or paramilitary 
organization.  We also exclude overseas ‘contractors’ providing security and other private 
services related to the occupation of Iraq. 
 
Included are all others killed violently, including regular local police forces.20 
 
The IBC definition of civilian contains several inconsistencies with IHL (these inconsistencies 
are discussed in more detail in following chapters).  Namely, members of the military or 
paramilitary/militia forces would not be considered civilians under IHL even if executed after 
capture.   Secondly, “contractors” who do not directly participate in hostilities may be considered 
impermissible civilian targets under IHL.  Thirdly, IBC presumably includes child soldiers as 
civilians since it excludes those killed who were 18 and older when they initiated violence.  
However, children under 18 who directly participate in hostilities (i.e., initiate violence) can be 
targeted. 
                                                 
19 Iraq Body Count. 2010.  http://www.iraqbodycount.org/about/methods/3 (February 22, 2010). 
20 Iraq Body Count. 2010.  http://www.iraqbodycount.org/about/methods/3 (February 22, 2010). 
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Another example is the Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities dataset 
funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.   The purpose of the Political Instability Task Force, 
to which this dataset belongs, is to describe 
the deliberate killing of non-combatant civilians in the context of a wider political 
conflict. This data collection project, which is still ongoing, is intended to advance efforts 
to understand and anticipate atrocities, i.e., the deliberate use of lethal violence against 
non-combatant civilians by actors engaged in a wider political or military conflict.21   
 
Pursuant to this purpose, noncombatant civilian is defined as follows: 
…any unarmed individual who is not a member of a professional or guerrilla military 
group and who does not actively participate in hostilities by intending to cause physical 
harm to enemy personnel or property.22  
 
The dataset also includes targeting of the following types of people in its tally of noncombatant 
civilian deaths: 
…we include as ‘non-combatants’ individuals who may be combatants in a different 
context, but who at the time they were killed were unarmed and unable to defend 
themselves. This would include, for example, members of guerrilla groups who had come 
into refugee camps unarmed in order to get food or medical care, or off-duty police eating 
at a pizza stand.23 
 
These individuals may not be considered civilians protected by IHL.  For instance, depending on 
what position they held in the guerilla forces, guerillas could be permissibly targeted even if they 
were unarmed and unable to defend themselves (see Chapter 5).  In other words, both datasets 
include in their count of protected civilians those whom IHL would deem as permissible targets.   
                                                 
21 Kansas Event Data System. 2010.  http://web.ku.edu/~keds/data.dir/atrocities.html (March 16, 2010). 
22 Kansas Event Data System. 2010. “Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection 
Codebook Version 1.0B2.” 3.  http://web.ku.edu/~keds/data.dir/atrocities.html. ( March 16, 2010). 
23 Kansas Event Data System. 2010. “Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection 
Codebook Version 1.0B2.” 4.  http://web.ku.edu/~keds/data.dir/atrocities.html. ( March 16, 2010). 
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The matter of multiple interpretations of permissible targets is problematic enough if it is 
limited to proponents of the civilian immunity norm like the practitioners and researchers 
discussed above.  The problem becomes more complicated when differences occur between 
norm proponents and belligerents, especially when belligerents claim they abide by the 
distinction principle at a cost to them.   
These observations hint that where impermissible civilian targeting occurs, there may be 
an absence of intersubjectivity on who is considered a permissible civilian target.  The historical 
analysis conducted in this study determined whether this lack of intersubjectivity in the 
distinction principle is solely a feature of the current civilian protection regime or present in 
previous attempts to protect certain groups from the blight of armed conflict.   It explores these 
protective efforts in legal environments pertinent to the former belligerents participating in this 
study (those who fought in conflicts on the African continent), namely European, Islamic and 
pre-colonial African legal traditions, as well as through the IHL codification process.  This 
investigation reveals that various understandings of what constitutes permissible targets 
coexisted at any given time and place.  In other words, while intersubjectivity existed on the 
obligation among belligerents to distinguish between permissible and impermissible targets, 
there never existed intersubjectivity on who constituted a permissible target, even after the 
codification of the distinction principle in the 1977 APs.   
The analysis of the interview data demonstrates that this lack of intersubjectivity is not 
simply a relic of the past; it continues to plague the civilian protection regime.  It does so in a 
manner that belies explanations rooted in a particular actor or conflict. This is because the data 
show that the distinction principle manifests in various forms today, differing within groups of 
relevant actors (IHL experts and former belligerents) and between them.   
 12 
 
These findings mirror what the historical analysis of the distinction principle reveals.  
Relevant actors generally agree that some form of the distinction principle must regulate armed 
conflict.  However, they do not always agree on how that distinction should be conducted.  
Belligerent narratives indicate a willingness to comply with the distinction principle, but their 
internalization of that obligation differs from norm proponents, like the IHL experts included in 
this study. 
This study’s findings hold implications for our understanding of violations of the civilian 
immunity norm in particular, and norms more generally.  By arguing that central actors do not 
commonly understand the civilian immunity norm’s obligations, this study questions a 
fundamental assumption in the relevant literature’s explanations of its violations.  If the civilian 
immunity norm lacks intersubjectivity, so that multiple interpretations of compliance and 
violation exist, how do we determine when it (or any ambiguous norm) has been violated?   The 
lack of intersubjectivity evidenced here suggests that actors do not always violate norms in line 
with some of the literature’s dominant explanations: to further some material interest or because 
of ignorance of normative obligations.  Sometimes, norm violations occur because actors, 
operating in an ambiguous normative environment, formulate their own understanding of the 
norm’s requirements.  These interpretations may differ from those enforcing the norm, causing 
the appearance of norm violation.  Consequently, this study’s findings draw attention to the 
differential power capacities of the actors involved not only in norm development but also in 
norm implementation.  The raising of such issues also offers new possibilities for policymakers 
interested in blazing new ground in civilian protection. 
The subsequent chapters discuss these issues at length.  Chapter 2 explains how the 
literature on international norms and civilian targeting offer insightful inquiries into these 
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violations of IHL, yet overlooks the utility of examining whether a lack of intersubjecivity can 
explain these very violations.  Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this research project.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are the analytical chapters.  Chapter 4 explores how the concept of 
permissible targets was treated in various parts of the world prior to IHL codification, while 
Chapter 5 picks up on this discussion during the codification process. They show that actors were 
never able to consistently define permissible targets.  Chapter 6 delves into how former 
belligerents and IHL experts currently understand the concept of permissible civilian target.  
Chapter 7 concludes this discussion by contemplating the wider implications of this issue and 
suggests some avenues for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2: NORMS AND CIVILIAN DEATHS 
 
War by definition consists of killing, of deliberately going out and shedding the blood of 
one’s fellow creatures.  Now shedding blood and killing are activities which no society- 
not even a society of animals- can tolerate unless they are carefully circumscribed by 
rules that define what is, and is not allowed…  ~Glen Gray24 
 
This chapter reveals that neither the extant literature on deliberate civilian targeting nor the 
broader literature on international norms fully appreciates the consequences of an absence of 
shared understandings of permissible civilian targets on violations of the civilian immunity 
norm.  The norm diffusion literature helpfully explains the norm dissemination process but does 
not fully account for differing understandings of a norm’s application in spite of this process.  
The norm violation literature claims norm violations occur because actors adhere to the logic of 
consequences: material interests drive actors who are individualist in orientation, and norms are 
valuable to the extent they support or enable action in pursuit of these interests.  Lack of 
intersubjectivity is less of an issue because these theories assume that power (domestic or 
international) determines political behavior in the international realm.25  The norm contestation 
does provide a theoretical avenue for examining the nature of intersubjectivity and norm 
violations, but scholars have yet to employ this framework within the context of deliberate 
civilian targeting.   
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Fresard, Jean-Jacques. 2004. The Roots of Behavior in War: A Survey of the Literature. Geneva: ICRC, 23-24. 
25 Mearsheimer, John.1995. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-
Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 375; March, James G. and Johan 
P. Olsen. 1998. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52:4; 
Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Schweller, 
Randall L. and David Preiss.1997. “A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 4; Thompson, Kenneth W.1980. Morality and Foreign Policy, Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press. 
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EXPLAINING NORM COMPLIANCE- LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES AND LOGIC OF 
APPROPRIATENESS 
 
International relations theories explaining norm compliance fall into several camps.  The two 
predominant ones are: those that focus on instrumental rationality (where the logic of 
consequences motivates actors) and those focusing on value rationality (where the logic of 
appropriateness motivates actors).26  Theories of instrumental rationality argue that rational, 
cost-benefit calculations (long term or short term) drive actor behavior, and are individualist in 
orientation.27  Theories of instrumental rationality do not deny the contribution of norms; 
however, this recognition is often limited to their ability to support or enable utilitarian 
motivations.28   
Constructivism, the study of social relations,29 follows the logic of appropriateness.  For 
theories that emphasize value rationality, ideas (and norms) “play an autonomous or substantive 
role in explaining outcomes” because actors are more socially conscious than rationalists 
                                                 
26 Tannenwald, Nina.2005. “Ideas and Explanations: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda,” Journal of Cold War 
Studies 7:2, 17-18; See also March and Olsen (1998) for further explanation of the two logics. 
27Mearsheimer, John (1995:375); March and Olsen (1998); Gilpin (1981); Schweller and Preiss (1997); Thompson 
(1980); Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World 
Politics 30:2, 171; Schelling, Thomas C.1980. The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 4; 
Snidal, Duncan. 2003. “Rational Choice and International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth 
A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage. 
28 Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1989. Rules, Norms and Decision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 61; Krasner, 
Stephen D.1982. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” International Organization 36:2, 191-192; Abbot, 
Kenneth W.1999. “International Relations Theory, International Law and the Regime Governing Atrocities in 
Internal Conflicts,” The American Journal of International Law, 93:2, 365-366; Rudolph, Christopher.2001. 
“Constructing an Atrocities Regime:  The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals,” International Organizations 55:3, 657; 
Tarzi, Shah M.1998. “The Role of Norms, Principles and Regimes in World Affairs,” Journal on World Peace 15:4; 
Cardenas, Sonia.2004. “Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State 
Behavior,” International Studies Review 6, 219-220.   
29 Onuf, Nicholas.1989. “Constructivism: A User’s Manuel,” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, andPaul 
Kowert (eds)., International Relations in a Constructed World, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
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claim.30 They do so when they are able to explain behavior that does not conform to the logic of 
consequences; that is, norms are “responsible for producing effects.”31  In other words, the logic 
of appropriateness can explain norm compliance in cases where the logic of consequences would 
predict otherwise.  Actors comply with norms  
for many reasons, among them being that norms define what and who they are, what they 
want, and how they view international politics.  Compliance is therefore seen not only in 
terms of narrowly defined incentives but also in terms of shared normative 
understandings that provide matrices of meaning for national or supranational cultures.32 
 
As such, actor preferences are endogenously derived.33   In the words of Alexander Wendt, 
“[a]ctors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social 
context….”34 
One mechanism for ensuring norm compliance via the logic of appropriateness is through 
the diffusion of norms. Norm diffusion explains how “similar action by dissimilar actors in the 
absence of constraint” occurs.35  In doing so, its explanations often, although not exclusively, 
encompass states as units of analysis and the social structures in which these units are embedded 
(such as the international system).36  In explaining “similar action by dissimilar actors,” norm 
diffusion particularly focuses on the “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and 
                                                 
30 Tannenwald (2005:18); Abbott (1999),  See also Wendt, Alexander.1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: 
The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46; Rudolph (2001), 658; Checkel, Jeffrey 
T.1998. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations,” World Politics 50:2; Bjorkdahl, Annika.2002. “Norms 
in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections,” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 15:, 9; Legro, Jeffrey W.1997. “Which Norms Matter?  Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism,” 
International Organization 51:1; Ruggie, John Gerard.1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52:4; Fierke, Karin M. and 
Knud Erik Jorgensen (eds.).2001. Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, Armonk:  M. E. 
Sharpe. 
31 Yee, Albert, S.1996. “The Causal Effect of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization 50:1, 70. 
32 Thomas, Ward. 2001. Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 17. 
33 Pulkowski, Dirk. 2006. “Testing Compliance Theories: Towards US Obedience of International Law in the Avena 
Case,” Leiden Journal of International Law 19, 518. 
34 Wendt (1992:397-98). 
35 Finnemore, Martha.1996. National Interests in International Society, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 6. 
36 True, Jacqui and Michael Minstrom.2001. “Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender 
Mainstreaming,” International Studies Quarterly 45, 33. 
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information from one region or population to another” including principles, norms and rules.37  
According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, who elucidate the diffusion mechanism as 
it relates to norms, once a critical mass of actors adopts a new norm and become norm leaders, 
these leaders diffuse the norm by socializing other actors to become followers, a process known 
as norm cascade.38  Socialization is “the process of inducting individuals [or states] into the 
norms and rules of a given community.”39    This socialization is usually done by states, 
networks of norm entrepreneurs or international organizations.40  Generally, for norm cascade to 
occur, the norm has to be institutionalized in specific rules and international organizations.41  
Institutionalization correlates with norm cascade by specifying exactly what the norm is and 
what constitutes its violation.42    
  The aim of socialization via norm diffusion is to ensure compliance with the norm.43  It 
instructs actors on what their obligations are and how to comply with them, in the hopes that the 
obligations become ingrained, “taken for granted.”44  Constructivists argue that through this 
socialization process, state identity and interests are shaped to align with the norm being 
                                                 
37 Checkel, Jeffrey T.1999. “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International 
Studies Quarterly 43, 85.  
38 Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink.1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52:4, 895. 
39 Hooghe, Liesbet.2005. “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A 
Case Study of the European Commission,” International Organization 59, 865. 
40 Finnemore And Sikkink (1998:901); See also Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, 
(eds.).2002. Restructuring World Politics:Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
41 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:900). 
42 Id at 895. 
43 Compliance occurs “when the actual behavior of a given subject conforms to prescribed behavior…” Young 
(1979). 
44 Johnston, Iain.2001. “Treating Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly 45:4,  494 
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diffused.45    Early on, Hedley Bull identified the importance of the shared norms and beliefs of 
international society particularly in the case of compliance with international law.46  
Constructivists acknowledge that this international socialization occurs via both coercion 
and persuasion.47  Coercive socialization follows the logic of rationalist explanations for norm 
compliance, except that for constructivists, coercion takes the shape of social sanctioning.48  
Persuasive mechanisms of socialization include discourse conferring international legitimacy and 
enhancing self-esteem.49     
Regulation (effective or ineffective) of international relations, as well as the production 
of identity, falls on the shoulders of international law.50  In the case of legal norms, “compliance 
with norms is significantly shaped by our values, among which deference to ‘the law’ is one of 
the most important.”51  In the realm of international law, compliance can be divided into six 
smaller bins that examine: problem structure, solution structure, solution process, norms, 
domestic linkages and international structure.52   The mechanism driving compliance via the 
logic of appropriateness is intersubjectivity and is discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
45 Checkel, Jeffrey T.2001. “Why Comply?  Social Learning and European Identity Change,” International 
Organization 55:3, 561. 
46 Simmons, Beth A.1998. “Compliance with International Agreements,” Annual Review of Political Science 1, 85. 
47 Landolt, Laura K.2004. “(Mis)Constructing the Third World? Constructivist Analysis of Norm Diffusion,” Third 
World Quarterly 25:3, 584. 
48 Checkel (2001:560). 
49 Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink.1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Thomas, Daniel.2001. The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human 
Rights, and the Demise of Communism, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Risse, Thomas.2000. “Let’s Argue! 
Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54; Ron, James.1997. “Varying Methods of 
State Violence,” International Organization 51:2, 278-279; Reus-Smit, Christian.2001. “Human Rights and the 
Social Construction of Sovereignty,” Review of International Studies 27. 
50 Kinsella (2005:164). 
51 Kratochwil (1989:64). 
52 Because the matter is beyond the scope of inquiry here, I will not elaborate on these concepts.  For a more 
thorough examination of these concepts, please see Raustiala, Kal and Anne-Marie Slaughter.2003. “International 
Law, International Relations and Compliance,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risee and Beth A. Simmons (eds), 
Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 545-548. 
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Intersubjectivity 
Since their adoption, the Additional Protocols I and II (APs) to the Geneva Conventions 
have become an integral part of international humanitarian law (IHL).  IHL can be considered an 
international regime.  According to the constructivist literature, international regimes are 
“principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue area.”53  The concept of intersubjectivity captures this convergence.  
Intersubjectivity denotes “shared understandings of desirable and acceptable behavior” 
(emphasis added).54  These shared understandings “provide people with reasons why things are 
the way they are and indications as to how they should use their material abilities and power.”55  
Intersubjectivity is based on a perception that although “each of us thinks his own thoughts; our 
concepts we share with our fellow men.”56  The key concept in intersubjectivity, and hence 
international regimes, is the idea that actors involved know and accept similar conceptions of 
appropriate courses of action to take in a given situation.  This is a crucial element for socially 
oriented theories like constructivism.  Even among rationalist theories which are more 
individually oriented and emphasize instrumental rationality, the notion of shared understandings 
plays a subtle and less acknowledged role in accounting for international behavior. Peter J. 
Katzenstein explains that according to rationalists: “…behavior is related to the constraining 
conditions in which these actors, with their assumed interests, find themselves” (emphasis 
added).57  Among rationalists, intersubjectivity takes the form of collective understandings that 
interest driven action is expected. 
                                                 
53 Krasner (1982:185). 
54 Kratochwil and Ruggie (1996). 
55 Adler (1997). 
56 Toulmin (1972) 
57 Katzenstein, Peter J.1996. “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in Peter J. Katzentesin 
(ed.),  The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 14. 
 20 
 
Regime Components  
As mentioned earlier, the component elements of international regimes are principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Principles are “beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude.”58  According to Stephen D. Krasner, norms are “standards of behavior defined in 
terms of rights and obligations.”59  Principles and norms make up the foundation of international 
regimes; they distinguish one regime from another.60  Norms exert a variety of effects on actors, 
including regulative and constitutive effects.61  Norms exert regulative effects by providing 
actors guidance on how to act in a given situation.62  Constitutive effects occur when “ideational 
structures [like norms] construct actor interests and identities rather than merely constrain 
behavior.”63  Constitutive effects are different from identities because whereas identities are 
“accounts of actors themselves,” constitutive effects inform actors on how to see others.64  A 
difference between norms and principles is that norms contain a behavioral component that is a 
manifestation of underlying principles. Therefore, behavior attributed to norms implicitly 
references the principles buttressing them.  As Ronald Jepperson, et al, state: “… norms establish 
expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these 
particular actors will behave.”65 Rules are defined as “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
                                                 
58 Krasner (1982:186).  
59 Id. 
60 Id at 188. 
61 Tannenwald, Nina.1999. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” 
International Organization 53:3, 437. 
62 Carpenter (2006). 
63 Tannenwald (2005:19): see also Wendt, Alexander.1999.  Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  The differences between regulative and constitutive effects correspond to the divide in 
constructivist literature between a compliance approach and a societal approach (Wiener, Antje.2003. 
“Constructivism: the Limits of Bridging Gaps,” Journal of International Relations and Development 6:3, 252, 253). 
64 Kowert, Paul and Jeffrey Legro.1996. “Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Peter 
Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of National Security, New York: Cambridge University Press, 453. 
65 Jepperson, Ronald, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein.1996. “Norms, Identity and Culture in National 
Security,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of National Security, New York: Cambridge University Press, 54 
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action.”66  While norms may be general collective understandings of appropriate behavior, rules 
inform actors more specifically of what is required of them to conform to these generalized 
understandings and the principles from which they derive.   
The strength of constructivist arguments depends on the shared understandings of 
appropriate behavior.  It is how constructivists are able to explain compliance with a regime like 
IHL when rationalist predictions fall by the wayside. Intersubjectivity lies at the core of each 
regime component and imbues them with meaning.  As stated earlier, intersubjectivity represents 
shared understandings of appropriate behavior.  If there is contestation over what is considered 
appropriate behavior, a regime can become ineffective. 
With regard to the civilian protection regime, the intentional targeting of civilians is 
important to both policymakers and scholars.  It is important for policymakers because it calls 
into question their abilities to design effective policies to curb such noncompliance.  It is also 
important to scholars because these acts cast doubts on arguments made by those who claim the 
significance of norms in explaining behavior.    Yet, despite a history of lack of intersubjectivity, 
as revealed by Chapters 4 and 5, scholars of the civilian immunity norm and norms generally fail 
to adequately incorporate this factor into theories of norm violation.  The following sections 
discuss how the literature on the violations of the civilian immunity norm treats the distinction 
principle as if it contains intersubjectivity and is uncontested.  A subsequent section reveals that 
the broader norms literature also fails to thoroughly investigate intersubjectivity’s role in norm 
violation.  But to appreciate the gravity of the questions presented in this study, a brief discussion 
of the civilian experience during armed conflict since the passage of the APs (which codified the 
distinction principle for the first time in international law67) is presented first.    
                                                 
66 Wiener (2003:253).   
67 Kinsella, Helen M.2006. “Gendering Grotius: Sex and Sex Difference in the Laws of War,” Political Theory 34:2  
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VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN IMMUNITY NORM 
 
Blood flowed down the aisles of churches where many sought refuge; five priests and 
twelve women hiding out in a Jesuit center were slaughtered.  A Red Cross ambulance 
was stopped at a check-point, the six wounded patients dragged out and bayoneted to 
death.  Toddlers lay sliced in half, and mother with babies strapped to their backs 
sprawled dead on the streets of Kigali.  The fighting was hand to hand, intimate and 
unspeakable, a kind of bloodlust that left those who managed to escape it hollow-eyed 
and mute.68 
 
The shooting started at about 4:00 p.m., but we were surrounded and could not escape. 
They [Serb troops] finally entered the village at 8:00 p.m. and immediately began setting 
houses on fire, looking for men and executing them. When they got to our house, they 
ordered us to come out with hands raised above our heads, including the children. There 
were four men among us, and they shot them in front of us. We were screaming, and the 
children cried as we were forced to walk on. I saw another six men killed nearby.69 
 
The driver saw that the road was blocked. He tried to reverse the van back. But then there 
were armed men, armed with assault rifles and dressed in green, came out from the 
roadside. They announced that all Buddhists would be killed, and started shooting at us 
one by one. My daughter was trying to lean to me when she was shot in the head.70 
 
 
Civilians in Armed Conflict 
The plight of civilians during armed conflict tells a story marked by horror, pain and 
death.  In a span of nine months, 3 million Bangladeshis met their end by Pakistani death squads 
during the 1971 civil war; 7000 were killed in one night.71   It is estimated that 95 percent of 
                                                 
68 Rudolph (2001:655). 
69 Gendercide Watch. “Case Study: Bosnia-Herzegovina” http://www.gendercide.org/case_bosnia.html, last 
accessed 3/1/08 
70 Human Rights Watch.  “No One is Safe: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border 
Provinces,” http://hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0807/, last accessed on 8/8/07. 
71 Gendercide Watch. “Case Study: Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971,” 
http://www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html, last accessed 3/1/08. 
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those killed in the conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia were civilians.72  While civilian 
protection forms the bedrock of IHL and the APs, actual war practices reveal a reality far 
removed from these legal commandments.  William Eckhardt laments that such acts “suggests 
that the average war over the past three centuries has not been very ‘just’ as far as the killing of 
unarmed civilians was concerned.”73   
The next section will discuss how the literature on violations of the civilian immunity 
norm insufficiently appreciates the link between a lack of intersubjectivity and deliberate civilian 
targeting.  Since this study considers the AP I definition of civilians as authoritative, discussion 
of the relevant literature will be limited to those studies covering conflicts that occurred after AP 
I went into legal effect. 
 
Utilitarian Reasons for Violations of the Civilian Immunity Norm 
Within the literature on civilians in armed conflict, many scholars attribute intentional 
civilian targeting to utilitarian reasons consistent with the logic of consequences.  AP I states that 
civilians who do not take a direct part in hostilities cannot be the target of an intentional attack.  
Intentional attack means “any action that is taken to deliberately kill civilians.”74  One such 
reason for deliberate attacks is belligerents’ inability to distinguish civilians from other 
belligerents.75  Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that in the Colombian civil war, many 
                                                 
72 Greitens, Eric.2001. “The Treatment of Children in Armed Conflict,” in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald 
(eds), War and Underdevelopment:The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict (Volume I), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 149. 
73 Eckhardt, William.1989. “Civilian Deaths in Wartime,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20:1, 91. 
74 Eck, Kristine and Lisa Hultman.2007. “One Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality 
Data,” Journal of Peace Research 44:2, 235. 
75 See for example Chesterman, Simon (ed).2001. Civilians in War, Lynne Rienner: Boulder; Human Rights Watch, 
“War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law,” http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/; 
Hammes, Thomas X.2004. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul: Zenith Press; Jones, 
Samuel Vincent.2006. “Has Conduct in Iraq Confirmed the Moral Inadequacy of International Humanitarian Law?  
 24 
 
civilians are killed because belligerents on all sides claim they cannot distinguish between 
civilians and belligerents due to the nature of the conflict blurring the line between these two 
groups.76    In criticizing Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon during the 2006 war, HRW Executive 
Kenneth Roth said, 
Hezbollah fighters often didn’t carry their weapons in the open or regularly wear military 
uniforms, which made them a hard target to identify… But this doesn’t justify the IDF’s 
[Israeli Defense Force] failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and if in 
doubt to treat a person as a civilian, as the laws of war require.77   
 
HRW goes to say, 
Statements from Israeli government officials and military leaders suggest that, at the very 
least, the IDF has blurred the distinction between civilian and combatant, and is willing to 
strike at targets it considers even vaguely connected to the latter.  At worst, it considers 
all people in the area of hostilities open to attack.78 
 
These statements intimate that it is not so much that belligerents cannot distinguish civilians; it is 
that it is too costly in terms of time, limited resources and troop losses to comply with the 
distinction principle. Consequently, civilian deaths result because it is more cost effective for 
belligerents not to distinguish.   
Another utilitarian reason for violations of the distinction principle is belligerents’ 
attempts to undermine opponents’ sources of support.79  Targeting civilians can lend more 
weight to calls to end hostilities or persuade survivors to back the other side.  Benjamin 
                                                                                                                                                             
Examining the Confluence between Contract Theory and the Scope of Civilian Immunity During Armed Conflict,” 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 249. 
76 Human Rights Watch, “War Without Quarter: Colomba and International Humanitarian Law,” 
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/. 
77 Human Rights Watch, “ Israel/Lebanon: Israeil Indiscriminate Attacks Killed Most Civilians,” 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/06/isrlpa16781.htm, last accessed 2/25/08. 
78 Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon0806/2.htm#_Toc142299220, last accessed 2/25/08 
79 Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein.2006. “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” 
American Political Science Review 100; for a discussion on targeting the enemy populace in supreme emergencies 
see Walzer, Michael.2000. Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York:Basic 
Books and Kaufman, Frederik.2007. “Just War Theory and Killing the Innocent,” in Michael W. Brough, John W. 
Lango and Harry van der Linden (eds.), Rethinking the Just War Tradition, Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
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Valentino, et al, posit that government forces intentionally kill civilian backers of popularly 
supported guerillas insurgencies on a massive scale in order to eliminate such essential support.80   
For instance, preventing civilian support for rebels in their fight against the Sudanese 
government is an oft cited reason for deliberate civilian targeting in Darfur by government 
backed Janjaweed forces.81  Stathis Kalyvas found that the similar motivations drove Islamist 
guerilla groups to target civilians in Algeria during the 1990s.82  The objective of undermining 
an opponent’s source of support is also commonly attributed as one reason for terrorists’ modus 
operandi of intentionally killing civilians.83  
Which regime type is more likely to participate in intentional civilian targeting for 
utilitarian reasons is contested.  Alexander B. Downes argues that the susceptibility of 
democratic institutions and leaders to public opinion makes them prone to targeting civilians to 
quicken the termination of hostilities in.  This is done in order to prevent heavy losses of their 
own troops in armed conflict.84  This was the reason for France’s targeting of Algerian civilians 
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during its conflict with Algeria.85  However, Barbara Harff and R.J. Rummel independently 
found that democracies are less prone to deliberately targeting civilians.86 
Finally, civilians are intentionally targeted as a means of securing credibility.87    
According to rebel fighters in Sierra Leone, deliberately targeting civilians is “’the best way to 
be taken seriously’ by the UN and other (wealthy) international agencies willing to contribute 
resources to ending such practices.”88  This attitude is a reaction to the efforts of humanitarian 
organizations to encourage groups to stop attacking civilians.89  Michael J. Boyle finds such 
signaling also explains the deliberate killing of civilians in Iraq as well: 
These three logics of bargaining, fear, and of denial interact to shape the patterns of 
 violence against civilians in Iraq, creating a vicious cycle which continually leaves 
 civilians subject to atrocities and treats them as pawns in a complex bargaining game.90       
 
While these studies have made great strides in our understanding of the reasons for 
violations of the distinction principle, they share in common the assumption of intersubjectivity 
on permissible civilian targets.  None of the examples discussed here question whether a 
common understanding of who is a permissible civilian target exists, or whether the absence of 
such an understanding contributes to seemingly deliberate civilian targeting.  Such silence 
suggests an assumption that whether or not belligerents share the international community’s 
definition of permissible civilian targets is not a contributory factor to the violation of the 
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distinction principle.  Instead, the causes for this willful targeting are placed elsewhere (i.e. the 
variety of utilitarian reasons presented here).  For example, Valentino, et al, institute their own 
understanding of “noncombatant” in determining the number of impermissible targets killed.91  
Yet, this is the definition of civilian (or noncombatant, as it were) as understood by Valentino 
and his co-authors; how belligerents define the term and how their (mis)understanding of it 
results in deliberately civilian targeting is not addressed.  Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. 
Weinstein, in their section titled “Theories of Civilian Abuse,” cite the conditions associated 
with either cooperative or coercive (and at times, lethal) extractive methods governing 
combatant-civilian relations as reasons for deliberate civilian targeting.92  Again, how 
belligerents understand permissible civilian targets is not included in this discussion.  Downes, 
who admittedly uses civilian and noncombatant interchangeably, articulates his bewilderment 
that “civilian victimization”93 occurs despite the fact that global public opinion condemns such 
practices and the widespread belief that doing so is ineffective.94  Rather than exploring the 
possibility that varying definitions of permissible civilian targets may be the culprit, he attributes 
a state’s desperation to win protracted conflicts and territorial ambitions as explanations for 
civilian victimization. This is in spite of the fact that Downes admits to the difficulty in 
distinguishing between, in his words, civilians and combatants.95  
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Differing Methods of Interpretation of Direct Participation 
“If you are holding a gun, you can no longer be a civilian” (former member of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo military)96 
 
“Those may have watched as the explosive device was planted along the road and did not give 
warning…That collusion makes them as guilty as the ones who planted the bomb” 97  
 
In fact, the literature on the deliberate targeting of civilians does implicitly recognize 
ambiguity on who is considered a permissible civilian target.  For example, legal scholar Ingrid 
Detter de Lupus declares, “it is really only in peacetime that a clear distinction exists between 
civilian and military forces.”98  The ambiguity results from the vagueness of the phrase “direct 
participation in hostilities” generating multiple interpretations of its meaning, as the above 
quotes imply.  This becomes evident when an examination of the literature yields different ways 
to determine direct participation.  The purpose of many of these works is to guide or identify 
interpretations of this key but imprecise phrase for compliance purposes.  Codified IHL offers no 
further guidance on what constitutes direct participation in hostilities.  Consequently, a plethora 
of articulations of how direct participation can and has been determined is found within the 
relevant literature.  These interpretations can be grouped into several categories; this study 
focuses on three: guilt/innocence, monist categorizations and specific acts.   
The guilt/innocence paradigm of direct participation incorporates essentially subjective 
moral determinations of the distinction principle.  This method of distinction commands those 
                                                 
96 Personal Interviews (Summer 2005). 
97 The quote refers to the killing of Iraqi civilians by U.S. Marines in Haditha Time Magazine, June 2006. 
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deemed “innocent” to be spared; those who are guilty can be permissively targeted.99  Anthony 
E. Hartle explains this manner of distinction:  
In most cases people who are not engaged in or guilty of morally or legally indefensible 
activities would satisfy the condition of innocence.  That condition would cover most 
people in the category we frequently use when we refer to noncombatants.100   
 
Based on this dichotomy, Jenny Teichman enumerates those historically considered innocent:  
 
…rulers of states engaged in just wars; soldiers fighting in just wars- that is, those 
fighting on the morally right side; rulers who after serious deliberation and after taking 
counsel from wise men come to the sincere, though false, belief that their cause is just; 
ordinary soldiers on the morally wrong side who are not close to government and so 
cannot know that their rulers are in the wrong; children…; women (unless they have 
power in the state or have committed crimes); old men (with the same proviso); and all 
harmless unarmed folk such as peasants, clerics, and literary men.101 
 
A second interpretation of direct participation is based on monist classifications.102  Here, 
identity is reduced to mere membership in a particular category which is then effectively treated 
synonymously with direct participation.103  These reductionist classifications include gender, 
age, religion, ethnicity and other group membership.  According to Laura Sjoberg, a gendered 
interpretation “requires men to be combatants and women to be passive victims.”104  This may 
be a reason why males between the ages of 10-34 were targeted twice as much as women in 
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Cambodia from 1975-1980.105  Igor Primoratz’s argument that if a moral interpretation of 
“innocent” were used as a method of distinction, then the number of people protected by the 
civilian immunity norm would shrink to “only children… and the aged and infirm…” because 
these groups “would be the truly innocent of the war,” reflects one type of age-based 
distinction.106  While lambasting U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq, Sari Nusseibeh provides 
another illustration of a gender and age bias in the impermissible civilian target conception:   
…the enormous human cost of civilian casualties still being paid by Iraqi women and 
children… as a result of the continued embargo against Iraq is yet another mockery of the 
U.S. moral claims, and clearly violates the just war dictum against civilian casualties.107  
 
This use of sex and age as cognitive shortcuts helps to explain the sparing of women and 
children while men are categorically considered permissible targets.108  Monist distinctions also 
explain the deliberate killing of Muslim civilians in Bosnia; the deliberate killing of Hema, 
Lendu and Ngiti civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and the deliberate killing 
of civilians during genocides (as defined by the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide109) that occur during armed conflict.110  In such cases “a 
critical part of a broader political war aim has often been the intention to eradicate a people or 
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reduce them to such a degree that they will never again pose a significant threat” (emphasis 
added).111  
A third interpretation of direct participation focuses on specific acts committed by the 
actor in question.  Conventionally, civilians engaging in acts that threaten belligerents are 
considered to directly participate and hence, are permissible targets.112  However, scholars 
enumerate different specific acts which are considered examples of direct participation.  This 
may be partially due to the fact the “merging of the ‘home’ and the ‘front’ into one makes any 
easy distinction between combatant and civilian difficult...”113  Consequently, direct participation 
includes acts in which the links of causality are short to those with more extended links.  A litany 
of acts some scholars consider as direct participation would include: voluntarily acting as a 
human shield114; taking up arms115; gathering intelligence116; working on a military base during 
armed conflict on “mission-essential” tasks117; approaching a military checkpoint in a fast 
moving vehicle118; contributing to the opponent’s “war effort” as a munitions worker, farmer or 
                                                 
111 Slim, Hugo.2008.  Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 41 
112 Slim (2003) at 486. 
113 Kinsella (2005) at 177. 
114 Schmitt, Michael N..Summer 2005. “War, Technology and International Humanitarian Law,” Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Occasional Paper Series 4, 37-38. 
115 Kaufman, Whitley.2003. “What is the Scope of Civilian Immunity in Wartime?,” Journal of Military Ethics 2:3, 
187 (FN2); see also Downes (2006) at 157. 
116 McDonald, Avril. April 2004. “The Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and the Principles of 
Distinction and Protection from the Increased Participation of Civilians in Hostilities,” 
http://www.wihl.nl/index.asp?c_nr=1&sub_categorie=78&ssc_nr=379&anker=Databases, last accessed 4/2/2008. 
117 Schmitt, Michael N.1999. “The Principle of Discrimination in the 21st Century,” 2 Yale H.R. & Dev. L. J. 143, 
150. 
118 Carter, Phillip.2003. “Why the Recent Civilian Shootings in Karbala, While Tragic, Were Probably Lawful,” 
Findlaw’s Legal Commentary Journal, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20030405_carter.html, last 
accessed 3/24/2006; see also Kahl, Colin H.2007. “In the Crossfire or Crosshairs?  Norms, Civilian Casualties and 
U.S. Conduct in Iraq,” International Security 32:1. 
 32 
 
allegiant parent of a belligerent119; and preventing one’s government from going on the war 
path.120  
The review of these studies reveals that a myriad of interpretations of direct participation, 
and consequently permissible civilian targets, exists.  Yet, the possibility that violations of the 
civilian immunity norm occur as a result of conforming to one of these many interpretations as 
opposed to another has not adequately been raised.  For example, Sjoberg states that applying the 
distinction principle based on a guilt/innocence rubric is problematic because  
the distinction between those who are ‘guilty’ of the enemy offense and those who are 
‘innocent’ is nowhere near as simple as it sounds.  There is substantial debate concerning 
the line between innocence and guilt in war-fighting, and the method by which that 
distinction is made.121   
 
But Sjoberg, like Downes, fails to capitalize on this insight as an avenue to explain seemingly 
deliberate civilian targeting and perhaps generates strategies to enhance the civilian immunity 
norm.  Instead, she contends that the current approach to civilian protection (i.e., who can be the 
intended target) be abandoned in favor of one that incorporates an empathetic lens supported by 
a feminist framework (i.e., who might get hit by targeting strategies).122 
It is premature to advocate abandonment of the current civilian protection regime as a 
means for more effective civilian protections.  Investing additional time on the question of who 
can be targeted can provide explanations for the tragedy that is the civilian experience during 
armed conflict.  For instance, what if the ICRC utilizes an interpretation of direct participation 
that differs from that used by belligerents?  A dilemma does not arise when the ICRC and 
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belligerents utilize similar conceptions of direct participation.  For instance, Vera Achvarina and 
Simon F. Reich demonstrate that the use of children as belligerents is a vastly underappreciated 
but incredibly grave problem in many current conflicts.123  Children who fight are considered as 
directly participating and are therefore permissible targets.124  Consequently, the ICRC 
acknowledges that child soldiers engaged in active hostilities “are recognized as combatants”125; 
their youthfulness alone will not protect them under these circumstances. 
However, what of instances where there is disagreement between the ICRC interpretation 
and belligerent interpretation of direct participation?  There are many gray areas that could 
generate disagreement on what it means to be directly participating in hostilities (and therefore, a 
permissible civilian target). This is particularly the case when it comes to which specific acts 
qualify as directly participating.  The current U.S. “War on Terror” is mired with these 
ambiguities.  For instance, in 2002 the CIA conducted an operation in Yemen in which an 
unmanned military drone fired upon a vehicle, killing six suspected terrorists.126 Would the CIA 
agents who operated the drone be considered directly participating?  Does direct participation 
include suspicion of terrorism (which itself is variously defined)?  While the United States would 
likely answer in the affirmative for the second question, the ICRC would likely not.127  This 
instance serves to demonstrate that ambiguity in what constitutes direct participation can yield 
conflicting interpretations of appropriate behavior.  In other words, the numerous methods of 
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distinction circulating in the literature and in practice may be an indicator of a systematic lack of 
intersubjectivity on what is a permissible civilian target.     
 
EXPLAINING NORM VIOLATIONS 
 
Unintentional Violations 
The general inattention to intersubjectivity in the literature on civilian targeting is 
reflected as well in the international relations literature on norms more broadly.  For instance, the 
norm diffusion literature fails to adequately take account of the role of lack of intersubjectivity 
on political behavior.  This theory explains norm violations as unintentional action by actors 
unaware of their normative obligations. As stated earlier, the international community often 
looks to the ICRC for promoting the international socialization of IHL through its interpretation 
and diffusion of it.   
Scholars widely agree that in carrying out its mandate, the ICRC “has played a 
fundamental role both in the evolution as well as enforcement of international humanitarian 
law.”128  Because states and nonstate actors give weight to what the ICRC says, how the ICRC 
interprets the ambiguities within IHL is of critical importance.  Placing the responsibility with 
one organization ensures that the norm diffused is similarly interpreted and executed among the 
various states.129    
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The Geneva Conventions mandate the ICRC to act as guardian of IHL.130  According to 
the ICRC, this includes dissemination of IHL to both armed state and non-state groups, including 
the APs, as well as monitoring the conduct of hostilities.131  One way the ICRC fulfills its 
mandate is through training seminars to teach states and belligerents what their obligations are 
under the APs during armed conflict, including the civilian immunity norm.132     
While the ICRC is responsible for the international socialization of the civilian immunity 
norm, states’ desire for approval from the international community partially compels them to 
participate in this international socialization.  This manifests in the form of announcements of 
their efforts to avoid civilian casualties or castigation of violators of the norm.133  However, 
violations of the civilian immunity, particularly the distinction principle, may be attributed to a 
lack of diffusion, as evidenced by a statement made by a former soldier in the DRC military 
about deliberate civilian targeting by rebel groups:  
… rebels, they don’t know rules. They didn’t go to school; they didn’t go to training.  
They just take people and train them how to use the gun… how to shoot only… [This is] 
the training they give these rebels… [They] don’t have that time to teach them134 
 
The diffusion literature is useful in explaining how “objects, processes, ideas and 
information” spread if one treats what is being diffused as monolithic.  Norm violations stem 
from lack of diffusion as reflected in the quote above. However, it is less useful in examining 
why differing interpretations of a norm exists even when the norm has been diffused; in other 
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words, why there is a lack of intersubjectivity.  This is unsurprising for two reasons.  First, as the 
above overview reveals, a norm diffusion analysis usually examines how a norm is propagated 
from its source and stops at the point in which it is accepted by a state.  How the diffusion 
process continues beyond the system level, how a state internalizes the norm (which is often the 
source of norm variation), is typically not included in the analysis.  Such an approach leaves little 
room for agency on behalf of the targets of norm diffusion.135 As a result, it is a less helpful 
explanatory tool in instances when the norm being disseminated generates various interpretations 
of compliance (as this study argues may be the case with the civilian immunity norm).    Second, 
norm diffusion is concerned with similar behavior among dissimilar states. Consequently, those 
norm diffusion studies that probe domestic level factors tend to focus on similarities in behavior 
(i.e., how states with different identities accepted the same norm), not their differences.136  Yet, it 
is the differences in behavior in light of diffusion that create an empirical puzzle.  These 
variations can mean the difference between norm compliance and norm noncompliance.  A 
second generation of studies in the constructivist literature recognizing this limitation has 
incorporated domestic level investigations of norm diffusion.137 
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Intentional Violations and Logic of Consequences 
The norm violation literature also fails to adequately take account of the role of lack of 
intersubjectivity on political behavior.  Norm violations occur “when actual behavior departs 
significantly from prescribed behavior.”138  As stated earlier, intersubjectivity does play 
somewhat of a role in rationalist theories because this paradigm expects actors to act on behalf of 
their interests.  This includes intentionally violating norms that conflict with the advancement of 
these interests.139  As Hans Morganthau stated, with particular reference to international law, 
governments “’are always anxious to shake off the restraining influence that international law 
might have upon their foreign policies, to use international law instead for the promotion of their 
national interests.’”140  Not only is it assumed that interests drive action, but the interests 
themselves are also assumed: power in its various manifestations.141 Variation in behavior is 
attributed to the pursuit (domestic or international) of power,142 not the lack of intersubjectivity, 
as demonstrated by the prior presentation of utilitarian reasons for deliberate civilian targeting.   
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Vaughn P. Shannon faults rationalist explanations for failing to reliably predict instances 
of norm violation or account for norm compliance in the face of a threat to interests.143  His 
critique of constructivism is that it presents more persuasive arguments for norm compliance 
than norm violation because of its focus on structure and obligatory action (logic of 
appropriateness).144  
Due to these limitations, Shannon offers a hybrid of constructivist and rationalist 
frameworks to explain norm violation.  Using a political psychology approach, Shannon argues 
that norm violation occurs when a conflict between interests and norm obligations erupts.145  The 
conflict reflects the hybrid nature of the model:  actors want to pursue their interests (rationalist 
model) but still comply with the norm (constructivist model).  However, because actors prioritize 
advancing their interests over meeting their normative obligations, they are forced to search for a 
socially acceptable way to violate the norm.146  This is a much easier task if the norm in question 
is ambiguous enough to allow them to interpret their desired action as norm consistent.147  The 
result is the use of “accounts” like apologies, denials, excuses, or justifications to explain this 
violation in a socially acceptable manner.148  The norm’s ambiguity allows violators to offer an 
interpretation that, at least marginally, fits within the parameters of the norm while 
simultaneously permitting them to pursue material interests.149   The interest- motivated 
                                                 
143 Shannon, Vaughn P.2000. “Norms are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm 
Violation,” International Studies Quarterly 44, 293. 
144 Shannon (2000) at 293. 
145 Id at 294. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Accounts are explanations for “’unanticipated or untoward behavior’  that can bring personal discomfort and 
disrupt the social order of an identity group by making conduct unpredictable and offenders untrustworthy.  Shannon 
defines apologies as recognition of “fault for an inappropriate act, leading to a plea for forgiveness.”  Denials 
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149 Id at 294. 
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interpretations generally do not conform to dominant interpretations of the norm.  These 
differences in interpretation signal a lack of intersubjectivity on the norm’s application.   
The model Shannon lays out is quite powerful in explaining norm violations by actors 
possessing a prior intent to violate ambiguous norms for utilitarian reasons.   Lack of 
intersubjectivity in Shannon’s model is opportunistic.  For example, Shannon explains that while 
the United States had been intending to violate the norm of nonintervention by invading Panama 
for quite some time, it had to wait until events emerged that could plausibly fall within the 
permissible exceptions to the norm of nonintervention (i.e., threats to national interests).  
Shannon’s case study demonstrates that the manipulation of intersubjectivity enables violations 
when material interests are threatened.  What differentiates Shannon’s model from a rationalist 
account of norm violation is the lip service norm violators pay to the norm while explaining 
deviant behavior.  This lip service connotes that norms do still matter, even when they are 
violated.150 For instance, the Bush Administration initially felt compelled, in the face of global 
and domestic outrage to its position that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Guantanamo 
Bay detainees, to argue that these detainees would be treated humanely in accordance with the 
spirit of the Conventions.151  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “’we plan, for the 
most part, to treat them in a manner reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to the 
extent that they are appropriate.’”152  
Yet what of situations in which transgressions from an ambiguous norm occur, not 
because actors intended to violate the norm for utilitarian reasons, but because they complied 
                                                 
150 Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986). 
151 Mills, Kurt.2005. “Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in 
Contemporary Conflict,” Global Governance 11,175.  To view the argument that these acts were patently 
noncompliance, see Paust, Jordan J. 2005. “Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law,” 43 
Columbia J. Transnat’l L. 811. 
152 Kinsella (2005) at 172. 
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with their interpretation of it?  In other words, an absence of intersubjectivity leads to acts 
governed by the logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of consequences.  This is different 
from Shannon’s explanation of norm violation because it is not material interests that produce 
the norm violation, but compliance with a version of the norm that differs from the norm 
proponent (which, for international norms is the international community or its designated 
representative, i.e., the ICRC).  In this case, compliance with this alternative interpretation may 
occur even when the pursuit of material interests would demand otherwise.  For example, 
medieval Christian and Islamic soldiers killed women and child noncombatants of different 
faiths for moral reasons, despite the material benefits these noncombatants could offer their own 
societies as slaves (see Chapter 4).  Here, a critical component of Shannon’s model of norm 
violation, the intent to violate for material interests at the outset, is missing.  So, while Shannon’s 
model cogently explains how lack of intersubjectivity on an ambiguous norm, produced by 
utilitarian motivations, leads to normative transgressions, it does not explain lack of 
intersubjectivity leading to behavior in contradiction to these interests.   
Shannon is not alone in overlooking this possible consequence of lack of 
intersubjectivity.  For example, in discussing the norm of humanitarian intervention, Luke 
Glanville explains U.S. unwillingness to label events in Rwanda as genocide because it felt that 
such a label carried an obligation to launch a humanitarian intervention.153  He states 
The reluctance to describe what was occurring in Rwanda as genocide points to the 
substance of the norm prescribing intervention. We can observe an awareness among 
administration officials that any portrayal of the situation creates expectations of an 
appropriate response. The administration believed that, if the Rwandan crisis was 
portrayed as genocide, there would be increased pressure to “prevent and punish” it, as 
they had undertaken to do as a contracting party to the Genocide Convention.154 
 
                                                 
153 Glanville, Luke.2006. “Rwanda Reconsidered: A Study of Norm Violation,” Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 24:2, 186. 
154 Glanville (2006) at 186. 
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One reason for U.S. reluctance to intervene in Rwanda was the absence of material 
interests.  Glanville offers the instructions given to the Defense Department’s Deputy-Secretary 
for African Affairs James Wood at the start of his term as evidence: 
 
Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it 
off the list. US national interest is not involved and we can’t put all these 
silly humanitarian issues on lists, like important problems like the Middle 
East, North Korea and so on. Just make it go away.155 
This absence of interest, coupled with the aftermath of Somalia, provided the impetus for the 
United States to deny genocide status to the horrific events in Rwanda, argues Glanville.156  
Since there was disagreement on what was happening on the ground in Rwanda, the United 
States tried to influence understanding of these events by employing the terminology of “acts of 
genocide” rather than “genocide.”157  The United States did this to prevent the invocation of 
humanitarian intervention it felt a classification of genocide compelled, despite the fact that 
many in the international community called it genocide.158  That way, the United States would 
not have to commit resources to an intervention contrary to its interests while at the same time, 
appearing not to violate the norm of humanitarian intervention.159  In doing so, Glanville writes, 
“Statesmen are often compelled to engage with the obligations prescribed by a norm in one way 
or another even when they choose to violate it.”160   
Intentional norm violation frameworks either do not include lack of intersubjectivity in 
their accounts of norm violation (rationalist theories) or result from lack of intersubjectivity 
spurred on by utilitarian needs (Shannon).  However, Shannon’s framework cannot explain 
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deviations from normatively expected behavior that contradicts these needs.  These observations 
of the extant literature on violations of the civilian immunity norm and the literature on norm 
diffusion and norm violation establish that the impact of ideational factors on actor behavior and 
lack of intersubjectivity have not been fully explored.161  
 
Norm Violations and Logic of Appropriateness 
An emerging literature on norm contestation takes intersubjectivity more seriously.   The 
extant contestation literature offers the most useful, if general, guidance if the query focuses on 
the nature of the intersubjectivity of a norm’s constitutive elements.  It is useful because, unlike 
the norm diffusion and violation frameworks, it acknowledges that norms operate in generalities 
which can lead to differing interpretations of compliance.162 
Rather than just focusing on behavior as a means to understanding how norms operate, 
the contestation framework also inquires into their social meaning.163   The contestation 
framework argues that norms derive their meaning from “historical and cultural 
circumstances.”164  A contestation framework posits that these different interpretations of 
permissible behavior may be motivated by non-material influences which are shaped by 
particular contexts.165  This differs from a norm diffusion framework which attributes variation 
in interpretation to lack of diffusion, or a norm violation framework which points a finger at 
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material interests.  Such an expanded approach is particularly beneficial when examining 
international legal language used in treaties codifying norms, such as the APs because,  
… treaty language…comes in varying degrees of specificity.  The broader and more 
general the language, the wider the ambit of permissible interpretations to which it gives 
rise.166   
 
Differing interpretations of what constitutes compliance with an ambiguous distinction 
principle can lead to variations in specific applications of the overarching norm which itself may 
be well accepted.167   This fluidity can create conflict within a norm because differing 
interpretations of compliance may not be congruent.168  Taken a step further, this incongruence, 
derived from the absence of intersubjectivity, can play a key role in the behavior observed.     
The discussion of Shannon’s framework for norm violation illustrates that lack of 
intersubjectivity can be the product of an intention to violate a norm.  So then, how can one 
determine that norm contestation is occurring, rather than norm violation in disguise?  I envision 
two elements in distinguishing norm contestation from other normative frameworks.  First, as 
already mentioned, norm contestation involves a lack of intersubjectivity.  Norm contesters 
possess a different understanding of appropriate behavior than norm proponents, a situation 
made more likely by ambiguous norms.   
But norm violators, cognizant of the norm proponent’s interpretation, may also claim to 
have such a differing opinion.  Thus lack of intersubjectivity is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for norm contestation.  The second element needed to differentiate norm contestation 
from norm violation is compliance with the alternative interpretation.  Constructivists argue that 
actors follow norms even if it is against their material interests to do so; this is the root of the 
                                                 
166 Chayes, Abraham and Antonia Handler Chayes.1995. “On Compliance,” International Organization 47:2, 189. 
167 See Hoffman (2004); Klotz, Audie.1995. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
168 Hoffman (2004) at 4. 
 44 
 
explanatory power of the logic of appropriateness and constructivism’s value-added to theories 
of international relations.  Consequently, the best way to differentiate norm contestation from 
norm violation is evidence of compliance with the alternative interpretation not necessarily 
congruent with material motivations.  Whereas norm violators may follow an alternative 
interpretation only to abandon it at the point it no longer furthers their material interests, norm 
contesters are more inclined to conform with that interpretation even if it undermines these very 
interests. 
In the case of civilian immunity norm violations, different interpretations of direct 
participation may have been influenced by the social context, in this case armed conflict, in 
which belligerents find themselves.  Variations in these interpretations correlate to the civilian 
immunity norm’s constitutive effects.  Alexander Wendt offers some illumination:   
…meanings depend on the practices, skills and tests that connect the community to the 
object represented in discourse… what counts as a lawyer or a state is equally not 
reducible to what is in people’s minds, but out there in public practices.169   
 
For example, Colin H. Kahl notes that U.S. troops have fired upon Iraqi civilians using cell 
phones shortly after a bomb blast because improvised explosive devices are often triggered by 
cell phones.170  In this instance, using a cell phone in the aftermath of a bomb blast is interpreted 
as direct participation.  The presence of non-state belligerents in non-international armed 
conflicts also influences the interpretation of the distinction principle.  The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia decided in the Tadic case that “‘membership in some form of 
resistance group’ in itself amounts to direct participation in hostilities” (emphasis added).171   
                                                 
169 Wendt (1999) at 176. 
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Ambiguous norms enable these differing social contexts to produce multiple 
interpretations of compliance.  This lack of specificity can diminish norm robustness and lead to 
norm violations.172  As Hugo Slim found, “ 
the extent of civilian suffering shows, this identity [civilian] is often genuinely difficult 
for enemies to accept within a war when they see the views and roles of some of the 
enemy population and perceive- quite rightly from one angle- that many civilians do have 
a very ambiguous identity in war. 173  
 
 
Emanuel Adler critiques existing constructivist research for inadequately showing “how 
enemies and military threats are socially constructed by both material and social facts.”174   
Therefore, research which probes these issues adds much value to normative explanations of 
violations of norms as well as improves the effectiveness of policies aimed at preventing such 
incidents. 
   
CIVILIAN CONTESTATION: A GOOD CASE STUDY 
 
Despite contestation’s potential utility in broadening our understanding of how norms operate in 
the international system, its emergent status means its methodological toolkit to capture 
contestation and substantive foci are incomplete.  This study aims to build up contestation’s 
repertoire in both areas by utilizing novel methodological approaches to the previously 
unexplored issue of deliberate civilian targeting.   
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Preliminary Evidence 
Patterns of civilian targeting constitute a helpful phenomenon with which to evaluate the 
possibility for contestation in explaining international norm violations. Exploratory research I 
conducted illustrates the difficulties described in using a norm violation framework to explain 
violations of the civilian immunity norm in the absence of intersubjectivity.  While some of the 
responses to why deliberate civilian deaths occurred conform to these frameworks, respondents 
also gave accounts that did not easily fit.  For example, several respondents attributed deliberate 
targeting because of support provided to opposition groups.   One respondent described victims 
dying at the hands of state forces because they kept supplies for rebels.175  In these cases, those 
killed were considered to be directly participating in hostilities, via their support, and therefore 
permissible civilian targets.  This version is broader than the more conventional understanding of 
direct participation as bearing weapons.176  What is interesting about these accounts is that these 
acts were considered as evidence of compliance with the distinction principle as determined by a 
particular reading of direct participation. 
Another example that does not fit neatly into the norm violation and diffusion 
frameworks reflects a gendered bias.177  Even though the AP language is sex neutral, instances of 
compliance with the distinction principle offered by respondents seemed to be dictated by a 
gendered interpretation of “civilian”.  Respondents used “guys,” “men,” and “he” exclusively in 
discussions of permissible targets while proudly retelling stories of saving women under perilous 
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conditions.178  Similar heroics involving male civilians were not recounted.  This observation 
implies the use of sex as a proxy for direct participation in contradiction to actual practices.   
These anecdotes run counter to the explanations offered in the existing norms literature 
for norm violations.  This difference relates to the constitutive and regulative effects norms exert 
described earlier.  Norms exert regulative effects by providing actors guidance on how to act in a 
given situation.179  Norm violation and diffusion analyses of normative transgressions generally 
center on regulative effects.  They seek to explain why actors diverge from collective 
expectations of appropriate behavior in a given situation.  Within the context of civilian 
immunity, this includes inquiries into why civilians are intentionally killed in armed conflict 
when IHL dictates otherwise.   The questions presented here center on a norm’s constitutive 
effects, “the actions that will cause others to recognize that identity and respond to it 
appropriately.”180  This study asks an important question, who is a permissible target among 
civilians, which needs to be answered prior to the above investigation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Wapiganapo tembo nyasi huumia. (Swahili)  
When elephants fight the grass gets hurt. (English)181 
 
The above quote reflects the notion that those least involved in armed conflict tend to be harmed 
by it.  The civilian immunity norm emerged to protect this group of people.  That belligerents 
continue to deliberately kill civilians, in light of nearly universal condemnation by global leaders 
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and public opinion, perplexes scholars and practitioners.  The fact that such acts persists is 
worrisome.  As Karma Nabulsi declares, “For those who seek to mitigate the effects of violent 
conflict, the primary difficulty is still how best to protect civilians.”182  Scholars and practitioners 
have studied the issue and tried to develop policy prescriptions to halt such actions, yet they 
continue.  This study seeks to bring to the table another angle, contestation, in which to analyze 
this empirical puzzle.  Specifically, this study asks whether the conception of permissible civilian 
target is contested.   While not advocating that contestation provides the sole answer, it provides 
a perspective that differs from those used previously.  In doing so, this study takes heed to Hugo 
Slim’s warning that “the civilian idea… can never be relied on as a given.”183  By supplementing 
previous research focused on the regulative effects of the civilian immunity norm with research 
on its constitutive effects, a more comprehensive understanding of such an important and 
complex matter will emerge with the hope of producing more effective prescriptions to end 
deliberate civilian targeting.  The next chapter discusses the outcome of a historical review of the 
civilian protection regime.  This review reveals how the ambiguity as discussed in this chapter in 
the constitution of permissible targets was inherent in efforts to restrict war conduct across time 
and space. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Perplexity is the beginning of knowledge~ Khalil Gibran 
This chapter will discuss the qualitative techniques used in this study, rooted within a 
constructivist paradigm.  One of the ways a constructivist analysis differs from a rationalist 
analysis is that it examines the way in which social facts are collectively understood.184  
Consequently, the primary purpose of this study was to determine whether intersubjectivity 
(collective understandings) on “permissible civilian targets,” a social fact, exists between civilian 
immunity norm proponents (international humanitarian law, IHL, experts) and norm 
implementers (former belligerents).  My strategy for investigating the existence of 
intersubjectivity was to analyze interview data collected from the two respondent groups.  In 
particular I scrutinized belligerent narratives which expressed espousal of the distinction 
principle and expressed a conceptualization of permissible civilian targets which differed from 
the distinction principle advocated by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).  
These particular belligerent narratives were important because they were used to determine 
which of the normative frameworks discussed in Chapter 2 could explain instances of differing 
interpretations of a belligerent’s obligations during armed conflict.  I also conducted a 
historiography to ascertain whether previous attempts to mitigate the ill effects of war possessed 
shared understandings on permissible targets. 
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INTERVIEWS 
Respondent Selection 
In this study, I interviewed two sets of respondents, former belligerents and IHL experts.  
I selected former belligerent respondents from those in residence at Dukwi Refugee Camp in 
northern Botswana.  There were several reasons why I decided to focus on African belligerents 
for this study and Dukwi as a site for field research.  Firstly, more actors engaged in one-sided 
violence,185 violence committed against civilians, in the African region than in other regions as 
depicted in the following figure produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program:  
 
 
Figure 3.1 One-sided actors by region, 1989-2007186 
                                                 
185 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines one-sided violence as “The use of armed force by the government of 
a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. Extrajudicial 
killings in custody are excluded.”  Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 2010/07/30) UCDP Database: 
www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University. 
186 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 2010/07/30) UCDP Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, 
Uppsala University. 
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Thus, it would be important for a study examining civilian deaths to situate itself where more of 
the actors who engage in these activities have been documented.  Additionally, Africa could 
arguably be considered a hard case for norm contestation based differences in interpretations of 
belligerent obligations because as Chapter 2 illustrates, a great deal of the discussion in the 
relevant literatures examining African conflicts emphasizes the utilitarian nature of such acts.  
These arguments conform to a norm violation framework.  Another reason why Africa might be 
a hard case for the norm contestation framework is the extent of inadequate infrastructure there 
to assist in the dissemination of IHL and the number of non-state armed groups in operation in 
African conflicts that do not have the resources to provide legal training for their fighters.  These 
factors give weight to the norm diffusion framework for explaining civilian targeting.    
I selected Dukwi to conduct my former belligerent interviews for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, it houses former state and non-state belligerents from both international and non-
international conflicts.  Consequently, conducting interviews in Dukwi offered me the 
convenience of providing in one location former belligerents from different conflicts where 
civilians have been intentionally killed.  In terms of which conflicts to include in this study, 
while some scholars would argue that treaty ratification indicates a states’ commitment to 
comply with treaties like Additional Protocol (AP) I and II,187 I do not limit myself to selecting 
belligerents from these states since, according to many legal scholars, both APs have acquired 
customary international law status.188  Consequently, all states and their populations are 
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beholden to the APs regardless of whether they ratified it.189  Furthermore as Chapter 4 
demonstrates, African norms for armed conflict historically required belligerents to engage in 
some form of distinction.  Thus, current African belligerents operate in an environment which 
endorsed the distinction principle independently of codified IHL.  For this particular study, I 
interviewed belligerents who fought for state and non-state armed forces in Angola, Zimbabwe, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Namibia (see Appendix V).  
In terms of selecting belligerent respondents, I employed snowball sampling as a means 
of securing interviewees through two refugees I recruited to assist me.  These were refugees I 
befriended during my last visit to the camp whom I knew possessed good reputations among 
refugees as well as camp stakeholders.  I purposely enlisted the help of well respected refugee 
assistants for several reasons.  First, I knew entry for me into the refugee community, particularly 
among former belligerents, would be difficult.  Many former belligerents resident in the camp 
fled persecution instigated by “sell outs,” people who provided intelligence to one of the armed 
parties to the conflict in their homelands.  Often times, these people were trusted members of the 
former belligerents’ network.  As a result of this violation of trust, former belligerents 
understandably viewed strangers, especially strangers asking sensitive questions, with a great 
deal of skepticism (see discussion below).  Consequently, I knew it would be difficult for me to 
secure interviews if I approached former belligerents directly.  Having a trusted member of the 
community serving as an intermediary greatly enhanced my chances of interviewing as many 
former belligerents as possible. 
Because of the air of mistrust surrounding strangers to the camp, I used well-reputed 
refugees to also ensure that my research purposes were accurately communicated.  It would be 
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relatively easy to misrepresent the nature of my study given the topic it addressed, thus 
jeopardizing data collection efforts.  Consequently, I strove to enlist credible members of the 
community to act as ambassadors for my project to that community. 
The reason the refugee community held these two particular refugees in high esteem was 
because they were very active members in civil society in the camp.  They served as mentors, 
coaches, and representatives to stakeholders in the camp.  As such, they were networked into the 
camp in such a way as to know who had fought in a conflict prior to arrival at the camp.  Many 
former belligerents would refuse to casually reveal this information for fear of deportation (often 
unwarranted).  Thus, my assistants would be able to offer me access to a larger pool of former 
belligerents than if I had attempted to recruit respondents on my own.   
To protect my belligerent respondents, I sought Institutional Review Board approval of 
the interview protocols to ensure that they comply with regulations protecting human subjects 
prior to conducting my interviews.  A second protective measure was to initially conduct 
interviews in a neutral location.   My residence while conducting exploratory research served 
such a purpose well because it was situated in a section of Dukwi set apart from refugee 
settlements and stakeholder offices.  I secured a similar residence for the use upon my return to 
conduct this field research.190  Additional protective measures included assigning a number to 
each respondent to avoid using their names and erasing the recorded interviews after 
transcription. 
IHL experts included ICRC delegates and IHL scholars who were willing to participate in 
this study.  I selected the ICRC because it is considered a norm proponent since it is responsible 
for IHL monitoring,191 as well as interpreting and diffusing IHL to belligerents.192  
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Consequently, IHL expert interviews enabled me to explore various norm frameworks.  With 
regard to ICRC interviews, my goal was to include the significant decision-makers for legal 
policy at ICRC headquarters.   I consider such informants most knowledgeable about the issue 
due to the position they hold.193  In the case of ICRC headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, the 
significant decision-makers for legal policy are the legal advisors.  I recruited ICRC respondents 
in Geneva by using a snowball sampling method through a contact in ICRC headquarters.   
 
Interview Protocols194 
 I pursued several objectives in my interviews.   The first objective entailed determining 
whether or not belligerents espoused some form of the distinction principle.  The purpose of this 
objective was to assess the presence of intersubjectivity with IHL experts on this obligation.  
Some form of the question, “Can anyone be killed in armed conflict?” served this objective.  
Since I designated the IHL experts as norm proponents, I assumed they embraced the distinction 
principle.   
I also sought to determine the similarity between any articulated distinction principle in 
belligerent narratives and IHL expert narratives. To accomplish this, I asked IHL experts what 
makes a civilian a permissible target.  For former belligerents who claimed they abided by some 
form of the distinction principle, I employed indirect interrogation techniques to determine the 
kinds of distinction methods they used.  I employed indirect methods because with these types of 
voluntarist accounts,195 there are concerns with the data collected, particularly when it is of such 
                                                                                                                                                             
192 Maragia (2002). 
193 McEvily, B. and A. Zaheer.1999. “Bridging Ties: A Source of Firm Heterogeneity in Competitive Capabilities.” 
Strategic Management Journal 20:12. 
194 See Appendix IV for my core interview questions (both belligerent and IHL expert). 
195 Essentially, voluntarist accounts come from the perspective of the participants in the phenomenon studied.  
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 18 
 55 
 
a sensitive nature.  As Norma Kriger writes, “How can one know that individuals actually 
believe what they say or say what they believe?”196  Yet despite this concern, like Kriger, I feel 
that researchers should not avoid the inclusion of people’s voices.  As was the case with her 
work, this study believes that “what people say or do matters.”197  However, to help ensure open 
and honest discussions and to minimize incentives to misrepresent the truth (e.g., fear of 
incrimination), I employed hypothetical scenarios.  Thus, I would ask former belligerents some 
form of the question: if you could only save one person in a village, who would it be and why.  
This helped me understand who belligerents considered worthy of protection.  I also tried to 
minimize any misrepresentation of the truth by asking belligerents to recount whether and how 
other fighters implemented the distinction principle.  I also asked belligerents questions about 
who they considered most dangerous in a conflict as well as what kinds of actions would 
civilians (or “people” if they did not know the word “civilian”) take that made them threatening 
to belligerents. 
In order to uncover the rationales for selective targeting of civilians among those 
belligerents who articulated some version of a distinction principle, I asked former belligerents to 
explain targeting decisions they made or witnessed.  Here, the goal was to determine which of 
the frameworks examined in this study explained civilian targeting. For instance, former 
belligerents were asked about the costs and benefits of complying with a particular method of 
distinction.  These belligerents were also asked how they acquired their particular method of 
distinction.  Thus, I asked them whether they received training in IHL, if the ICRC or another 
international organization or non-governmental organization talked to them about IHL, or if any 
foreign actors told them they were restricted in what they could do when fighting. 
                                                 
196 Kriger, Norma J. 1992. Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6 
197 Id. 
 56 
 
Challenges in Data Collection 
Conducting interviews, while potentially extremely fruitful, can also pose challenges, 
particularly to novice researchers.  The challenges of interviewing elites specifically are well 
documented,198 and my experiences interviewing elites in the ICRC is consistent with this 
literature.  Instead, I would like to concentrate this section’s discussion on my experiences 
interviewing former belligerents.  This set of interviews highlighted issues that feature less 
prominently in the discourse on qualitative approaches.   
Despite my previous experience in the camp in 2005, I encountered several unexpected 
situations during my 2009 stay in Dukwi that hindered the study’s progress.  Firstly, Dukwi 
hosted far fewer refugees in 2009 than it did in 2005.  Rumors ran rampant in the camp; one such 
rumor was that reduction in the population was because the government of Botswana planned to 
shut down the camp soon.  Regardless of the reason, the reduced population impacted my study 
because there were fewer potential interviewees.  This meant that my study would not include 
the diversity of conflict experience I had anticipated. 
Secondly, the weather wrecked havoc on my tightly packed schedule.  With limited 
funding and time, every day spent in the camp was valuable.  This was one reason I decided to 
go to Botswana during the dry season; I did not want cancelled interviews on account of rain.  
Despite these planning efforts, Botswana experienced several days of uncharacteristically heavy 
rains during my time there.  Heavy rains turned Botswana sand into an impassable sludge, 
hindering movement about the camp and thus, forcing me to cancel or postpone interviews.  The 
rains also washed away the large termite mounds abundant in the camp, some more than five feet 
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tall.  As a result, thousands of termites scurried about, giving the ground the impression of a 
vibrating black carpet.  While visually interesting, walking in the camp after the rains became a 
painful and slow process as these termites bit me while traversing my feet. 
Another issue I confronted dealt with how refugees viewed me.  Structural factors played 
out in the one on one interactions between the refugees and myself.  My identities as a woman, 
as an Indian, and as a researcher from the United States acted as both a boon and a constraint.  
The gendered dynamics inherent in the refugee camp enabled many of the respondents to view 
me as non-threatening. Being a small woman and regarded as younger than my years put many 
of the males I interviewed at ease, thus lowering their guard and ultimately led to rather candid 
discussions.   
My Indian heritage also helped in this regard.  The shared colonial experiences of the 
national communities from which we descended opened doors that might have remained 
otherwise shut.  This perception of me resonated particularly with Angolan and Zimbabwean 
belligerents who fought in wars of resistance against the Portuguese and the British.  They 
assumed me to be an empathetic comrade even though I spent little time in India; belligerents 
would say to me, “Sister, you understand.”   
Paradoxically, for some, my “Americaness”199 loomed larger than any assumed 
camaraderie generated by my birth in a former colony.  The questions I asked, in conjunction 
with the fact that I pursued my degree from an American university, spoke with an American 
accent and behaved more like a Westerner, raised suspicions among certain members of the 
refugee community.  Stories circulated that I belonged to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and was looking to arrest people for violations of international law.  This occurred despite my 
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efforts to prevent such misinformation by working with trusted members of the community.  
Initially, these stories amused me, but I soon realized the gravity of the situation when one of the 
refugees I hired as an assistant was threatened with physical violence if he continued to work 
with me.  I immediately stopped the interviews and had to spend some time contemplating 
whether to continue with the project.  As important as this research was to me, nothing was 
worth jeopardizing my assistant’s safety.  An account of being a foreigner, I never feared for my 
own safety, but I could not be certain as to my assistant’s.  I consulted with community leaders, 
explaining my presence in the camp and the problems I faced.  After convincing them of my 
actual purposes (which included testimonials from refugees I worked with during my previous 
visit), these leaders then spread the word as to why I was there, persuading their constituents not 
to fear me. It was this intervention by community leaders that permitted the continuation of my 
project. The intervention quashed the CIA rumors, and I did not have trouble from that point on.  
I also began conducting interviews in the homes of respondents, rather than in my residence, in 
an effort to increase transparency, which also helped to lower suspicions refugees had of me.  I 
was concerned that problems for my assistant might resurface upon my departure from the camp, 
but thankfully, that has not been the case.  However, I lost considerable time during this process 
that had been allocated for interviews.    In the end, I collected 19 former belligerent interviews, 
8 IHL expert interviews and 10 interviews with civilians who experienced armed conflict. 
The concerns for my research team exacted a toll on me mentally.  So did the stories I 
gathered in my interviews.  I spent considerable mental energy devising strategies to enable 
respondents to offer as truthful accounts as possible.  However, I did not spend enough time 
preparing myself for what I would hear. I was unprepared to learn about the horrors of war, and 
often needed time between days of interviews to absorb these stories and recoup from them.  
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These interviews impacted me so much that it took some months after I returned from the field 
for me to be able to review the transcripts and begin data analysis.  In essence, I experienced 
“burnout,” resulting from “feelings of exhaustion and tiredness… often feeling quite 
overwhelmed by the nature of the data.”200 
 
Interview Data Analysis   
Coding 
For constructivist research agendas, exploring the constitution of social facts is essential 
in understanding how they influence behavior.201  To uncover how the two respondent groups in 
this study constituted the social fact of interest here, permissible civilian target, I subjected the 
interview data to a particular type of inductive examination, grounded theory,202 for qualitative 
analysis.  
I conducted this analysis with assistance from the University of Pittsburgh’s Qualitative 
Data Analysis Program (QDAP).  QDAP consults with researchers to develop a coding scheme 
appropriate to their projects. It employs and trains graduate students in the use of ATLAS.ti and 
to understand and help shape the coding scheme relevant to a specific project.  Working in 
tandem with the principle investigator or project team, QDAP staff members produce project 
outputs such as statistics, summaries, and analyses.   
One of the first steps in using a grounded theory approach is open coding.  Anselm 
Strauss, a pioneer of the grounded theory approach, defines open coding as the “unrestricted 
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coding of data… The aim is to produce concepts that seem to fit the data.”203    QDAP coders 
and I conducted open coding by scrutinizing a portion of the transcripts word by word to develop 
“concepts that seem to fit the data.”204  Attention focused on concepts that would inform the 
question of how respondents constituted the category of permissible civilian targets.  This was 
broadly conceived in order to capture the myriad ways in which respondents discussed the 
matter.  Articulations of permissible civilian targets were categorized along two dimensions: 
actor and act.  I chose these categories because they reflect the categories existing in the 
literature and in practice.   
Once the QDAP coders and I derived a list of open codes, I then explored any thematic 
patterns that emerged from this list.  According to Strauss, this type of grouping should be done 
in terms of paradigm items.205  These paradigm items are conditions that give rise to a category, 
the context, strategies utilized and the consequences of the strategies.206  The aim of this 
examination is to yield a new set of codes called axial codes.  In order to conduct this 
organization, open codes may be combined to make them fit a paradigm heading better and 
others may be dropped because they do not fit any heading.  Through this process, we had to 
constantly reference the open codes and axial codes.  Steven I. Miller explains this is how 
grounded theory is derived, through “’constant interplay between proposing and checking. This 
back and forth movement is what makes…theory grounded.’”207  Eventually, we created a list of 
axial codes with the open codes partially forming their definitions.    
The next step in grounded theory analysis is to “delimit coding to only those codes that 
relate to the core codes in sufficiently significant ways as to be used in a parsimonious 
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theory,”208 in order to derive a list of selective codes.  The core codes are “that category of data 
that accounts for most of the variation of the central phenomenon of concern and around which 
all the other categories are integrated.”209  The QDAP coders then used these codes to code the 
entire dataset over six rounds.  An example of a selective code is “Targets~Legitimate,” used to 
capture belligerent conceptualizations of permissible civilian targets.210   The coders coded 
relatively reliably; the average Fleiss’ kappa result211 for the “Targets~Legitimate” selective 
code was .71.212      
 
Analysis of Coded Data 
In order to explore the constitution of permissible civilian targets, my first step was to 
determine whether former belligerents claimed adherence to some version of the distinction 
principle if their narratives recounted the intentional killing of civilians. What I was looking for 
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Appendix VI has the kappa scores for the codes used in this project. 
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here was whether belligerent narratives articulated limitations on who could be targeted during 
armed conflict, and if so, what are the parameters of those limitations.  I interpreted these 
limitations as indicating that belligerents delineated some members of the population as 
impermissible targets and others as permissible targets.  For instance, a response implying that 
anyone could be killed during armed conflict indicated to me that the belligerent did not endorse 
the distinction principle. 
For those belligerent narratives which claimed adherence to some version of the 
distinction principle under these conditions, I compared the articulated principle to those of the 
IHL experts.   The purpose of this step was to determine whether intersubjectivity exists on this 
concept.  Since the IHL respondents offered different distinction methods, I used the Guidance 
for comparative purposes.  Specifically, I compared belligerent explanations for what act or 
attribute made a civilian a permissible target.     Thus, I compared these articulations along two 
dimensions: act based distinctions and actor based distinctions.  As mentioned earlier, these two 
categories reflected the two predominant themes I observed in the literature.  Act based 
distinctions mirror the distinction principle reflected in codified IHL through the language of 
direct participation in hostilities.  Thus, with this method of distinction, particular acts or 
behavior separate permissible from impermissible civilian targets.  An example of this 
distinction method would be one in which civilians engaged in espionage are treated as 
permissible targets, while those civilians who do not are considered impermissible targets.    
Actor based distinctions are distinctions premised on an individual’s membership to a group.  An 
example would be a distinction method in which a child is spared, regardless of what she is 
doing when a belligerent encounters her, because that belligerent views children as a blanket 
category of impermissible targets.   
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The third step was to assess which of the dominant theoretical explanations for norm 
violations (see Chapter 2) apply to each belligerent narrative among the narratives that offered a 
differing version of the distinction principle from that contained in the Guidance.  To make this 
assessment, I analyzed the rationales provided by former belligerents to explain their observed 
interpretations and actions regarding intentional civilian targeting.   For those narratives in which 
belligerents claimed they did not receive training or did not interact with foreign actors, I labeled 
as consistent with the norm diffusion framework.  I labeled those narratives which claimed 
utilitarian or strategic motivations influenced the killing of civilian targets as consistent with a 
norm violation framework.  I labeled the narratives in which civilians were intentionally killed 
even when it contravened the stated interests of the respondent or the respondent’s group as 
consistent with the norm contestation framework.   I also inquired whether the norm contestation 
or norm violation framework applied to the narratives coded with the norm diffusion code, 
despite the lack of diffusion.   
A valid argument could be made that narratives articulating adherence with the 
distinction principle which differs from that of IHL experts should be viewed with suspicion.  
This is because the respondent may want to hide an intentional violation in the guise of 
compliance.  In this case, respondents would know that their version of distinction is different 
from the version advanced by norm proponents.  To avoid being reprimanded for violating the 
norm proponent’s version of the distinction principle, respondents claim compliance, albeit with 
their own version.  The problem with this scenario is that if respondents use an alternative 
method of distinction to escape punitive measures for what they know to be violations, why 
would they volunteer violations as examples of compliance?   As I mentioned earlier, 
respondents were initially very suspicious of the purposes of my interviews.  To hedge against 
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the possibility that I was actually collecting information to support criminal investigations, it is 
more likely that respondents would provide examples of compliance that resonated with norm 
proponents rather than the less certain strategy of arguing compliance with an alternative version 
of the distinction principle.    
 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE 
 
In addition to investigating the contemporary presence of intersubjectivity on the concept of 
permissible civilian targets in the interview data, I embarked on an historical analysis of the 
distinction principle in order to assess whether it existed during other time periods.  In particular, 
I was interested in the intersubjective understandings of permissible targets found in normative 
frameworks that might have influenced the former belligerents I interviewed.  Consequently, I 
delved into whether and how rules encapsulated this idea in Western European, Islamic and pre-
colonial African legal norms, as well as in the period of IHL codification by the international 
community. The Western European, Islamic and pre-colonial African traditions helped shape the 
rules regulating armed conflict on the African continent prior to the IHL codification era.  Once 
IHL codification occurred, many of these traditional rules took on customary law status so that 
they bound all states in the international system, irrespective of whether they individually ratified 
each treaty. 
To engage this question, I pursued a type of historiography, defined as “the writing of 
history based on a selective, critical reading of sources that synthesizes particular bits of 
information into a narrative description or analysis of a subject.”213  With this method, the 
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historical record provides the data used to answer the research question.214  Consequently, the 
choice of historical source materials carries great significance.  Since I am not a historian by 
profession or a polyglot, I relied on a diversified set of secondary sources written by experts to 
gain an understanding of how the distinction principle manifested in these various traditions. I 
cast my net far and wide to gather a mélange of perspectives in an effort to reduce bias and 
selectivity.  I examined the collected material to glean whether first, there existed a tradition of 
restricting who belligerents can target and if so, whether I could discover commonalities in these 
restrictions within each legal tradition and between them.  The next chapter discusses the results 
of this analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4: AMBIGUITIES IN THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE PRIOR TO IHL 
CODIFICATION 
 
 
Remember: 
1) Fight only combatants 
2) Attack only military targets 
3) Spare civilian persons and objects 
4) Restrict destruction to what your mission requires215 
The United States issued the “Pocket Card on Rules of Engagement” (from which the opening 
quotation is taken) to its soldiers during the first Gulf War.  This particular passage aims to 
articulate the distinction principle within the civilian immunity norm, which Hugo Slim 
summarizes: 
The idea that there are certain groups of people who should be protected from the killing 
and wounding of war and from the worst effects of its impoverishment and disruption is 
an ancient and enduring one.  The idea holds that there is a category of people who must 
somehow be set apart from the fury of battle because of who they are, what they do or 
what they cannot do.216   
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) regulates the conduct of armed conflict with two 
main purposes: to restrict the conduct of hostilities and to render certain categories of persons 
hors de combat, or outside the scope of conflict.217  The distinction principle, which belligerents 
employ to determine who is hors de combat  and who is not, has long played and continues to 
play a pivotal role in IHL.218  For example, in the pre-Christian era, Celtic tribes forbade the 
killing of poets to ensure a record of the battles fought.219 Megastenes writes in 300 B.C.E. that 
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belligerents in India were instructed to spare those who laid down their arms.220  A speech by the 
first Muslim Caliph exclaims:  
Stop, O people, that I may give you then rules to keep by heart!... You must not mutilate, 
neither kill a child or aged man or woman… You are likely to pass by people who have 
devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them to that to which they have devoted 
their lives…221  
 
Michael Walzer, a noted scholar on the laws of war, confirms the long standing and universal 
importance of the distinction principle,  
the tendency to set certain classes of people outside the permissible range of warfare, so 
that the killing of any of their members is not a legitimate act of war but a crime. Though 
their details vary from place to place, these rules point toward the general conception of 
war as a combat between combatants, a conception that turns up again and again in 
anthropological and historical accounts.222  
 
In 1929 the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) used the term “civilian” to denote 
those categories of people considered as protected and impermissible targets.223     
While it may seem surprising given the lengthy history of the distinction principle, there 
never existed a consensus on who belongs to the permissible and impermissible target 
categories.224  As John Kelsay notes, “The notion of noncombatant immunity is actually one way 
[emphasis added]- the way most characteristic of just war thinking- of specifying who the just 
(or the innocent are).”225  This chapter will reveal how the boundary between permissible and 
impermissible targets fluctuated throughout the centuries and across geographical regions.  Such 
is the case despite the widespread support for the obligation requiring belligerents to distinguish 
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between permissible and impermissible targets.  The chapter will also show that the justifications 
for considering someone a permissible target did not always fall along strategic lines.  
Consequently, rather than culminating in a clearly defined protection regime, this chapter (along 
with the next chapter) argue instead that the historical evolution of the distinction principle 
produced a fog of protection which confusedly, and even erroneously, guided belligerents 
through targeting decisions.  Instead of clearly delineating who possessed immunity, these 
variations in the distinction principle created a legacy of confusion that continues today.   
This chapter is organized in the following manner.  The first section explains why an 
examination of the origins of current norms is fruitful in understanding how they operate, and 
conversely, why they are violated.  It then proceeds into a discussion of the evolution of the 
distinction principle in three disparate normative environments: Western European, Islamic and 
pre-colonial African traditions. 
 
THE UTILITY OF AN HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF A NORM IN UNDERSTANDING 
ITS VIOLATION 
 
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, much of the literature on norms centers on why actors choose to 
adhere to or violate norms.  However, a discussion of the genesis of these norms is often lacking, 
despite the clarity such a discussion can offer to understanding norm violations.  Ward Thomas 
argues, 
… while empirical studies based on sociological insights have done a good job of 
showing how norms can explain outcomes in ways that rationalist theories cannot, this 
work seldom examines where the norm in question came from, focusing on their effects.  
…while many sociological institutionalists ‘take existing international relations theory to 
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task for treating the construction of political actors and their preferences as exogenous, 
[they] tend to treat their own core concepts as exogenously given.226 
 
A grasp of the origins of normative principles is vital to understanding their current operation; as 
Francois Bugnion notes, “It is impossible to grasp fully the sense and the scope of a rule without 
first understanding the context in which it was first established and that in which it was supposed 
to take effect.”227 Regarding the civilian immunity norm, the literature generally explores 
whether and how it influences the behavior of actors, without delving into the history of the 
norm.  Those that do tend to offer an historical inquiry into attempts to mitigate the ills of war, 
with an underlying assumption of uncontested victimhood.  Without this historical grounding, 
attempts to fully understand the civilian immunity norm, and to determine whether 
intersubjectivity on its constituent elements exists, may fall short.  This chapter attempts to 
partially fulfill this lacuna. 
 
A HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE IN EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
While much of the legal codification of IHL occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries, efforts to 
limit the tragedies of warfare were not limited to activists and scholars of those periods.    As 
Geoffrey Best writes,  
Abhorrence of war and with it the making of plans for its abolition, prevention, or 
limitation is an old-age aspect of man’s confused and ambivalent thinking about war… 
demonstrating… that the 20th century’s endeavors in this direction have more solid 
foundations than simply utopian aspiration.228    
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A major element of the movement to restrain war is the idea that the negative effects of 
war should not be felt by everyone.229  Honore Bouvet, prior of a Benedictine monastery and 
trained in canon law pleaded, 
Valiant men and wise, however, who follow arms should take pains, so far as they can, 
not to bear hard on simple and innocent folk, but only on those who make and continue 
war, and flee peace.230 
 
Hugo Grotius, considered by many to be the father of IHL, also advocated the principle that 
certain members of societies should be protected during times of war.  Citing proclamations from 
the Old Testament to the Roman writers of the Christian era, Grotius noted their calls to respect 
the protected classes during warfare.231  For example, women, children, philosophers, priests and 
merchants were considered defenseless and uninvolved in war; from this characterization 
stemmed their protected status.232    
Early European jurists determined that it was unlawful to deliberately kill certain classes 
of people on the basis of pragmatism and relied on reciprocity for compliance to advance their 
arguments.  These jurists premised this immunity categorically on the basis of one’s contribution 
to society and the ability to fight. Governments issued prohibitions against killing merchants, 
clerics and farmers due to the importance of their role in ensuring a fully functional society.233  
Traditionally protected classes, women and children, enjoyed this immunity as long as all sides 
complied.  And it was in the interests of belligerents to comply because women and children 
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could be used as slaves.234    Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers note that, “’the women, and 
the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof,’ were to be 
taken and used.”235  Additionally, the victor had an interest in restricting warfare because a total 
war may foster such feelings of hostility as to make control difficult over conquered 
territories,236 a sentiment aptly expressed by Shakespeare’s Henry V: “’For when lenity and 
cruelty pay for a kingdom, the gentler gamer is the soonest winner.’”237   
As the Christian Church rose in prominence in Europe, it managed to not only dictate the 
substance of norms for daily life but military activity as well.    Because European societies 
continued to wage wars which required Christians to apply deadly force, the question inevitably 
arose: was it ever acceptable for a Christian to kill?  Early Christian thought stressed the value of 
pacifism, but this value became difficult to adhere to once Christians came to power and needed 
to defend their territorial realm against invaders.238  Augustine would provide the answer in the 
form of just war theory.  Just war theory emerged as the amalgamation of Christian thought, 
chivalric codes and Roman law that enabled Christians to reconcile their divine principles 
against human constraints.239  Just war theory possesses two components: jus ad bellum, which 
dictates the appropriate conditions under which to wage war, and jus in bello, rules determining 
appropriate belligerent behavior once war commenced.240   
Rather than taking a completely pacifist stance when it came to jus ad bellum, Augustine 
promoted a position of limited warfare.  For Augustine, it was acceptable to kill if done in a just 
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war.241  Augustine defines just war as “’…those which avenge injuries, when the nation or city 
against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish wrongs committed 
by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it.’”242  Such wars were just 
because Christians were compelled to restore order so that their earthly realm mirrored their 
divine realm.243  
What Augustine attempted to do with this immunity was to incorporate a moral element 
to the basis of its utilitarian analysis.244  Augustine sought to restrict the outbreak of war and to 
ensure that when war did break out, it was fought humanely.245  He sought to distinguish and 
protect the innocent, a word derived from the Latin in-nocens, meaning not harmful.246  The 
Peace of God movement continued the development of jus in bello by offering the earliest formal 
statement of the distinction principle through its articulation of the wholesale innocence of 
ecclesiastical persons.247    
Augustine provided early Christians a means to wage war; however, this did not signal 
the end of moral conundrums faced by Christian scholars.  The next issue they had to contend 
with was, even if Christians engaged in just wars, what if they killed those who committed no 
wrongs?  Thomas Aquinas carved out an exception to the killing of the harmless if doing so were 
a means to a public good (collateral damage in modern parlance).248  He put forth the rule of 
double effect, which Michael Walzer summarizes: 
(1) The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means… that it is a  
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       legitimate act of war; 
(2) The direct effect is morally acceptable…; 
(3) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil 
effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends; 
(4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect…249 
 
 
As is the case with Augustine’s just war, Thomas Aquinas focused on intent to exempt 
Christians in the exercise of violence.  Generally, just war theory offered immunity to the 
uninvolved; killing them was excused only if it met the requirements of double effect.  Jus in 
bello stipulated that those engaged in traditionally peaceful occupations or unable to bear arms 
were considered impermissible targets.250   
Yet for the most part, the general immunity offered was limited to those within a certain 
group, Christians.251  For example, immunity advocated by the Peace of God movement only 
held in Christendom, not to the lands in which the Crusades were fought.252  Christian soldiers 
deliberately targeted Muslims belonging to the same categories that protected Christians.   
It would be a Spanish theologian who would alter the applicability of the immunity norm.  
To Francisco de Vitoria, the basis of such immunity should be premised on objective, material 
fact.253  The key objective, material fact is whether or not the person bore arms.254  Only those 
who bear arms qualify as permissible targets because they are “’obviously dangerous.’”255  If not 
bearing arms, then they pose no imminent threat and therefore should be spared.256  As such, 
Vitoria’s distinction between permissible and impermissible targets shifted from one based on 
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identity to one based on action.257  Vitoria’s contemporaries like Gentili and Suarez also 
supported this sentiment.258  His directive leaves little room for scrutiny of religious beliefs.  For 
instance, Vitoria proposed a prohibition against killing Muslim women and children, previously 
considered permissible targets by virtue of their faith, if they did not engage in hostilities.259  
Consequently, Vitoria’s ideas secularized the distinction principle.   
Vitoria may have been influenced by the battlefield behavior of knights who complied 
with chivalric codes.  These codes placed primacy on a person’s ability to fight in targeting 
decisions.260  Social norms compelled knights to fight only those trained in the art of warfare or 
those physically able to fight.261  In this time period, this generally excluded women, children, 
the injured and the aged from attack.262  However, much like the Peace of God movement, 
chivalric protections only applied to Christians.263   
Ostensibly, the ability to fight served as the means by which knights distinguished 
between permissible and impermissible targets.  However, upon closer inspection, identity 
formed the basis of these chivalric protections.  An individual would not be deliberately targeted 
if s/he belonged in a particular category.  These categories were protected for a variety of 
reasons.  One reason includes prevailing stereotypes of innocence via inability to harm.  This is 
the reason women, children, the elderly and the aged were considered impermissible targets, 
while young men who posed no harm died at the hands of knights.  Functional importance was 
another reason.  Those in functionally necessary or powerful roles received protection.  Hence 
the reason farmers, merchants, clergy and ambassadors found themselves formally immune to 
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deliberate targeting.  Political interests dictated another category.  During the Crusades, 
European armies focused on ousting Islamic forces in the Holy Land.  Shirking these jus in bello 
obligations, many believed, would ensure victory.  Consequently, European forces did not extend 
these protections to non-Christians.  Vitoria and his peers attempted to shift the distinction 
between permissible and impermissible targets from a categorical (identity based) concept to an 
action (and thus, individually) based one.  However, the shift did not occur instantaneously, so 
that both the categorical and individual based distinctions coexisted.   
The concepts underlying immunity of the “uninvolved” continued to develop in a more 
objective fashion and were greatly influenced by wars in Europe.  By the time of Emmerich von 
Vattel, another important figure in the history of the distinction principle, the norm was arguably 
well established.  Incorporating fairly recent ideas such as the state, Vattel asserted states are the 
combatants.264  Consistent with the Rousseau- Portalis doctrine, Vattel argued that war rages 
between states.265 More specifically, war fighting was to be limited to battles between trained 
and disciplined armies of states.266   Possessing citizenship of an enemy state did not 
automatically make one an enemy, and hence a permissible target.267  In this line of thinking, 
members of the population not actively engaged in fighting were impermissible targets.268  If 
they did not resist, they were immune to deliberate attack; in the words of Vattel, “’but these 
enemies who offer no resistance, and consequently the belligerent has no right to maltreat or 
otherwise offer violence to them, much less put them to death.’”269  This differed from much of 
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the prevailing view which conformed to an identity based distinction, viewing everyone residing 
within the territory of the enemy state as enemies and hence permissible targets.  In the tradition 
of Vitoria, immunity was based on what one did, rather than who one was, and echoed a 
distinction in Hugo Grotius’s magnum opus, De Jure de Bellis ac Pacis.270 
The French Revolution would challenge Vattel’s notion of states as combatants because it 
would return the idea of levee en masse back into discussions of jus in bello in Europe.  Levee en 
masse describes situations in which the population participates in conflict, making it difficult to 
distinguish between belligerents and non-belligerents.271  In such circumstances, efforts to 
mobilize the populace, and involving it in the war effort, afforded opponents the opportunity to 
argue the entire population was a permissible war target.272  War strategies included attacking 
unarmed citizens to break their will to resist.273  As a result, an opponent’s political, 
psychological and moral resources were considered permissible targets regardless of the 
traditional act based distinction.274  By blurring the line between traditional notions of 
uninvolved and involved, the French Revolution ushered in a return to an identity based 
distinction between permissible and impermissible.  The way belligerents implemented this 
distinction method enlarged the number of people who could be permissibly targeted.   In doing 
so, it took the movement to limit the category of permissible targets several giant steps 
backwards.275  It would take the codification efforts of the international community some effort 
before this widened scope of permissible targets narrowed.   
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A HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 
 
There are many similarities between Western legal thought on permissible and impermissible 
targets and another of the world’s influential legal traditions, Islamic jurisprudence.  An 
historical examination of the distinction principles warrants a discussion of Islamic perspectives 
since, as the guide for Christianity’s foe during the Crusades, it also influenced Western thought 
on the laws of war.  Edmond Rabath writes that Europeans 
…found in their chivalrous adversaries from the time of the Crusades, pre-set rules 
concerning the declaration of war, combatants and non-combatants, the sick and 
wounded, prisoners of war…  It is natural that these principles were amalgamated with 
more or less analogous seeds of law to form, by the end of the Middle Ages this 
unwritten code of law of war which formed the basis of the international legal concepts in 
this field until the contemporary period.276 
Much like the above brief overview of Western traditions reveals, Islamic legal tradition contains 
a deep and reflective history of laws related to armed conflict.  And as is the case with Western 
legal tradition, the distinction principle varied throughout its evolution in Islamic law. 
 Despite the fact that Islam emerged well after Christianity, its rules of war possessed an 
organizational structure that contemporary Western law lacked.277 The Siyar constitutes the body 
of Islamic law pertaining to public law, and addresses the proper justifications for war and the 
proper conduct of war.278  It includes the Koran and the Sunna, treaties enacted between Muslim 
leaders and the opinions of Muslim jurists, among others.279  The Siyar requires belligerents to 
distinguish between permissible and impermissible targets.280  For example, one of the principle 
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Islamic legal texts, the Viqayet, forbids the intentional targeting of women, children, the elderly, 
the sick and merchants during armed conflict.281   
 While the corpus of Islamic law is arguably less known than its Western counterpart, 
jihad is likely one of the most familiar and least understood of Islamic legal concepts.  An in 
depth discussion of this concept is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, a cursory 
description is important to understanding Islamic laws of war.   
Jihad originates from the Arabic term jahada which means to struggle or exert.  There 
are essentially two versions of jihad.    The Sunna states that exertion on the battlefield is minor 
jihad while internal exertion to comply with Islam is major jihad.   
Minor jihad is relevant to Islamic ideas on international relations. Classical Islam divided 
the international system into two realms: dar-al harb (roughly, non-Muslim territories) and the 
dar al-Islam (Muslim territories).  Classical jurists like al-Shaybani typically characterized the 
relationship between these two realms as violent since they felt the Koran only permitted war 
with non-Muslims.282  As John Kelsay notes, “In the Prophetic report, ‘Fight those who refuse to 
acknowledge God’; that is, as indicated by their refusal of an invitation to accept Islam or its 
hegemony.”283  
However, many modern jurists disagree with this interpretation, arguing instead that 
relations between the two realms are to be peaceful rather than violent, and jihad is defensive 
rather than offensive.  This constitutes jus ad bellum in Islamic jurisprudence.  Scholars like 
Agha Shahi and Muhammed Abduh posit that divergent practice by Muslim leaders reflect 
political considerations rather than religious philosophy.284 
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Like its Western counterpart, political considerations, as well as religious and societal 
influences, also shaped Islamic legal traditions on appropriate battlefield behavior, or jus in 
bello.285  Much like Just War theory, these considerations produced sets of rules for Muslims that 
sought to humanize warfare.  As An-Na`im finds, 
Historically, jihad was a positive phenomenon because it humanized the practice of 
warfare in the Middle Ages.  First, Sharia prohibited the prevalent practice of using war 
for material gain or revenge.  Second, the Prophet and his companions, acting in 
accordance with the Quran and the Sunna, laid down very specific and strict rules for 
honorable combat.286  
 
However, these factors also drove the way in which belligerents considered who they can 
target.    Consequently, since Muslims often faced non-Muslims on the battlefield, a religiously 
based distinction between permissible and impermissible targets emerged in early Islamic 
jurisprudence.  Much like early Christian just war thought, immunity was generally only 
applicable to those of the faith; non-believers did not benefit from this immunity and all were 
considered permissible targets.287  However, Muslims honored the Peace of God Movement’s 
edict: they granted immunity to Christian monks as long as they did not join the ranks of 
belligerents.288 
Yet there existed inconsistency among early Islamic jurists as to how immunity should be 
implemented.  Take women for example.  Mohammed instructed a military commander, Abdur 
Rahman ibn Awf to ‘never commit breach of trust nor treachery nor mutilate anybody nor kill 
any minor or woman.’”289  While some Islamic scholars argued this meant that all women should 
be spared, al- Shafi’i (who belonged to the scholarly generation succeeding al-Shaybani’s) 
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advocated that polytheistic women could be considered permissible targets while women of the 
Book (Jews and Christians) were impermissible targets.290  Such a policy contravened the 
interests of society which would benefit from slave labor if belligerents spared these women.  
There was also disagreement on how men should be viewed.  Some jurists like Yamani argued 
all able-bodied men were permissible targets regardless of whether they actually engaged in 
hostilities; others argued that clerics and those under a certain age should be spared.291  
Furthermore, whereas Shaybani interpreted Koranic scripture to require the refusal of a formal 
invitation to Islam and the payment of tribute to render a person a permissible target, al-Shafi’i 
posited that any non-Muslim could be permissibly targeted since he assumed everyone “heard” 
the invitation to Islam.292 Still others argued it is inappropriate to ever kill a prisoner.293  A 
preeminent jurist, Ibn Rushd, describes this dissidence: 
The source of their disagreement on the matter is that they [the jurists] disagree on the 
legal cause for killing the unbelievers. The jurists who claimed that the legal cause for 
killing the unbelievers is their disbelief do not exempt [from killing] any of the 
unbelievers. Those who claim that the legal cause is the capacity [of the unbelievers] to 
fight. . . exempt from killing those who are unable to fight or who are usually not inclined 
to fight such as peasants and serfs.294  
  
Furthermore, some Islamic jurists declared differential treatment even among Muslims.  
Wars against the bugha295 operated under more restricted rules of engagement than wars against 
other Muslim foes.296 In wars against the bugha, belligerents were prohibited from executing 
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prisoners and intentionally killing women and children.297 Wars against Muslims fighting for 
lesser causes proceeded under less restrictive rules. 
The basis of the distinction between permissible and impermissible targets may also have 
been a function of the nature of conflict; impermissible targets consisted of those who were not 
conventionally considered as militarily threatening.298  This non-threatening construct, coupled 
with their utility as slaves, justified their immunity.299  Hence the reason why most men of 
fighting age, believers and non-believers alike, were labeled permissible targets while women 
and children held protective status. 
While some Islamic jurists declared certain categories of people impermissible targets, 
others argued individuals lost that immunity once they engaged in hostilities.300  Yet, as is the 
case with Christian Just War theory, there existed division among Islamic jurists as to what 
engagement in hostilities entailed.  While some limited the coverage to those bearing weapons, 
others took a more expansive view.  For some, those playing a supportive role in armed conflict 
(e.g., via the provision of food or supplies) were engaged in hostilities.301  For example, during 
the battle of Hunayn, Muslim soldiers reportedly killed a centenarian for giving advice on the 
battlefield.302  Furthermore, impermissible targets could be killed if their deaths were foreseen 
but unintended, much like the Christian doctrine of double effect.303 
What this brief discussion reveals is that, much like its Christian counterpart, Islamic 
rules of war fluctuated, both within and between time periods, on the notion of permissible 
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versus impermissible targets.  Neither legal tradition held a constant position on what many 
considered IHL’s most pivotal issue.304 
 
A HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
If Islamic perspectives on rules and norms of armed conflict are less known compared to Just 
War thought, African perspectives are even less so.  The discussion of African rules of war prior 
to colonization (after which colonizers implemented their rules of war in the continent) in this 
section is thinner in relation to above discussions of Just War and Islamic traditions for several 
reasons.  First, pre-colonial African jurisprudence on armed conflict possesses much more 
diversity than the other pan-regional legal frameworks discussed above due to a lack of a 
unifying religious or political structure.305 As such, African societies differed in their structure, 
security arrangements and codes of conduct for their belligerents more so than European and 
Islamic societies.306  This variety extended to the manner in which warfare was conducted.307  
Secondly, the literature offers few examinations of pan-African rules of war before colonization.    
Thirdly, much of what is written about pre-colonial African rules of war focuses on the Zulu 
practices in present day South Africa.  This is due to the fact that the Zulu maintained one of the 
few standing armies on the continent.308  As such, the Zulu operated under more formalized rules 
than their martial counterparts.  However, because African societies bore comparatively fewer 
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similarities with each other, an understanding of Zulu war practices does not necessarily offer 
insight into the rules and norms espoused by other societies. 
Nonetheless, despite the differences in African cultures, “conflicts and war between 
remote lineages were regulated by legal norms” so that when “war did break out between them, 
defined rules of behavior were followed and respected.” 309 As African leaders expanded and 
consolidated their empires, they also managed to harmonize norms operating within their 
domains, including the norms for warfare.  Consequently, 
These conscious attempts to disseminate and assimilate a new code of conduct in warfare 
and in peace time made it possible to propagate certain standards of behavior in the 
different regions of Africa.310 
  
For example, African societies share in common an association of belligerency with 
adulthood311; that is, only adults were considered fighters and therefore only they could be 
permissibly targeted during armed conflict. And generally speaking, only adult males played the 
role of belligerent.312  African societies, with the exception of the Zulu, designated this role to a 
select minority of their populations, although during emergencies African leaders called all able-
bodied men into service.313  Despite an esteemed status, these select men did not serve as 
belligerents exclusively.314  They were not full-time soldiers.  They held this role concurrently 
with other roles like farmer or religious leader, with circumstances dictating which they would 
play.  This multiplicity of roles inevitably made it difficult for belligerents to determine who was 
a fighter and who was not.   
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Additionally, this literature does reveal that like their European and Islamic counterparts, 
African norms of armed conflict required a distinction between permissible and impermissible 
targets.315  The Zulu in particular possessed an organized set of rules applicable to non-
belligerents during armed conflict.316  For instance, Zulu fighters were expected to spare anyone 
who dropped their spears in battle and to enslave both men and women.317  In the wars between 
the Kikuyu and the Maasai, Kikuyu fighters spared Maasai fighters who laid down their weapons 
and held a Nyarageta grass as a sign of surrender.318  Women, children, the elderly, slaves, 
laborers and emissaries were generally considered impermissible targets.319  The Zulu spared 
women, and young girls in particular, because of the material benefit they offered Zulu society:  
they more easily assimilated into society than males, could bear children (vital to a continent that 
made survival difficult) or could be sold as slaves.320  While the Zulu also enslaved men, the 
Zulu preferred females over males since female slaves fetched a much higher price in the slave 
markets than male slaves.321  Slave traders shifted their preference away from females to male 
slaves with the institution of slavery in the Americas, arguably reducing the targeting of male 
non-belligerents.322 
While the distinction principle possessed an important role in African legal traditions as it 
did in European and Islamic legal tradition, how it performed this role similarly varied.  As 
Emmanuel G. Bello states, “Some tribes took pride in according respect and human rights to 
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women, children and old persons; others were ready to kill everyone who might be considered a 
potential enemy.”323  The immunity offered to women serves as a useful example.  It varied 
considerably among the different African fighting forces.  For instance, Kenyan tribes did not 
allow the deliberate killing of women because they considered it disgraceful.324  Meanwhile, 
Nuer (present day Sudan) immunity to women depended on the identity of their opponent.  Nuer 
fighters spared foreign women of marriageable age while killing older women.325  However, the 
immunity was expanded to all women and children when fighting neighboring tribes.326  Since 
warfare between the Nuer and their neighbors was common, this expansion of immunity was 
predicated on reciprocity.327  While the Nuer sometimes spared women, the Galla and Bovana 
(Ethiopia) did not offer immunity to women as they considered them permissible targets.328 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter focused on the implementation of the distinction principle in various traditions prior 
to IHL codification.  It  reveals that despite the development of normative practices to distinguish 
between permissible and impermissible targets, relevant actors (including fighters and scholars) 
within and between various time periods and normative traditions differed as to who fell into 
each category.  These practices did share some similarities (many placed women, children and 
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the elderly within the impermissible target category), but they also deviated greatly from each 
other as to the designation of permissible targets.  These categorizations fluctuated based on 
regime, reason for conflict, external influences, interests and salient normative preferences.  For 
example, the shift in preference from female to male African slaves reflects the utilitarian 
foundation of the norm of civilian immunity in its infancy, a foundation present not only on the 
African continent but in the other regions previously discussed.  Political and economic changes 
in the international system transformed the linkage between sex and the distinction principle: 
able bodied men once considered permissible targets because of their sex were no longer so for 
the same reason. However, non-utilitarian arguments also defined permissible and impermissible 
targets, as exemplified by the call of Christian and Islamic jurists to kill those religiously distinct 
despite the value to their own societies as slaves.  Thus, a belligerent fighting in an armed 
conflict in any of the traditions discussed here could chose from a plethora of distinction 
methods at any given point during that armed conflict.  Imagine the situation when two or more 
of these normative traditions encountered each other.  It would not be a stretch to claim that 
operating in such an ambiguous environment could result in violations of the civilian immunity 
norm.  The next chapter will reveal that ambiguity on permissible targets permeated the 
international community’s efforts to codify IHL, ambiguity that is still present today. 
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CHAPTER 5:  AMBIGUITIES IN THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE DURING IHL 
CODIFICATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
It is the bidding of mercy, if not justice, that, except for reasons that are weighty and will affect 
the safety of many, no action should be attempted whereby innocent persons may be threatened 
with destruction. ~Grotius329 
 
The previous chapter traced the development of the distinction principle in different normative 
traditions, concluding that they commonly produced an unclear sense of the protected and 
unprotected.  This chapter overviews the major developments during the IHL codification 
process.  As contact within the community of states increased, and with it, the number of 
conflicts, the international community launched a codification effort to ensure its members 
operated under a uniform set of codes during armed conflict.  This chapter will show that, as was 
the case in the pre-codification period, inconsistency in what constitutes a permissible target 
plagued the codification era as well.  This was inherent from the first general codification of 
IHL, the Lieber Code, to the first definition of civilian in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions (AP).  Throughout this history, while the international community 
maintained its commitment to the distinction principle, it was unable to arrive at a clearly 
articulated definition of what constitutes a permissible civilian target. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of how the Lieber Code treats the distinction 
principle.  It moves on to an examination of early IHL treaties like the 1864 and 1906 Geneva 
Conventions.  It then examines more recent international agreements like the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their 1977 APs. The chapter closes with an inquiry into whether these more 
recent additions to the body of IHL clarify the constitution of permissible civilian targets. 
 
                                                 
329 Quoted in Rudolph (2001:655). 
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THE LIEBER CODE 
 
The 19th century marked an era of intense codification of IHL.  The excessive casualty rates 
during the French Revolution, the continuous outbreak of conflicts between newly conceived 
“states”, and technological advancements in the science of lethality spurred the international 
community’s efforts to restrict war practices.330  Political leaders and jurists felt that compliance 
with IHL, and hence fewer casualties, would result if laws were codified.331  Prevailing thought 
was that ambiguity in customary international law produced many of the atrocities that 
occurred.332  This ambiguity could be minimized by writing laws down in treaty form with states 
publicly acknowledging their commitment to them.333  Codifying IHL would also allow fighters 
to operate under a common framework rather than the differing rules that were the subject of the 
previous section. 
The Lieber Code amounts to the first attempt by a Western state to codify IHL.334  It is 
considered “a concise and careful rendering of international legal theory and practice up to 
Lieber’s time.”335  Drawn up by Columbia University political science professor Francis Lieber, 
at the request of President Abraham Lincoln, the 1863 General Orders No. 100 (the Lieber 
Code’s more formal appellation) tackled the question of how to discern permissible and 
impermissible targets vexing military officials during the U.S. Civil War.336  Article 21 of the 
Lieber Code states: 
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The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of 
the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.337 
 
The Lieber Code goes on to articulate the civilian immunity norm, 
 
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise 
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private 
individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in 
arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to 
be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.338 
 
Thus, the immunity offered to unarmed enemy citizens in a conflict between countries is not 
absolute.  The Lieber Code extends immunity only as far as “the exigencies of war will admit.” 
Military necessity tempers these protections, 
Art. 14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the 
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and 
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.  
 
Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of ' armed ' 
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally ' unavoidable ' in the 
armed contests of the war….339 
 
For conflicts occurring within a country, the Lieber Code states, 
Art.155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general classes -- that is to say, 
into combatants and noncombatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government. 
 
The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of rebellion, 
distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of the country and the 
disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may further be classified into those citizens known 
to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without 
taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being 
bodily forced thereto.   
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Art.156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander 
protect the manifestly loyal citizens, in revolted territories, against the hardships of the 
war as much as the common misfortune of all war admits. 
 
The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on 
the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or province….340 
 
While the Lieber Code did address the distinction principle, its primary focus centered on 
the proper treatment of fighters, in particular Confederate soldiers.341  Were they rebel fighters or 
belligerents?  At the time, international law distinguished between rebellions, which fell under 
the purview of domestic law, and belligerency, for which international law possessed 
jurisdiction.342 Yet despite this limited focus, the Lieber Code encompassed a version of the 
distinction principle which would influence the subsequent development of the civilian 
protection regime.343 
 
1864 AND 1906 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, ST. PETERSBURG DECLARATION AND 1907 
HAGUE CONVENTION 
 
The focus on fighters, compared to non-fighters, as evidenced in the Lieber Code also manifested 
in subsequent IHL treaties like the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906.344  This characteristic 
trait of IHL treaties would continue until the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  While these early 
Geneva Conventions focused on the treatment of wounded and sick fighters, they merit 
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discussion on the topic of the distinction principle for their connection to the International 
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), an instrumental player in the realm of IHL.  
The 1864 and 1906 Geneva Conventions were the products of the efforts of Henri 
Dunant, the founder of the ICRC.345  Dunant was moved by the suffering of wounded soldiers he 
came across in a battlefield near Solferino, Italy during the Battle of Italian Unification in 
1859.346  Unable to forget the battlefield images seared into his memory, a few years later 
Dunant wrote A Memory of Solferino, a huge success particularly among contemporary 
influential elites.347  It generated a movement to improve the treatment of fighters during armed 
conflict.  This movement was inclusive of all fighters, regardless of religion, a departure from 
previous jus in bello practice.348  A year later, on the basis of the arguments presented in his 
book, Dunant and others formed the ICRC.349  Within a year of its founding and with the help of 
the Swiss government, the ICRC organized a diplomatic conference which would give birth to 
the first Geneva Conventions in 1864.350  Thus began the era of modern IHL: 
Through the ages communities have created humanitarian rules of one kind or another, 
limiting the evils of war and protecting its victims.  No period in history, and no 
civilization, can take sole credit for the ‘invention’ of humanitarian law.  That being said, 
Solferino was unquestionably the inspiration for modern humanitarian law, enshrined in 
treaties, having a secular basis and aspiring to universality…”351 
 
This practice of convening international conventions after the identification of gaps in existing 
IHL or its implementation became the method by which the ICRC promulgated IHL 
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development.352  Consequently, the ICRC quickly became a major force in the development of 
IHL.353  As Rene Provost finds, the ICRC 
exerted considerable influence by setting agendas, lending its credibility to the process, 
acting as an independent expert advisor throughout the negotiations, and issuing 
authoritative commentaries after the adoption of the conventions.354 
 
However, despite Dunant’s desire for universal appeal, states without a majority Christian 
population were absent at the 1864 Geneva Convention.355 
 Consistent with Dunant’s motivations, the early Geneva Conventions focused primarily 
on the treatment of fighters, much like the Lieber Code.  In particular, they focused on the proper 
treatment of combatants rendered hors de combat.  Prior to these Conventions, wounded soldiers 
were left to fend for themselves as Dunant witnessed at the Battle of Solferino, and medical staff 
was often targeted.356  However, the Conventions endorsed the distinction principle through their 
identification of these fighters and those who aid them as impermissible targets.  However, they 
did not contain language referring to non-military personnel (other than hospital staff) as 
immune.   
The next development in IHL originated in Russia.  Czar Alexander II of Russia 
convened an international conference to address the issue of explosive rifle bullets.357   As such 
this Conference addressed one particular branch of IHL, the Law of The Hague, which limits the 
means of harming the enemy during armed conflict; the other branch of IHL, the Law of Geneva, 
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provides protections for victims of armed conflict and includes the above mentioned 1864 and 
1906 Geneva Conventions.358  As was the case with the first Geneva Conventions, the plight of 
fighters motivated the organizers of the St. Petersburg Conference.  At its conclusion, delegates 
produced the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, affirming that the “the necessities of war ought 
to yield to the requirements of humanity.”359  With this Declaration, delegates sought to end the 
practice of “total” war in which fighters disregarded the distinction principle.  As such, while not 
explicitly articulating the distinction principle, the Preamble of the St. Petersburg Declaration 
argued that a state’s armed forces constituted the only permissible target during armed 
conflict.360   
A persistent theme among these treaties was the use of ambiguous language.  Chris af 
Jochnick and Roger Normand critique the St. Petersburg Declaration for its imprecise wording:   
The drafters of the St. Petersburg Declaration set an example to be followed at 
subsequent international conferences of…. avoiding difficult subjects through vague, 
non-binding resolutions incapable of imposing practical limits on conduct.361 
 
Such imprecise language would become the hallmark of codified IHL.  
The 1907 Hague Convention represented the international community’s first broad 
attempt to restrict land warfare.362  Forty-four states met in The Hague, attempting to minimize 
the ambiguity in IHL in order to reduce the brutal effects of war.  This time, non-majority 
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Christian states including Persia and the Ottoman Empire attended.363  James Brown Scott, U.S. 
delegate to the Conference, recounts Chairman de Nelidow’s announcement at the start of the 
conference, 
This task, gentlemen, as outlined in the program of the Conference and accepted by all 
the governments, is composed of two parts.  On the one hand, we are to seek the means 
of settling in a friendly manner any differences which may arise among the nations, and 
of this preventing ruptures and armed conflicts.  On the other hand, we must endeavor, if 
war has broken out, to mitigate its burdens both for the combatants themselves, and for 
those who may be indirectly affected… I was told, ‘the peoples waging it must feel its 
full weight so that they will seek to put an end to it as soon as possible and not desire to 
resume it.  This idea, gentlemen, seems absolutely fallacious to me.364 
 
Pursuant to this goal, the delegates of the Hague Convention produced and adopted the 
1907Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. In accordance with the humanitarian spirit of 
the Convention, Article 22 of the Annex to the Convention famously declared, “the right of 
fighters to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited…”365  It also adopted a 
universalist orientation: the Conference officially declared a secular approach to its humanitarian 
ideals.366  However, much like the Lieber Code and the first Geneva Conventions, the Hague 
Convention focused disproportionately more on fighters than on civilians367: “The central 
problem plaguing the lawmakers at The Hague was most emphatically not about the protection 
of civilians but defining what types of combatants the laws were to cover.”368  For instance, it 
offered a definition of belligerent without similar treatment of “civilian.” The Hague 
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Conventions did provide a general list of protected persons.369  This list included combatants 
rendered hors de combat, residents living in undefended centers of population, and in occupied 
territory, those that did not bear arms or engage in espionage.370  Reciprocity governed these 
protections: they held until the first state violated them.371    Furthermore, these protections only 
applied in international conflicts.372  
While it attempted to humanize war practices through its call to honor the distinction 
principle, the 1907 Hague Convention gave the principle short shrift because of the imprecise 
manner in which it was done.  Regarding the distinction principle, for instance, the previously 
mentioned Article 22 announces its restrictions without further clarification as to who is 
considered “the enemy” or what is meant by unlimited means.373  The indefinite language used 
about the distinction principle prompted scholars af Jochnick and Normand to claim regarding 
battlefield practices subsequent to the Hague Convention, “the Hague laws are vaguely worded 
and permissive, enabling powerful states to use the latest military technology with little regard 
for humanitarian consequences.”374   
In addition to imprecise language, these treaties underserved the distinction principle 
because of their limited applicability.  These efforts to humanize the practice of warfare applied 
primarily within the European and American domains.  Restrictions like the distinction principle 
played a much less significant role in battlefield practices in colonial wars.  Contemporary legal 
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scholar John Westlake argued that “’savages of half-civilized tribes’ should be treated quite 
differently in combat.”375 
 
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
 
The World Wars had a profound impact on the development of the distinction principle, 
primarily because so many civilians died during the course of them.  One of the reasons for the 
heavy civilian casualties during the two World Wars is tied to the blurring of the line 
distinguishing permissible from impermissible civilian targets.  During the World Wars, civilian 
workers in military installations, the wide exercise of voting rights in democracies on the war 
path, and the merging of the home-front and the front-lines broke down the more definitive line 
separating fighters from others present in previous wars, and led many to make broad based 
arguments that contributing to the war effort amounted to hostile acts.376  William Ford explains: 
Hardly a century ago war was a matter involving but small numbers of people.  The 
situation changed when national consciousness and democracy began to develop… Sir 
Winston Churchill said, ‘When democracy forced itself upon the battlefield, war ceased 
to be a gentlemen’s game.’377  
 
Essentially they argued for an expansion in who was conventionally considered a permissible 
civilian target.378  In fact, some argued that permissible civilian targets included anyone who had 
the misfortune of finding herself within the zone of hostilities.379   
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This more expansive (and strategic) view partially accounts for bombing strategies during 
World War II.  It led to “’total war.... fought by entire nations in wherein all are considered 
‘combatants’…’” (emphasis added).380  This was the case for states that engaged in bombing 
strategies (as the previous quote indicates) and those victimized by them.  For instance, German 
civilians (that is, citizens who were not in the armed forces) killed during British bombing raids 
were buried with full military honors and considered soldiers who died for their country.381   
Such a perspective was an offshoot of the levee en masse (discussed earlier) leading military 
planners to categorize “political, psychological, and moral resources as military targets…”382 
And at the time, codified IHL fell silent as to the legitimacy of this categorization. Recall that 
none of the previously mentioned treaties defined “civilian.”  A.P.V. Rogers finds that military 
air planners 
would not have found a list of legitimate targets or a definition of the distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant; at best, they ‘would have found considerable 
disagreement and confusion among scholars.’383 
 
As Ward Thomas explains 
…the failure of the bombing norm in the 2nd WW was caused not only by the strategic 
interests of the fighters but also by the inherent weakness of the norm itself...384   
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Consequently, the World Wars witnessed heavy bombing campaigns on both sides, leading to 
the deaths of millions, counter to the purpose of IHL.  It led many to question the future of the 
distinction principle. 
 In response to the massive violations of IHL during the World Wars, the Swiss 
government, in collaboration with the ICRC, convened a diplomatic conference on April 21, 
1949 to address these issues.385  Two hundred seventy-seven delegates representing fifty-nine 
countries attended.386 The horrific discrepancy between IHL and the conduct of hostilities during 
the World Wars sent a message to IHL advocates that the law needed to be revised or the 
distinction principle was in danger of becoming extinct.  Consequently, the Geneva Conventions, 
specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, recognized civilians as a distinct category 
under IHL which came with rights and obligations no longer contingent on reciprocity.387  
“Civilian” in this context differed semantically from previous usage of the term.388  Prior to this 
point, “civilian” did not connote necessarily a protected class but the non-military members of 
the population (including members of non-state armed groups).389 
Article 4 defines some protected persons as those “who, at a given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”390  Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions states the most basic minimum rules applicable to protected persons391: 
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…each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or 
wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture 
 
The distinction principle, as embodied in the Geneva Conventions, differentiated between those 
who take no active part in hostilities and those who do, with the former being impermissible 
targets.  The basis of this distinction can be traced back to chivalric codes discussed in the 
previous chapter in which protection was offered to those who did not enter the knights’ 
exclusive realm of warfare.392   
The Geneva Conventions would also expand the jurisdictional base of IHL to include 
non-international conflicts, continued further by Additional Protocol II.393  For example, the 
Geneva Conventions apply to undeclared wars between parties and powers (including non-state 
actors), occupations and those not a party to the Conventions.394  Consequently, IHL protections 
like the civilian immunity norm, once limited to international conflicts, now governed conflicts 
and protected victims once without redress because they fell under the sacrosanct domain of 
sovereignty.395   
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Groundbreaking as the Geneva Conventions may have been, they still left many issues 
related to war’s effects on impermissible targets unanswered.396  For example, Common Article 
3 does not offer further guidance as to how to interpret the pivotal phrase, “active part in 
hostilities.”  One reason for this was the political considerations which greatly influenced the 
shape of the civilian protection regime during the drafting of the Geneva Conventions.397  For 
instance, the victors of World War II dictated the content of the civilian protection regime 
contained within the Geneva Conventions.398   Consequently, much of the deliberations focused 
on the distinction principle within the context of the treatment of civilians under enemy 
occupation and enemy detainment, rather than the civilian experience of aerial bombardment.399  
This is despite the fact that many decried the bombardment of enemy population centers to break 
morale as impermissible targeting.  Many jurists espoused the view that 
No matter how closely a civilian might be engaged in war-supporting, indeed, war 
enabling work, so long as he was not actually a fighting man, equipped personally to 
carry on hostilities against you or to defend himself against you, he must not be counted a 
combatant any more than should the soldier’s fiancée, wife or parents.400 
 
Yet, many experts considered civilians working in industries directly related to the war effort as 
permissible targets.401  Even the ICRC discounted the common association of “civilian” with 
inability to harm; its commentary on the 4th Geneva Convention posits 
wounded and prisoners of war are human beings who have become harmless, and the 
State’s obligation towards them are not a serious hindrance to its conduct of the 
hostilities; on the other hand, civilians have not in most cases been rendered harmless, 
and the steps taken on their behalf may be a serious hindrance to the conduct of war.402 
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Consequently, the basic distinction principle in the Geneva Conventions reflected a particular 
perspective of targeting decisions of those, within one’s effective control or in occupied territory, 
which did not encompass the full experience during armed conflict or a consensus among legal 
experts. 
 
1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
 
Much like the evolution of IHL in response to the World Wars, global events continued to 
influence the development of the distinction principle in codified IHL.  As a result of the 
tremendous loss of life during the Vietnam War, as well as liberation struggles in the post-
colonial era, the ICRC recognized the need for revisions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.403  
Consequently, in 1968 the ICRC commenced a new effort to reaffirm and update IHL.404  The 
reaffirmation of the distinction principle possessed particular importance to the ICRC since the 
community of states had expanded significantly in the post-1949 Geneva Conventions era.405  
The ICRC wanted to ensure these new states bound themselves to IHL.406  However, these new 
states did not want to pledge their commitment to laws they had no hand in drafting.407  
Therefore, the ICRC initiated efforts to revise the 1949 Geneva Conventions.   
The Additional Protocols of 1977 (APs) were a product of such activities.  They were 
adopted during the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and the Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, held in Geneva from 1974 to 
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1977.408  More than one hundred countries attended the conference.409  It is no small feat that 
with this many in attendance the APs were adopted by consensus.410  The APs in essence merged 
the Law of The Hague and the Law of Geneva and supplemented Geneva Convention 
protections.411   AP I applies to international conflicts (which includes self-determination 
movements against colonial and racist regimes) and AP II applies to non-international conflicts 
of a certain intensity.412   
The rather unprecedented number of countries present during this convention allowed the 
presentation of, and debate over, issues that previously received less attention.413  One was the 
impact of asymmetrical warfare between two states on compliance with IHL.  Lesser developed 
countries argued that insufficient technology and fewer resources would prevent them from 
being able to properly distinguish between permissible and impermissible targets, as well 
influence the composition of these categories.414  Further disagreements over the purposes and 
the means for achieving those purposes produced a treaty, which according to Antonio Cassese, 
… is replete with general or ambiguous clauses designed to please both the States hostile 
to the development of international legislation on the matter and those which desired to 
create an international instrument of considerable substance.415 
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In other words, state interests contributed to the vagueness in the APs.  Richard D. Rosen 
claims, 
Not all conference participants were motivated by a selfless desire to protect civilians 
from the devastation wrought by war. Many delegations, particularly those from so-called 
third world nations and with assistance from the Soviet bloc, fiercely advocated for the 
development of targeting restrictions that would negate the military superiority of 
Western nations, most notably the United States and Israel.416 
 
George H. Aldrich, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Diplomatic Convention which 
produced the 1977 APs, also alludes to this prioritization of state interests at the expense of 
crafting a more effective civilian protection regime: “In general, I believe it can be said that [the 
APs] provide as much protection to civilians as was negotiable at the time.”417  Thus, state 
interests of both developed and developing countries, rather than humanitarian concern, drove 
the negotiations on civilian protection.  That state interests colored the language and scope of the 
AP treaties comes as no surprise.  As Shirley V. Scott points out, 
 The entwining of international law with world politics is evident in the realm of treaties 
 insofar as treaties are the product of negotiations between states and states can be 
 expected to approach negotiations… as a political exercise.  Each state will bring its own 
 political objectives and strategies to the negotiating table, and as the product of those 
 negotiations, the resultant treaty text is likely to reflect the political compromises that 
 were required to reach agreement. 418 
 
Despite the discord produced by the diversity of perspectives present, the AP convention 
did manage to produce a treaty that continued the development of the distinction principle.  The 
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extensive protections offered to civilians differentiate the APs from other IHL treaties.419  
Aldrich endorsed this view: 
The Protocol is, without any doubt, the most important treaty codifying and developing 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts since the 4 Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and it is the first such Treaty since 1907 to deal with methods and 
means of warfare and the protection of the civilian population from the effects of 
warfare.420 
 
As stated earlier, the primary purpose of the APs was to reaffirm the applicability of the 
distinction principle in all conflicts421 and is encapsulated in Article 48, AP I:  
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives.422    
 
Article 50.1, AP I defines a civilian for the first time in codified IHL as “any person who does 
not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A (1), (2), (3), and (6) of the 
Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”423  This language represents a departure 
from previous official versions of the distinction principle.  In prior versions, impermissible 
target status was premised on identity-based criteria, such as membership in a particular group or 
contemporary notions of innocence.424  Additionally, the 1949 Geneva Conventions offered a list 
of protected persons.   The APs, instead, confer protection on a homogenous group (civilians) 
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based on the criterion of inactivity.425  According to Article 51, §3, AP I civilians lose the 
protections afforded by the civilian immunity norm “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities.”426  This marks a slight change in language (from “active part in 
hostilities” in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).427   
AP II, which applies to both state and non-state armed forces in non-interstate armed 
conflicts, is much less developed than AP I.428  While using the term “civilian,” AP II does not 
offer a definition of it.  For instance, Article 13(2) states that “the civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack,”429 but does not define who is 
considered a civilian.  Neither is there a definition of combatant.  Consequently, AP II fails to 
clearly lay out the core elements of the dominant distinction dichotomy.   It does echo the 
distinction principle as expressed in AP I; Article 13, AP II mirrors Article 51, §3, AP I by 
stating civilians lose immunity from attack for “such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.”430  Both APs resemble language in Common Article 3 (1) of the Geneva 
Conventions.  However, the less developed nature of AP II leads Frits Kalshoven to conclude 
that “provisions on the protection of the civilian population… hang somewhat in the air.”431     
As articulated by the APs, being a civilian does not in itself entitle one to immunity.  That 
is because once a civilian takes a “direct part in hostilities,” she forfeits the protections of the 
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civilian immunity norm, and can be subject to direct, intentional and lethal attack.432 However, 
she retains her civilian status.  Only civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities are 
immune from direct, intentional attack.  As such, there are essentially two levels of distinction in 
the APs: a distinction between civilians and combatants (of which the latter can be targeted at 
anytime unless rendered hors de combat), and between civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities and civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities.  Only those that fall within 
the latter category are deemed impermissible targets.  This parallels the distinction principle 
contained in the Lieber Code discussed earlier.   
Permissible targets are those that further a military objective and confer a definite 
military advantage.  Article 52 (2), AP I address military objective and military advantage: 
…military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, 
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage.433 
 
Permissible targets include combatants and civilians who directly participate in hostilities.434  
Military necessity trumps blanket civilian protection:    
The direct participation rule represents a paradigmatic example of this dynamic in that 
attack is permitted against civilians only in the face of clear military necessity—where 
those civilians are so harming the enemy…. that withdrawal of their protection from 
attack is merited.435 
 
Consequently, the meaning of direct participation holds the utmost importance to the current 
civilian protection regime. 
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CONTINUED AMBIGUITY IN THE DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE 
 
As the above overview demonstrates, the civilian immunity norm imposes certain obligations 
upon belligerents toward civilians within the context of armed conflict.  One such obligation is to 
distinguish between permissible and impermissible targets.  Belligerents can only target the 
former.  The APs decree that direct participation dictates the identification of permissible targets 
among the civilian population.   
However, if the purpose of the APs was a clearer enunciation of permissible and 
impermissible targets, the end product fell far from its mark.  As Antonio Cassese noted, the APs 
are filled with ambiguous terms.  The ambiguity that plagued the distinction principle prior to 
codification continues today because “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities” is tremendously ambiguous from a legal and operational perspective.436  This is so 
despite the fact that Article 51 (AP I) instructs belligerents to assume a person is a civilian when 
in doubt.437  The ambiguity is so significant that the ICRC, tasked with the monitoring and 
dissemination of IHL, convened a panel of IHL experts in a multi-year investigation into how 
best to clarify this critical phrase.438  In the workshops’ output, 2009 Interpretive Guidance on 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (Guidance), the ICRC 
recognizes this problem: 
International humanitarian law has addressed the trend toward increased civilian participation 
in hostilities by providing a basic rule, found in both Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, pursuant to which civilians benefit from protection against direct attack “unless 
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and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”  It is the meaning of this notion- 
direct participation in hostilities- that the present Interpretive Guidance seeks to explain.  In 
examining the notion of direct participation in hostilities the ICRC not only had to face 
longstanding dilemmas that had surrounded its practical application…. but also had to 
grapple with more recent trends that further underlined the need for clarity.439 
 
Courts can also be counted in this group.  Hilly Moodrick Even-Khen describes the Israeli 
Supreme Court landmark decision in The Public Committee against Torture v. The Government 
of Israel (regarding the legality of targeted killing in IHL) 
…it seems to the Court that according to the international literature, there is no customary 
agreed-upon definition of the term “direct” in the context under discussion. Hence, it 
reaches the conclusion that “there is no escaping going case-by-case, while narrowing the 
area of disagreement.440 
 
As such, scholars and policymakers offer a variety of means for interpreting this vital 
phrase.441  To maintain the humanitarian purposes of the distinction principle, some argue that 
the term should be interpreted to comprise those activities that military personnel would 
perform.442  Others suggest a narrow interpretation so that few actions would be considered 
direct participation.  Others argue that a more liberal interpretation would honor this 
humanitarian spirit.  For example Michael N. Schmitt claims,  
While broadly interpreting the activities that subject civilians to attack might seem 
counterintuitive from a humanitarian perspective, it actually enhances the protection of 
the civilian population as a whole by encouraging distance from hostile operations.443  
 
                                                 
439 Kellenberger, Jakob. 2009. International Committee for the Red Cross. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities. Geneva: ICRC. 5. 
440 Even-Khen, Hilly Moodrick. 2007. “Case Note: Can We Tell What ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Is?”, 
International Law Forum of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 22.  
441 Chapter 4 offers a more detailed discussion of this point 
442 For example, see Schmitt (2005:FN 93 at 593) 
443 Schmitt, Michael N. 2005. “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees,” Chicago Journal of International Law 5:511, 532.  
 109 
 
The distinction becomes more muddled with the increased use of private military contractors.444  
The ambiguity between what is a permissible and impermissible target is even stronger in the 
case of non-international armed conflict where IHL is much less developed.   
 The parameters of direct participation are not the only ambiguous language in the 
Additional Protocols handicapping the distinction principle.  There is also much uncertainty as to 
what “unless and for such time” means.445  The Commentaries to the APs state that loss of 
immunity is confined to this time period.446  However, even if actors agreed upon an 
interpretation of direct participation, what is the duration of the participation for which civilians 
would lose their immunity?  How this phrase is understood is of pivotal consequence for it is 
during this time period that a civilian loses immunity and can be deliberately targeted with lethal 
force.  Yet, IHL offers no consensus direction, and the Commentaries to the APs offer little 
guidance.447  They advise that participation is not limited to the actual attack, but also includes 
the period involving the preparation or return from attack.448   However, they offer no further 
instruction as to what acts fall under the gambit of preparation.  For instance, would “unless and 
for such time” extend to the entire period of membership in a terrorist group, inclusive of rest 
periods between acts of preparation for an attack, or just the period of actual implementation of 
the attack?449  Many argue that this phrase gives rise to the “revolving door” problem whereby a 
civilian who directly participates in hostilities through the use of a weapon can reclaim his or her 
immunity simply by dropping the weapon.450   
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 The ICRC, recognizing the multitude of problems related to the distinction principle as 
articulated in the 1977 APs, issued its 2009 Guidance in an attempt to clarify the matter.  It 
notes, 
aspects of contemporary warfare have given rise to confusion and uncertainty as to the 
distinction between legitimate military targets and persons protected against direct 
attacks…. 
 
Under IHL , the concept of direct participation in hostilities refers to conduct which, if 
carried out by civilians, suspends their protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations. Most notably, for the duration of their direct participation in 
hostilities, civilians may be directly attacked as if they were combatants. Derived from 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, the notion of taking a direct or active part 
in hostilities is found in many provisions of IHL . However, despite the serious legal 
consequences involved, neither the Conventions nor their Additional Protocols provide a 
definition of direct participation in hostilities.451 
 
It goes on to summarize its conceptualization of “civilian” in international and non-international 
armed conflicts: 
For the purposes of the principle of distinction in international armed conflict, all 
persons who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor 
participants in a levée en masse are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection 
against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.452 
For the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict, 
all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups 
of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against 
direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In 
noninternational armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces 
of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous 
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat function”).453 
As for direct participation in hostilities, 
In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the 
following cumulative criteria: 
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1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, 
injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack 
(threshold of harm), and 
 
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result 
either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act 
constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold     
of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus).454 
Furthermore, 
Measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in 
hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution, 
constitute an integral part of that act.455 
 
Civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each specific act 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas members of organized armed 
groups belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict cease to be civilians… and 
lose protection against direct attack, for as long as they assume their continuous combat 
function.456 
  
Yet, despite this laudable attempt to enhance compliance with IHL, the Guidance did not, 
and does not, eradicate the ambiguity connected to permissible civilian targets.  Workshop 
participants disagreed on what constitutes a permissible civilian target.  This contentious nature 
of the expert meetings led some scholars to conclude,  
To some extent, the process ended in failure. The experts were unable to agree on several 
key issues though there was a considerable degree of common ground…  Nevertheless, 
the ICRC, encouraged by the amount of agreement there was, decided to publish their 
own ‘Interpretative Guidance’ based on the process.  As Section 1 states, the Guidance ‘is 
widely informed by the discussions held during these expert meetings but does not 
necessarily reflect a unanimous view or majority opinion of the experts. The ICRC have 
therefore expressed their own views ‘informed by’ but not necessarily reflective of the 
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views of the experts. This is an important factor to bear in mind when considering the 
Guidance.457 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter sought to examine the distinction principle during the era of IHL codification.  It 
reveals that throughout this process, ambiguity plagued key elements of the distinction principle.  
At times during this codification process, ambiguity was intentionally created in order to cater to 
state interests.  As the continued high civilian casualty rates that followed each attempt to 
improve the civilian protection regime suggest, the ambiguity created in codified law ultimately 
undermined its humanitarian objectives.  While interested parties may debate the reasons for this 
ambiguity, that pivotal elements of the distinction principle, particularly those in the APs, are 
vague is clear, as noted by some members of government delegations to the Diplomatic 
Conference that led to the APs, 
As the interpretation of these terms may affect matters of life or death, it is indeed 
regrettable that the ambiguities are left for resolution to the practice of States in future 
conflicts.458 
 
While the APs are the main subject of inquiry for this study, such an allegation can be leveled at 
the distinction principle in all its many forms throughout its history.  Fighters and scholars 
throughout the centuries have disagreed on who is considered a permissible target.  This legacy 
of ambiguity created, and as evidenced in the following chapter, continues to create, a fog of 
protection surrounding the civilian immunity norm. 
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CHAPTER 6: IHL EXPERT AND FORMER BELLIGERENT VIEWS ON 
PERMISSIBLE CIVILIAN TARGETS 
 
There are few IHL topics as timely or contentious as direct participation in hostilities.459 
 
 
This chapter demonstrates that different interpretations of the distinction principle are not simply 
a relic of the past; they continue into current manifestations of the civilian protection regime.  It 
also provides a demonstration of the norm contestation framework as a tool for understanding 
these variations in distinction methods.  It does so in the following manner:  first, an examination 
of the various ways IHL respondents (ICRC delegates and IHL scholars) conceptualize 
permissible civilian targets is offered.  This discussion reveals that IHL respondents do not 
completely agree on what constitutes a permissible civilian target.  Then an exploration of the 
nature of intersubjectivity on permissible civilian targets among former belligerents follows.  
This exploration exposes the multitude of distinction methods former belligerents use in their 
narratives describing intentional civilian deaths.  The chapter also discusses belligerent narratives 
that conform to a norm violation framework. 
 
DOES INTERSUBJECTIVITY EXIST AMONG IHL EXPERTS ON THE DISTINCTION 
PRINCIPLE AND PERMISSIBLE CIVILIAN TARGETS? 
 
Distinction Principle, DPH, and Permissible Targets 
As mentioned in previous chapters, AP I states that civilians are protected from deliberate 
attack if they do not directly participate in hostilities (DPH). An ICRC delegate, instrumental in 
the drafting of the 2009 ICRC “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
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Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law”460 (Guidance), explained the connection 
between the distinction principle, permissible civilian targets and DPH in IHL.  According to this 
respondent, the notion of military necessity acts as the backbone to the distinction principle 
(discussed in Chapter 5).  If there is no military necessity to attack a target, then there is no need 
to deliberately attack that target.  Military necessity captures the essence of the distinction 
between permissible and impermissible targets.  If it is militarily necessary to target something, 
then it is a permissible target.  If it is not, then that target is impermissible.  In the case of 
civilians, it might be a military necessity to deliberately target some civilians, but certainly not a 
military necessity to target all civilians.  When would civilians become a permissible target?  
They become permissible targets when they directly participate in hostilities.  Thus, civilians 
who DPH are permissible targets under IHL, while still retaining their civilian status. 
Therefore, DPH serves an incredibly important concept in IHL for it informs belligerents 
when they can and cannot target civilians.  Despite its importance, this respondent acknowledged 
that IHL did not adequately define DPH prior to the ICRC organized workshops (Workshops) 
which produced the Guidance:  “there was a lack of criteria for the distinction between peaceful 
civilians and others… there is no definition in treaty law, state practice or jurisprudence...”461  
The ICRC delegate stipulated that there were no gaps in the law; just that the law needed to be 
clarified.  This created the impetus for the Workshops to clarify the matter.  As such, these 
Workshops needed to answer three questions:  who is a civilian; what does DPH mean; and what 
are the modalities of suspension of protection.   
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 Another respondent detailed the three prong test the Guidance proposed to further 
explain the operation of DPH.462  First, DPH requires the act in question to meet a threshold of 
harm.  Once this threshold of harm has been met, the act needs to directly cause the harm.  
Consequently creating or distributing propaganda would not qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities because the connection between the act and the potential harm caused is not direct 
enough.  For this reason, financing, feeding and housing the opponent would also not qualify.  
Lastly, there needs to be a belligerent nexus.  Violence between private citizens would not be 
considered direct participation in hostilities. 
 
Intersubjectivity on Distinction Principle and DPH 
 IHL respondents almost unanimously stated that the method for distinguishing between 
targetable and untargetable civilians hinged on DPH.  In other words, civilians who DPH could 
be permissibly targeted.  Therefore, one could conclude that intersubjectivity exists among IHL 
experts on direct participation as the method of distinction between permissible and 
impermissible civilian targets. 
Based on this consistent identification of the DPH standard and the detailed 
understanding of its parameters after the Workshops, it might seem that there is little room for 
ambiguity about the distinction principle among interested parties.  However, intersubjectivity 
deteriorated when respondents were asked what acts constitute DPH.  As stated earlier, this 
phrase is vitally important as it helps to determine when civilian might be targeted and whether a 
war crime has been committed.  Despite the importance of this phrase, IHL experts less 
consistently articulated its meaning in practice.  Take the act of bomb making for example.  
Some IHL respondents thought bomb making should be considered DPH, while several others 
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disagreed.463  Those who disagreed felt that bomb making did not fit the three prong test of DPH 
as discussed previously.  In particular, they felt there is not a direct enough connection between 
the act of bomb making and the harm caused by the bomb created.  Instead, those who disagreed 
thought that the act of placing the bomb in its detonation site would satisfy the direct link 
element. 
IHL respondents not only disagreed on what acts constitute DPH, they also could not 
agree on how certain categories of people should be viewed for the permissible/impermissible 
target distinction.  The notion of childhood serves as a prime example.  Respondents 
acknowledged that there is no consensus on what constitutes a child.  Not only is there a lack of 
consensus on what constitutes a child, there is lack of consensus on what presumption to make 
regarding children.  IHL respondents could not agree one whether children should have blanket 
immunity during armed conflict.  That this issue came up during the course of my discussions 
with them about DPH is interesting because the Guidance asserts that DPH is act based.  
However, the discussion on children centered on actor based notions of which civilians can or 
cannot be targeted.  Thus, this discussion reveals another level of the lack of intersubjectivity 
among IHL experts on what is a permissible target during armed conflict. 
The lack of consensus is not lost upon these respondents.  Several respondents I spoke to 
readily admitted that the legal, military and humanitarian practitioner communities disagree on 
the parameters of DPH, particularly as it is articulated in the Guidance.  These disagreements 
manifested in the Workshops as well.  The disagreements on which specific acts constitute DPH 
reflect different opinions on the scope of DPH.  One expert pinpointed this issue as one source of 
contention during the Workshops.464  According to this participant, state representatives wanted 
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to leave the concept of DPH vague; they had an interest in keeping “the definition from being too 
precise.”465    Another IHL respondent corroborated this sentiment: “the military does not think 
[the guidelines] are wide enough and the NGOs think it’s too wide.”466  Another respondent 
offered more detailed elaboration: the air force representatives lobbied for a wide interpretation 
of DPH while the army representatives wanted a more restrictive interpretation.467 
Furthermore, there is still confusion about some of the terms used in the Guidance.  For 
instance, the Guidance states that civilians who DPH are only targetable while they directly 
participate, whereas civilians who assume a continuous combat role in an organized armed group 
are targetable any time as long as they have that role in the organization during armed conflict.468   
In essence, the difference relates to when civilians regain their immunity from deliberate attack.  
For those civilians who DPH, immunity resumes once they terminate their action.  For those 
civilians who belong to an organized armed group and hold a continuous combat role, their 
immunity resumes when they terminate their relationship with that organization or they cease to 
have a continuous combat role within the organization.  The language in the Guidance discussing 
these two related concepts was such that one expert said that “it can be difficult to distinguish 
between civilians who directly participate in hostilities and those who have a continuous combat 
role.”469  The confusion created may be because the Guidance utilizes two disparate methods of 
distinction for civilians: an act based one for civilians who directly participate in armed conflict 
and an actor based one for those civilians who possess a continuous combat role in an organized 
armed group. 
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What my interviews revealed was that IHL respondents do agree that the concept of 
“direct participation in hostilities” determines which civilians can be targeted and which civilians 
cannot.  As for what exactly qualifies as DPH, the consensus crumbles.  While IHL respondents 
did agree that some acts constituted DPH (spying), this agreement was not comprehensive.   
Respondents also disagreed on whether some acts could be considered DPH. They expressed this 
disagreement not only to me, but during the Workshops organized for the purpose of clarifying 
this crucial concept in IHL.  This disagreement serves as one indicator of the lack of 
intersubjectivity on permissible civilian targets.  IHL respondents also seemed unclear on 
another level: whether the conceptualization of permissible civilian targets should be act centered 
or actor centered.  While the Guidance argues the basis of determinations of permissible civilian 
targets should be specific acts, respondents also indicated that actor perception still factors into 
assessments of permissible targets.  This was evident in the discussions about how children 
should be viewed.  As such, not only were respondents lacking consensus on which acts should 
determine a permissible target, but whether such perceptions should matter as well and if they 
should, how they should matter.   
 
DOES INTERSUBJECTIVITY EXIST AMONG FORMER BELLIGERENTS ON THE 
DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE AND PERMISSIBLE CIVILIAN TARGETS? 
 
The previous discussion reveals that intersubjectivity on DPH as the appropriate means for 
distinguishing between permissible and impermisisble civilian targets exists among IHL 
respondents.  It also reveals that intersubjectivity is inconsistent among this group when it comes 
to what DPH means in practice.  This condition exists even after the conclusion of Workshops to 
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clarify the matter and the creation of the Guidance to assist various armed groups as well as other 
interested parties.  The consequences of this disunity pose less severe hazards if the lack of 
intersubjectivity were isolated to this particular group of actors.  But is it?  How do belligerents 
fare when asked what determines a permissible civilian target?  The next section discusses how 
former belligerents view the obligation to distinguish, and if they accept this duty, whether they 
consistently identify permissible civilian targets.  
 
Distinction Principle 
 Much like the IHL respondents, nearly all the former belligerents I interviewed 
acknowledged the obligation to distinguish between permissible and impermissible civilian 
targets.  Of the twenty former belligerent narratives collected (which discussed the actions of 
both the respondent and the respondent’s opponents), only one respondent described an instance 
of a rejection of the distinction principle, and this was in reference to the respondent’s opponent.  
Not only do they acknowledge this obligation, belligerents also claimed to abide by it.  
For instance, none of the former belligerent respondents spoke of total war; they claimed to make 
an effort to be selective about which civilians they would target.  This finding corroborates a 
statement made by an ICRC delegate I interviewed: “I never met anyone who said all is fair in 
war.”470  Consequently, it appears that intersubjectivity on the obligation to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible targets exists among former belligerent respondents. 
 However, like the IHL respondents, this intersubjectivity weakens when former 
belligerent respondents were asked what constitutes a permissible civilian target.  As will 
become apparent in the following discussion, these respondents proffered myriad methods of 
distinction.  Many of these methods differ significantly from those offered by IHL respondents.   
                                                 
470 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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Permissible Civilian Targets: Actor-based Distinctions 
Age- Children 
As the introductory chapter reveals, children are not always deemed innocent, 
unthreatening and worthy of protection simply because they are children.  Former belligerents I 
interviewed also expressed such a complex view of children.  That the conflicts in which these 
belligerents fought saw the direct participation of children negated the presumption of innocence 
often attached to children:  
…which type of a child because when we say of “this size” they might be around 6, 7, 8, 
10…this one is not a problem as such but the person who is, maybe around 12, is 
dangerous because he can maybe come with a bomb… around that age of 12, if he is 
approaching, if they see him coming and they are not sure, they are not familiar to this 
child, they can point a gun. If he is an innocent person he can surrender, he can raise the 
hands.  But if you see the person [at which] you are pointing a gun, [and] he is carrying 
something dangerous, if maybe he comes closer, it can harm you. You can attack that 
person or injure so that you can question the person.471 
 
The excerpt indicates that the concept of child is quite different from that in other societies.  
Children above the age of 12 lose the presumption of innocence because those in that age group 
have been used to carry out attacks.   As such, these belligerent children over the age of 12 are 
viewed with heightened suspicion when they approach a military camp. 
 A Zimbabwean soldier’s narrative supports this sentiment.  When asked about how he 
viewed young people in conflicts where there existed child soldiers, he offered his method of 
distinction based on the use of child soldiers in that conflict: 
Interviewer:  I heard in some conflicts in Africa that some of the rebel groups will use 
children as soldiers… 
 
                                                 
471 Interview 09060801 (Dukwi, 2009). 
 121 
 
Respondent:  Young to the tune of about seven because at seven years old, you will be 
about that much [raises his hand above the ground to the estimated height of a seven year 
old].  From seven and above, up to 15, they are turned into soldiers.  That is very 
prominent in those countries you are talking about. 
 
Interviewer:  In those countries [in which child soldiers fought], when you are going into 
the bush or you are going to these villages, if you saw a young person, would you think 
that person is dangerous? 
 
Respondent:  When you are in those countries it’s a question of knowing [whether] that 
person knows something about weapons… is he involved in the conflict that I have come 
here for?  That’s all you have to find out.  No young boys of about 7 years or 10 years in 
those countries who know weapons.472 
 
 In these narratives, respondents articulate an age based distinction, one that seems 
calibrated. According to such narratives, belligerents are more likely to consider children 
appearing older than 10 to be permissible targets because they experienced children in that age 
group participating in hostilities and thus, posing a threat to them.   
 However, not all children are viewed with equal suspicion.  Narratives imply that 
children appearing to be younger than 10 are viewed as non-threatening.  In respondent 
narratives, children deemed non-threatening were protected: 
 Respondent:  With children, [fighters] will protect them because they have no way to 
 protect themselves.  They are young.  If they run, they might run toward the enemies.473   
 
Age-Elders 
Village elders were often targeted by the opposing side during attacks on villages because 
of their importance (in this case, the opposing side is the Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola or MPLA): 
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…the senior members or the senior elders in the village. Usually they are [MPLA] targets 
because they work together to control that village and to have some other important 
information.474 
 
These village elders were targeted because they often collaborated with the União Nacional para 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), providing intelligence and logistical support for 
UNITA.  Thus, by killing them, MPLA was able to eliminate a crucial resource upon which 
UNITA depended.  Hence, rationalizes another UNITA fighter, the reason why the elders might 
be offered special protection: 
…any information communicated to the community comes through the chief.  The chief 
tells the community what is happening, what are the plans of the government.  He is even 
told some secrets which he cannot tell the village. That may be at a certain point of time 
it can be released, maybe to a few people or some. So he will be keeping some secrets.  
Now, [the UNITA fighters] will make sure that they save him, so that those secrets are 
not revealed to their enemies.  They protect the information.475 
 
While the above excerpt is used to explain why UNITA protected the elderly, the 
following excerpt explains why UNITA also employed an age based distinction to target elderly 
people in MPLA villages: 
Interviewer: Were [UNITA fighters] ever concerned about spies or informers in the 
villages? 
 
Respondent: …those things did not happen with the young ones.  It used to happen with 
grown up people.   
 
Interviewer: The older people would be spies? 
Respondent: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: Why were the older people more likely to be spies than the younger people? 
 
Respondent: When they were still there, young ones were not given secretive information 
or private information about the war or politics which the adults know.  So most of the 
information were with the grown up people. 
                                                 
474 Interview 09060801 (Dukwi, 2009). 
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Interviewer: Why would they not give that information to the younger people?  Were 
they not trusted? 
 
Respondent: With the young ones, in that kind of environment, war, they are considered 
to not have much experience in life.  So they are less likely to receive information.  They 
are not clever enough.  They can’t keep that information to themselves.476 
 
These narratives conceive elderly as threatening because their advanced age signals 
wisdom and importance.  This was also the reason why they were protected.  This view of the 
elderly contrasts with those described in previous chapters as needing protection because they 
are viewed as weak and vulnerable.  
 
Gender 
Among the narratives, gendered ideas influence the conception of the distinction 
principle in different ways.  In some narratives, this influence plays out in ways that might 
challenge gendered notions of permissible targets contained in Western European, Islamic and 
pre-colonial African normative traditions.  For instance, a soldier fighting for the Rhodesian 
military acknowledged that the soldiers would inquire about the whereabouts of both young men 
and women because women also fought for nonstate armed groups during that country’s civil 
war once Robert Mugabe became President:  
Interviewer: When the Rhodesian army came to the village and asks, where are your 
sons, would they only ask about the sons, or they asked about the daughters as well?  
 
Respondent: [T]hey used to ask both women and men because also women were going 
for some training. 
 
Interviewer: So there were women fighting on the guerilla side? 
 
Respondent: Yes, they were on the guerilla side.477 
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According to one UNITA fighter, a gender-neutral sense of belligerency also prevailed in 
Angola, at least among UNITA fighters: 
Interviewer:  Do [UNITA fighters] only examine men for these [marks that fighters had 
on their bodies]?  Would they examine women and children as well? 
 
Respondent: …UNITA side also, they will look at women and children, the way she 
walks, the cleverness, they way someone looks.  They will tell that, ‘Look, this is not just 
the cleverness of a civilian.’  The way this person behaves, she knows something, she is 
not a civilian.  They will tell, they will know.478 
 
While a gender-neutral sense of belligerency compelled fighters to inquiry about both 
absent sons and daughters, as well as scrutinize the behavior of men and women they 
encountered in villages, gendered perspectives on appropriate attire played a role in decisions to 
attack women as articulated by the above Rhodesian soldier: 
Respondent: …it was not very easy to identify a woman [fighter] but there was one thing 
which was common. You see, during our African culture and tradition, during that time, 
women were not recommended, were not even allowed, to wear some trousers.  But those 
who were from training, you could see them that this one is from training by wearing a 
trouser, maybe a jean. 
 
Interviewer: So women who were wearing trousers were suspected of being soldiers? 
 
Respondent: They were because most of the common women in the village would not 
wear a trouser or a short. So this one who is trained now, she knows what a trouser is.  
You cannot run away with a dress or you cannot fight with a dress. You need a trouser. 
So it was easy. You find a woman with a trouser or with a jean, automatically you know 
that this one is different from the others, she is trained and is ready to fight. 
 
Interviewer: So if [Rhodesian soldiers] came across a village and found a woman who 
was wearing trousers, what would they do? 
 
Respondent: …when the soldiers come across a woman like that, automatically a fight 
starts because that woman also won’t be alone.  She would be having her people. When 
they move, the way they move, maybe there will be twenty. They will move in small 
groups of two’s or three’s, even someone will be alone but someone maybe twenty to 
fifteen meters away. Others are around. So once they see that woman, they come to her, 
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they confront the woman. Those will be watching…a fight, they start fighting. Whenever 
they meet, they start fighting.479 
 
What this exchange reveals is that gender operates in very complex ways during conflict. 
Gendered perspectives do not preclude an assumption that women may be fighters, but, via 
societal understandings of appropriate garb for women, they do serve as an assessment tool to 
determine belligerency.  This gendered notion of appropriateness, that a woman wearing trousers 
must be a fighter because female civilians would not wear pants, acts as a cognitive shortcut to 
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible targets.  Thus women wearing pants are 
permissible targets, and women who do not are not impermissible targets. 
 The interaction of gender and conflict also factors into how UNITA fighters view women 
who are considered impermissible targets: 
Interviewer:  Earlier [you] said [UNITA fighters] were limited in who they could protect 
when fleeing a village under attack.  If they had to choose, they would have a preference 
for women and children and old people.  Why would they prefer those groups of people? 
 
Respondent: …And with women, they are the mothers of the nation.  Without women, 
you will not have soldiers for tomorrow.  So they will protect them for that.480 
 
Women’s protection stems from a strategic reading of their gendered role in a society 
experiencing armed conflict: women are protected because of their roles as mothers capable of 
sustaining the rebel force by giving birth to future generations of fighters.   
 What these narratives demonstrate is that gender colors the way the distinction principle 
is discussed.  Respondents articulate a form of the distinction principle, a gendered form, in these 
narratives: women are permissible targets because of their image as a maternal figure.  However, 
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their use of gender inappropriate garments serves as a mark of their alleged belligerency, thus 
transforming them from impermissible to permissible targets. 
 
Physical characteristics 
 Physical characteristics also serve as a mode of distinction among respondents.  
Respondents observed that fighters tended to have certain marks on their body resulting from 
carrying their backpacks and wearing combat boots for lengthy periods of time.  Opponents 
would search suspected fighters for these declared signs of belligerency, killing those who 
possessed these marks.  Those that did not have these marks were presumed not to be rebels.  
However, the correlation between these marks and belligerency was not always perfect so that 
various cases of misidentification occurred, 
…there were special marks when you are closer to a guerilla. It’s through carrying that 
gun and axe. There are marks here [pointing to his back]. Also, they use to wear those 
boots, high boots, so there were also marks here [pointing to his shin] because you can 
wear that boot, maybe for six months without changing it. So it leaves marks. So they use 
to identify [rebels] through those marks. So [the Zimbabwean military] killed a lot of 
people.  Then they go there, they look for those marks, they don’t see them. So you see, 
that person they killed him just because they suspected him…481 
 
Zimbabwean fighters were not the only ones who used physical marks to identify fighters.  
UNITA and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) fighters also used this 
method of distinction. 
 
Permissible Civilian Target: Act-based Distinctions 
Opponent Support via Refusal to Assist 
Former belligerent narratives expressed the attribution of support for the opposition to 
various acts.  One act was the refusal to join the armed forces.  For example, a former UNITA 
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fighter explained that young civilians (approximately 15-40 years of age), particularly males, 
would be killed if they refused to join UNITA.  The reason given was that if these civilians did 
not want to join, it was because they were supporting UNITA’s opponents,  
Those who accept to go [to become a UNITA fighter]…, they carry them, they go with 
them.  Those who refuse, [UNITA soldiers] kill them.  [UNITA fighters] say, ‘why they 
are refusing, there is something which they know.  Why they are remaining?’482 
 
This method of distinction was not confined to Angola; it was operational in Zimbabwe 
as well.  In the following excerpt, a former fighter for a nonstate armed group in Zimbabwe 
explains why government officials who would not support the guerrilla movement were targeted: 
Interviewer:  Who can be legitimately targeted? 
 
Respondent:  I was trained as a guerilla.  In a liberation movement, you are there to 
liberate your country.   So then I would target those in power.  Also, the forces of the 
colonials.  Policeman, soldier, administrators.  Guerrillas will warn that people must stop 
doing these jobs.  So if you continue to do those jobs, it’s like you are supporting the 
government.  So then you can’t complain. 
 
Interviewer:  Why? 
 
Respondent:  Because we warned you ahead of time.  If you can’t support us, you are the 
enemy and can be killed.483   
 
Thus, the narratives justify civilian killing on the refusal to support the cause.  The 
refusal to support one’s own group is viewed as implicit support for the opposition.  Essentially, 
this method of distinction assumes no neutral parties in armed conflict: all civilians support at 
least one group in some way.  The act of refusal serves as way of legitimizing the killing of those 
civilians who support the opposition.  Those who provide their support are spared.   
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Opponent Support via not Obeying Evacuation Orders 
 Support for the opposition could also be manifested by refusing to heed evacuation 
orders.  A UNITA fighter recounts how UNITA would ask civilians to leave an area that it 
planned to attack; only those who stayed behind were killed because they were assumed to be a 
MPLA supporters: 
Respondent:  …[UNITA fighters] will give [villagers residing near MPLA bases] 
instructions, telling the people on our side to stay up during the night at this time because 
we will be attacking in that camp.  We are going to kill everyone.  If you want to survive, 
run from that place.  Escape from that place.  Go to our side.  We are telling you this so 
you don’t associate with these people, even if they captured you this way.  You should 
make some plans to leave there because they are not our people.  If those people, they 
don’t leave, then they will still be there.  What UNITA will do is, they will get in and 
attack.  Not to destroy their people, but to kill the others and to avoid their people from 
being around their enemies. 
 
Interviewer:  So they chose to attack the people that stayed behind. Why did they attack 
those people? 
 
Respondent:  It’s like they want to follow those [MPLA].  They don’t want to run or 
come back like their colleagues.484 
 
Much like the civilians who refused to offer support, the act of remaining around the base after 
being forewarned of an upcoming attack, served to legitimize these civilian deaths.  According to 
the narrative, only the civilian who remained were targeted; those who fled were not. 
 
Threatening Behavior 
 Threatening behavior distinguished permissible civilian targets from impermissible 
civilian targets.  What respondents considered threatening behavior varied.  However, by far the 
most commonly offered example of threatening behavior was collecting intelligence.  
Respondents who fought for both state and nonstate armed groups claimed the act of spying, or 
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even the suspicion of spying, could get a civilian killed.  A soldier for the Zimbabwean 
government explained, 
Yes, and then for the civilian people, is like usually, they are so unlucky that so many 
things happen in war like information spying and so on, crossfire and things like that. 
You find that some die because they are suspected that they are passing on information. 
Some might actually be caught in the cross fire; they might not be able to run away. But 
mostly is about crossfire and being suspected of, you know, passing on information from 
one group to the other. It was very common for us in DRC [Democratic Republic of 
Congo]. Yes, you would find that once we suspected or we got information that some 
civilian people were going to the rebel guys, we will take them for investigation and 
sometimes… you know how it ends up…485 
 
Another narrative from a Zimbabwean soldier reiterates this point: 
 …during the military training you are told, you see that lady there, that one there, that 
 lady is going for something.  You can even read from her walking that she is very 
 reluctant, and she is not worked about time.  So I can sit down and look at her and say 
 that one, no.  But if it is a person that is sent to come and get news about us to go and 
 report to the rebels, you will see with his walking:  he looks around and he is very 
 attentive.  He wants to see nearly everything.  Then you know that one, that one has been 
 sent by the rebels.  Ok, let me watch him.  He goes there, he reaches there, he comes back 
 again.  Within two minutes he comes back… yes, yes, yes, come.  You give him one 
 good “mama” [a beating], and he will tell you I have been sent by the rebels.486 
 
This interpretation of the distinction method was not limited to Zimbabwean soldiers fighting for 
the government.  A fighter fighting for a Zimbabwean nonstate armed group offered a similar 
explanation: 
Respondent: It was really more or less a war of blacks against settlers.  So it was assumed 
that, well, we were operating among them, it was assumed that the blacks were our 
supporters.  But we had cases where the civilians were killed.  The guiding principle was, 
each person has the right of his opinion, but at the end of the day, you find that some 
guerillas, sometimes, would kill someone suspected of being, collaborating with the 
enemy.  The rationale being that if we don’t, we are going to be killed. 
 
Interviewer:  What kinds of activities would be considered collaboration with the enemy? 
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Respondent:  The army would go around to the villages and ask for the presence of the 
guerillas.  Some people were paid by the government to give this information. 
 
Respondent:  People are called spies, sell outs.  Sell out is a very common name, a very 
common word.  Once they call you a sell out, you are in trouble.  Once you are labeled a 
sell out, then the guerrilla will say we can’t take chances.  Because if the enemy gets 
information, they will just come and kill us.  We are dead.  They will say that we would 
rather kill those we suspect.487 
  
 As demonstrated by these narratives, respondents claimed civilians were targeted based 
on certain acts they engaged in which raised the suspicion of spying.  These narratives indicate 
belligerents used these acts to designate which civilians would be subjected to lethal action.  If 
belligerents determined that a civilian’s actions did not signal intelligence gathering, they were 
left alone.  However, actions that implied spying legitimated a civilian’s maltreatment. 
 
Intersubjectivity on Distinction Methods among Former Belligerents? 
 The previous discussion illustrates that former belligerent respondents did articulate the 
use of the distinction principle in the narratives explaining deliberate civilian deaths.  The 
narratives show that certain civilians were targeted while others were left alone.  However, 
selection criteria for targeting fluctuated.  Some respondents discussed actor-based distinctions, 
while others discussed act-based distinctions.  Sometimes the methods of distinction were 
shared, and sometimes they were not.  For instance, fighters who encountered child soldiers felt 
it was permissible to target children.  However, it was not appropriate to target all children; only 
those who conformed to an image of child soldiers, even if there was not actual evidence of their 
belligerency.  Belligerents who did no encounter child soldiers did not articulate instances in 
which it would be permissible to target children (as they defined children). 
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 The same could be said of women.  Respondents used certain indicators to inform them 
which women would be permissible targets (those who might be fighters).  They claimed to not 
have killed women who did not fit this image.  Those who did not experience combat with 
women tended to offer a categorical immunity to females. 
 Additionally, many respondents counted acts of espionage as well as suspicion of 
espionage as reasons for the targeting of civilians.  By engaging in spying or appearing to spy, a 
civilian transformed from an impermissible to a permissible target.  This method of distinction 
was used by respondents with different types of conflict experience. 
 
Nature of Intersubjectivity on Permissible Targets 
 Thus, it appears that intersubjectivity on permissible targets among former belligerents is 
mixed, just as is the case among IHL respondents.  It exists on some measures but not on others.  
There is also a mixed assessment on intersubjectivity between IHL respondents and former 
belligerents.  These two groups agree on some things that would make a civilian a permissible 
target.  This includes spying, as well as the following articulation of the distinction principle by a 
former soldier in the South African military: 
Interviewer:  When a rebel soldier puts on civilian clothing, how do you know who is a 
soldier and who is a just civilian? 
 
Respondent: You will never detect unless when he starts shooting. 
 
Interviewer: Can you shoot when there are people shooting at you? 
 
Respondent: Yeah when they are shooting at us.488 
 
  However, spying was one of the very few acts upon which the groups agreed legitimated 
deliberate civilian targeting.  Former belligerent respondents offered several other methods of 
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distinction that IHL respondents did not.  Furthermore, narratives offered by both groups do not 
agree on the exact parameters of spying that allow permissible civilian targeting (IHL 
respondents: current engagement in the act of spying; former belligerents: suspicion of spying or 
past acts of spying).  In essence, there is a disagreement on the temporal nature of the acts that 
make a civilian a permissible target.  This disagreement may be related to the additional 
observation that none of the former belligerent respondents couched their method of distinction 
in the language of DPH, as IHL respondents consistently did.   
 
CONTESTATION IN FORMER BELLIGERENT NARRATIVES 
 
The next issue to explore is how former belligerents justified the use of their distinction method.  
If former belligerent respondents justified the use of their particular method in the language of 
utilitarian concerns, then a norm violation framework holds (as well as a norm diffusion 
framework if these narratives also claim ignorance of the ICRC’s interpretation).  The above 
discussion of the different methods of distinction appearing in former belligerent respondents 
provides some evidence to support this claim.   
However some of these former belligerent respondents also presented narratives that did 
not conform to a utilitarian based argument. That is, former belligerent respondents described the 
use of different methods of distinction that contravened their group’s interests.  Such narratives 
would be consistent with a norm contestation framework.  A contestation framework argues that 
actors abide by their version of the norm even when doing so goes against strategic interests.  
This differs from a norm violation framework which posits actors claim a different 
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understanding of a norm because they want to violate it (to further some objective) without 
appearing to do so (through the use of accounts to justify the norm violation).   
Since the narratives provided by ICRC delegates lack intersubjectivity, there is the issue 
of which distinction method should be used to determine divergence between ICRC and former 
belligerent methods of distinction.  Since this is the case, I looked to the Guidance for answers as 
this document is supposed to guide belligerents on how to make these determinations.  I then 
selected methods of distinction contained in former belligerent narratives that differed from what 
the Guidance advises. 
Of the 21 distinction methods for which I could apply a normative code, just more than 
half (52%) conformed to a norm contestation framework.489  That is, former belligerents 
discussed killing or protecting civilians, in compliance with their articulated distinction method, 
in a manner which did not further some interest which they articulated, and which differed from 
the Guidance.  The following discussion cites examples of such articulations.  This includes 
compliant behavior which might actually pose a risk to the respondent.   
 
Distinction Based on Support 
One distinction method used by belligerents which differed from the method used by the 
Guidance is one based on support for the opposition.  This distinction method contravenes the 
method advocated by the Guidance because the link between the civilian’s act and the resulting 
harm is not direct enough.  An example involves the killing of young people from villages 
supporting the opposition.  Upon first glance, killing these civilians is a strategic move because it 
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eliminates this support.  In civil wars like those fought in Angola, every advantage counts, and 
taking away any advantage an opponent has is a realistic goal, 
[MPLA] thought was that in those villages where civilians stayed is where the soldiers, 
the young ones who will grow up to become soldiers. They will come from those 
villages.  So it was better to destroy them so that Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, will not 
have enough human resource.490 
 
However, upon closer inspection, one could argue that killing these civilians is not the 
most strategic move.  As this former UNITA soldier goes on to explain, UNITA could forcibly 
recruit villagers to help it wage war:  
Interviewer: Did [UNITA fighters] force those young people to be soldiers on their side? 
 
Respondent:  There were situations like that whereby the young ones are forced, even 
older men, they are forced to join491 
 
Support for the position that there are benefits to not killing MPLA supporters is offered through 
the narrative of another UNITA fighter: 
But what [UNITA fighters] used to do is to take young men and instead of killing them, 
they would make them join the military.492 
 
These young men could be used to fill in the ranks, and also fight on the front lines in order to 
preserve the more valued fighters.  A Namibian soldier offers a similar narrative: 
Interviewer:  Would South African fighters get any benefit if they didn’t kill these 
civilians who were supporting SWAPO?  
 
Respondent: …they can use the civilians on both sides: South African can use the 
civilians which they get from the SWAPO side to provide them with information and 
they will not even bother to, to…at other times to kill them… they will get them, train 
them and maybe put them aside for other things.  Maybe if this person is trained or is 
kept maybe for a year, sometimes they can use them.   Both sides, even SWAPO, even 
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South Africans, they will use them to be the people to provide them some information, 
some directions where to get to the camps of their enemies on both sides.493 
 
Belligerent narratives employ this distinction method even though doing so might 
undermine utilitarian considerations.  For instance, narratives from respondents who fought on 
behalf of nonstate armed groups, which were typically under-resourced in human resources, 
describe the forcible recruitment of civilians to serve as frontline fighters.  Rather than place the 
limited number of loyal and trained fighters in lead positions of an offensive strike where 
casualty rates were higher, respondents said civilians supporting the opposition would be forced 
to take those positions.  Thus civilians could be used to further tactical objectives and spare the 
lives of the more valued fighters.   
Civilians could also be kept alive to act as porters, wives, and cooks.  Furthermore, these 
respondents acknowledged that keeping civilians alive (even those supporting the enemy) could 
promote good will toward a group by demonstrating its kindness, mercy and power: 
See, there are situations whereby something can happen, you will try to find a way that 
maybe you don’t just fight anyhow.  You try to make sure that this person who is trying 
to attack you, or to take you to be very bad, will see you to be a good person. That is what 
you want, to liberate, not just to kill. These people will leave your side, go, maybe to that 
MPLA side, and tell them that those people are just okay. I was with them like "this, 
this," and they didn’t fight me.494 
 
Such acts of kindness and mercy would increase the chances of converting these civilians to their 
supporters, providing them with much needed resources such as food, lodging and protection. 
 
 
 
                                                 
493 Interview 09060803(Dukwi, 2009). 
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Distinction Based on Age   
Another way in which contestation manifests in the former belligerent narratives is 
through the extension of immunity to civilians who might pose a threat to these respondents.  
Some of the belligerents would not target children even though children served as fighters and 
spies, and in these capacities, undermine the respondent’s physical security.  One narrative 
described earlier indicates that a child younger than a certain age (typically10) is categorically 
considered an impermissible target.   This is so even when such a child carries a weapon, as 
suggested by another Zimbabwean soldier’s narrative:    
Interviewer: …are there certain types of people that soldiers would say, no I can’t shoot 
that person? For instance, if you see a child carryng a gun, would some people say, no I 
can’t shoot that person because this is a child even though they are carrying a gun?   
 
Respondent: Yes there are. Like small children. You try by all means to capture that child 
because you will never know, maybe the enemy is hiding behind. Or maybe he just only 
picked the gun from the home, he doesn’t know how to use that gun.495  
 
A Rhodesian soldier’s narrative suggests that opponents exploited this assumption of 
innocence to their advantage: 
Respondent:  [Opponents] send young boys like that one (points to a very young boy 
nearby), you see this one and above this one.   These are the boys they send to go and 
check how may [Rhodesian soldiers] are and how they are positioned. 
 
Interviewer:  Why would they send the young boys? 
 
Respondent:  War is all about information.  That’s the point number one.  War is about 
information.  You have to know the opponent of your friend, his strength, his maneuvers 
and his position. 
 
Interviewer:  Why would they send the young boys rather than grown ones? 
 
Respondent:  Young boys are less suspected.496 
 
                                                 
495 Interview 09052702 (Dukwi, 2009). 
496Interview 09052800 (Dukwi, 2009). 
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Consequently, complying with this distinction between categories of children might not always 
work in the belligerent’s favor as the children they assume to be non-threatening, and thus 
impermissible civilian targets, might well pose as much of a threat as those children considered 
as threatening.  Furthermore, such a nuanced distinction method must be difficult to implement.  
The physical difference between a ten year old and a seven year is difficult to discern, especially 
when the children are malnourished as may be the case in the conflicts in which these 
belligerents fought. 
 The Guidance does not obligate belligerents to distinguish between categories of child 
civilians.  Instead it declares that DPH controls this analysis.  As such, the Guidance states 
The notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific hostile acts carried out by 
individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict.497 
 
In other words, the determination of permissible and impermissible targets is based on “specific 
hostile acts,” rather than a person’s identity.  This direct participation in hostilities suspends 
civilian immunity from deliberate attack “exactly as long as the corresponding civilian 
engagement in direct participation in hostilities.”498   Therefore, children, regardless of their age, 
lose protection for the duration of their direct participation and regain it once they cease this 
participation.  They are also protected against categorical targeting; they cannot be targeted if 
they do not DPH, even if children of the same age serve as child soldiers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
497 International Committee for the Red Cross. 2009. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities. Geneva: ICRC. 45. 
498 International Committee for the Red Cross. 2009. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities. Geneva: ICRC. 70. 
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Distinction Based on Gender   
Respondents provided a similar type of narrative when discussing female belligerents.  
These narratives describe the suspension of suspicion for women even though they fought female 
fighters.  For instance, some allege that belligerents scrutinize young men for signs of distress 
assumed to result from fear that their belligerent status will be revealed.  Belligerents hone in on 
young men because young men typically fought for the opposing side.  So the selection criteria 
for careful scrutiny are based on the belligerent’s previous combat experience.  If the respondent 
did not experience female fighters, it was hard to image the possibility of their existence as 
indicated by this excerpt from an interview with a Rhodesian soldier: 
Interviewer:  Do [the opponents] use women also as soldiers?   
 
Respondent:  Ahh… in the Great Lake region I didn’t see that. In Zimbabwe, soon after 
independence, women were involved as soldiers but they were not going in the war front.  
They were working. 
 
Interviewer:  What about on the rebel side? 
 
Respondent:  Uhh, there was no woman… soldier’s life (laughs).499 
 
Even when belligerents have fought against female fighters, women were not always 
scrutinized as intently as their male counterparts.  The narrative of a Namibian soldier, who 
fought for the South African Defense Force (SADF), exemplifies this point, 
 
Respondent: …yes it can be that [SADF soldiers] can observe much on men but even 
with women and children they can observe because the enemies can use the women to 
attack them. So they will carefully look at them, but usually with women they were not a 
threat. But when they come, if [SADF soldiers] observe that there is no danger in those 
people, even with men, what they will do, they will provide them with food. 
 
Interviewer:  Even though the enemy has used women in the past to attack them… they 
are not as afraid of the women as they are the men. Why is that? 
                                                 
499 Interview 09052800 (Dukwi, 2009). 
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Respondent: …a woman is someone who is kind, who is having mercy compared to a 
man.500  
 
This narrative suggests that gendered notions enable the respondent arguably to relax security 
measures when encountering females while taking more precautions when it comes to males.  
These gendered notions also likely played a part in who belligerents killed as indicated in the 
following explanation of UNITA actions by a UNITA fighter, 
Interviewer: Among the villagers, who was most likely to be tortured or killed? 
 
Respondent: Usually when they are fighting, when they attack, one cannot tell easily who 
the enemy is to target.  But young men who are likely to join the army will be targeted. 
 
Interviewer: So young men, men that look like they might join the army, are the ones 
who would be attacked? 
 
Respondent: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: What is the purpose of attacking these men? 
 
Respondent: See, UNITA needs power.  To get power is to win.  How to win is to attack 
those who are in a position to join the enemy’s forces.  So they are trying to take away 
this support. 
 
Interviewer: So they attack young, strong looking men as a way of weakening the 
opponents? 
 
Respondent: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: So is it the case that these men always join the opponent’s forces, or are 
some just unwilling to fight? 
 
Respondent: Usually with the young ones, energetic men, what they would do is, if they 
are attacking a village, if they have a chance to run away, they will run away and go to 
other countries.  But if there’s nowhere to run, then they are forced to surrender and hand 
themselves over to the opponents.  They will get these men. The men have no option, 
they will do as their opponents wish them to do.501 
 
                                                 
500 Interview  09060803(Dukwi, 2009). 
501 Interview 09062400 (Dukwi, 2009). 
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As stated previously, the Guidance directs belligerents to use act based criteria to 
determine permissible targets, not actor based criteria like gender.  The Guidance would not 
include potential future soldiering as a direct enough act to be considered DPH: 
For a specific act to qualify as ‘direct’ rather than ‘indirect’ participation in hostilities 
there must be a sufficiently close causal relation between the act and the resulting harm… 
direct causation should be understood as meaning that the harm in question must be 
brought about in one causal step.  Therefore, individual conduct that merely builds up or 
maintains the capacity of a party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly 
causes harm, is excluded from the concept of direct participation in hostilities.502 
 
However, these narratives utilize gender based distinctions in ways that contravene the Guidance 
as well as the interests of armed groups.  Thus, as is the case in the previous examples, the 
justifications used in these narratives go against the stipulations of the Guidance as well as the 
group’s interest.   
 
DELIBERATE CIVILIAN TARGETING NOT EXPLAINED BY NORM CONTESTATION 
 
While the discussion so far suggests the presence of norm contestation in narratives that describe 
civilian deaths, it does not aim to suggest that this is the exclusive rationale appearing in 
narratives that recount civilian deaths.  The norm violation framework also plays a part in the 
narratives I collected; in fact, 48% of codable narratives conformed to a norm violation 
framework.  Belligerents described the killing of civilians in furtherance of some interest.  This 
is the case even among former belligerent respondents who offered narratives of compliance 
with their particular version of the distinction principle.   
                                                 
502 International Committee for the Red Cross. 2009. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities. Geneva: ICRC. 52-53. 
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While IHL respondents did acknowledge that belligerents may employ different 
interpretations of permissible targets, they argued such use is strategic and intentional.   Any 
claimed confusion on the part of belligerent serves a mask for the pursuit of interests.  In other 
words, these claims conform to Shannon’s description of accounts used to justify or excuse a 
deliberate norm violation.    
Instead of considering whether the lack of consensus among IHL respondents on 
permissible civilian targets might be mirrored among belligerents, and that such potential 
disagreements might impact their targeting decisions as the previous discussion revealed, IHL 
respondents offered other explanations for civilian targeting.  Respondents acknowledged that it 
occurs intentionally and unintentionally.  Sometimes civilian killing occurs unintentionally 
because belligerents lack intelligence or sophisticated weapons that have precision targeting 
capacities.  Without good intelligence, belligerents may mistake an impermissible civilian target 
for a permissible civilian target.  Without precision guided weapons, there may also be instances 
of collateral damage in which civilians die despite the fact they were not the primary targets.  
And to expect some of the actors currently involved in armed conflict to acquire these types of 
technologically advanced weapons is “unrealistic.”503 
 Another reason civilians may be killed is because belligerents in non-international 
conflicts are not obligated to wear uniforms.504  In such circumstances, belligerents commit 
perfidy by wearing civilian clothes and hiding among civilians.  Under these conditions, 
identifying the belligerents is a difficult task.  Civilians inevitably get killed because they are 
more likely to be mistaken for belligerents. 
                                                 
503 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
504 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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In addition to explaining unintentional civilian deaths, IHL respondents suggested a host 
of reasons for the deliberate targeting of civilians during armed conflict.  One reason was linked 
to the psychological impact of fighting.505  In a sense, belligerents become desensitized to killing 
so that the act loses its moral and psychological weight.  Under these conditions, belligerents 
turn numb and kill without much thought to what they are doing. 
IHL respondents also presented some of the utilitarian motivations that influenced 
deliberate civilian targeting.  One such motivation was to clear territory belligerents wanted to 
seize.  Taking property with hostile residents is a difficult task under the best of circumstances.  
Killing some civilians instills fear among these populations; they do not want to live under the 
control of belligerents who are willing to kill people who are not involved in the conflict.  These 
civilians would rather flee their homes than live under such conditions.  Belligerents, one IHL 
respondent stated, employed these strategies during the Rwandan genocide as well as the 
Yugoslav conflict as ‘an integral part of winning the war or waging war… the goal was to get 
people out.”506 
Deliberate civilian killing is also a way to demoralize the opposition and the communities 
that support them.  Belligerents feel demoralized because they cannot protect their support 
base.507  Civilians, because of this incapacity, may then throw their support to the other side.  As 
such, this strategy weakens the morale of the fighting forces of the opposition and helps to 
eliminate crucial support they need from the populace (with the added bonus that this populace 
may even turn against those they initially supported). 
                                                 
505 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
506 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
507 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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Another reason for deliberate civilian targeting is that civilian protections are based on a 
double standard.508  Belligerents expect their opponents to refrain from attacking their civilian 
supporters.  However, if the situation arises, these belligerents will not restrain themselves from 
attacking the civilian supporters of their opponents. 
Impunity may play a role in deliberate civilian targeting.  According to one IHL 
respondent, “there is a prevailing sense of immunity; that nothing will happen.”509  This is 
because the obligation to distinguish is difficult to enforce.  Because few are convicted for 
intentional targeting of civilians, belligerents violate the law when it is in their interests to do so. 
 Several former belligerent narratives, for which there is recognition of the distinction 
principle, support the norm violation framework running through some of the IHL expert 
responses. Some narratives suggest that civilians were used strategically to exhaust an 
opponent’s ammunition: 
Interviewer: So would [the rebels] have any rules about who they can shoot and who they 
cannot shoot?  
 
Respondent: No, no they didn’t have that because even the other thing they would do 
sometimes is, they would attack civilian people because they realized that they were not 
very good. They were not that competent to us and with us. So one of the other strategies 
that they were employing is taking civilians and putting them in front. But I think they 
will tell them that a bullet can’t pass and enter you and so on. Because one thing you 
have to understand is that the DRC is underdeveloped.  The place is still, civilization is 
still a question, is something to question in Democratic Republic of Congo, especially out 
of the cities. So there still have a lot of traditional beliefs and so on. So they would put 
them in front, they make a lot of noise and so on. So now at first, if you didn’t know this 
is the civilian population, you would shoot at them and then you finish all ammunition.  
By the time you finish ammunitions and so on, they come and they get a hold of you. So 
that is the other way a lot of civilians were being killed. A lot of people were being killed 
there; the rebels would take them and put them in front with drums, clapping hands, 
ululating.  So it was a strategy for them.  
 
Interviewer: The rebels were using civilians? 
 
                                                 
508 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
509 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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Respondent: They were using them. At the end of the day we had no option but…..510 
 
 
In the same vein, another Zimbabwean soldier, who acknowledged the obligation to distinguish 
and who fought in the DRC, justifies the killing of civilians based on prioritizing the soldier’s 
life over the civilians: 
… the object in the army when you are at a war, they say defer, and fight to kill, but don’t 
incur casualties on your side. Avoid incurring casualties.  So to avoid incurring 
casualties, we could not just penetrate within the community with rebels.  You never 
know who is who.  A weapon can be driven from the house, through the window and kill 
you.  So we harm everything.  When those civilians who are innocent get pain, they will 
say ahh… ahh…ahh… is not good for us, let’s get away from these rebels   Then we 
know the situation is separating itself.  But the general view is not that we are mean. 
Soldiers are meant to kill civilians.  You know is very unfortunate that some of these 
wars that are fought, like in DRC because those are very stupid wars.511   
 
Some IHL respondents also said that belligerents target civilians in order for something 
to happen, namely greater media attention.512  Belligerents strive to advance their goals through 
this increased media attention.  Legitimacy, pressure on the opposition, aid and other resources 
are just a few of the objectives amplified media attention can achieve.  A former belligerent 
respondent, who fought for a nonstate armed group, gave a narrative that demonstrates this 
rationale: 
Respondent:  Unfortunately in a guerrilla situation, especially in Africa [inaudible], if you 
are not well known or well connected, no one is going to write about you.  There is no 
publicity about that, you see.  So they will kill you. 
 
Interviewer:  Why does it matter if there’s publicity? 
 
Respondent:  Image.  The guerillas are so worried about their image.  The international 
community.  That was important because they got their support from the international 
community.513   
 
                                                 
510 Interview 09052500 (Dukwi 2009). 
511Interview  09052800 (Dukwi, 2009). 
512 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
513 Interview 09062901 (Dukwi, 2009). 
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Protected civilians are intentionally killed because commanders order their belligerents to 
do so: 
… more especially the leaders in the military, they know about international law. Usually 
they will teach the juniors. Now what the juniors do to those on the lower ranks, what 
they do, it is, they are trying to do what they want. Sometimes if they will do what they 
are commanded. If they do, maybe take people’s animals or chicken for other people, it is 
the instruction from the above. It will be deliberate only, but otherwise someone who is 
trained in a military, more especially on the government side, knows the law. Now if this 
person will be doing something in contrary to the law… you see in military if you are 
commanded to fire, to fight that’s what you have to do. If you are told to stop, you have 
to stop, you follow instructions. So in most cases you will find that some other things, 
some other crimes some soldiers will commit, they will be under instruction of their 
bosses.514 
 
Ultimately in these excepts, the reason for the deliberate targeting of civilians is a lack of 
respect for IHL norms.515  IHL respondents apply this conclusion to both state and non-state 
actors.  However, as claimed by an IHL respondent, it is actually worse when states lack respect 
for these norms because it makes it difficult for norm proponents to credibly urge compliance 
when even states do not comply.516  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter reveals that IHL experts and belligerents do not always share an understanding of 
who is a permissible civilian target during armed conflict.  IHL experts continue to debate who 
falls into this category and how to make those determinations.  This disparity also characterizes 
the narratives of former belligerents.  What their narratives indicate is that belligerents justify the 
deliberate targeting of civilians via compliance with a particular method of distinction, a method 
                                                 
514 Interview 09060202 (Dukwi, 2009). 
515 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
516 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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of distinction that differs from the Guidance.  These narratives also suggest that these distinction 
methods do not always advance the interests of their armed group.  In fact, sometimes 
compliance undermines those interests, consistent with a norm contestation framework.  Finally, 
the use of differing methods of distinction distorts the attempted balance between belligerent and 
civilian interests housed in the principle.  For instance, some narratives reflect a more expansive 
view of the distinction principle, as articulated by the Guidance, while at times they reflect a 
more restrictive version of the principle.  The broader version increases the range of situations 
that could harm civilians (civilians who should be immune are killed); the restrictive version 
increases the range of situations that could harm belligerents (civilians who could be 
permissively targeted are not).  The next chapter explores some possible reasons why norm 
contestation occurs as well as its implications. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
An important aspect of engagement with legal pluralism is to understand the fault lines 
between different legal orders in order to avoid any overlap likely to be marred by 
ambiguity and contestation.517 
 
This dissertation sought to determine the validity of a common assumption in many theories of 
deliberate civilian targeting during armed conflict.  This assumption is that key actors in the 
civilian protection regime share an understanding of permissible civilian targets.  Based on this 
assumption, the literature then offers strong explanations for these violations of IHL and the 
civilian immunity norm.  This study found that such an assumption is not empirically warranted.  
It found that IHL experts and belligerents currently hold different understandings of who can and 
cannot be targeted in armed conflict, and thus interpret the distinction principle differently.  In 
other words, respondents disagreed on the constituent elements of the distinction principle.  It 
also found differences present in the histories of various normative traditions and the IHL 
codification process.  However, one commonality within this chronicle of the distinction 
principle and this study’s data is an endorsement of belligerents’ obligation to distinguish.  These 
observations are captured in the remarks of a participant in the ICRC workshops to clarify the 
distinction principle: 
Scholars and practitioners universally accept the normative premise that although 
civilians generally enjoy protection from attack under international humanitarian law 
(IHL), they lose such protection while directly participating in the hostilities. However, 
no authoritative guidance has existed on the question of which activities qualify as direct 
participation (or on how they so qualify)…., or on the related issues of who qualifies as a 
civilian and how long the loss of protection lasts. Therefore, analysis has tended to be 
case-by-case and based upon vague and somewhat instinctual criteria; it verged on a 
“know it when you see it” approach.518 
 
                                                 
517 Dinnen, Sinclair. 2010.  “From Ideals to Reality in International Rule of Law Work- the Case of Papua New 
Guinea.” Journal of International Peacekeeping 14, 329 
518 Schmitt (2010:699). 
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 This study also shows that utilitarian reasons cannot account for all the rationales 
belligerents provide to explain civilian deaths.  The analysis of belligerent narratives reveals that 
belligerents utilize non-utilitarian rationales, consistent with a norm contestation framework, to 
explain civilian targeting.  That is, the targeting of civilians did not always conform to the logic 
of consequences.  This study made these determinations by analyzing instances where 
belligerents attributed their targeting of civilians to compliance with a distinction principle when 
such behavior undermined some interest.  Yet, behavior adhering to the logic of appropriateness 
does not always have to diverge from behavior prescribed by the logic of consequences.  At 
times, both logics can suggest similar behavior.  However, from a methodological perspective, it 
is more difficult to attribute behavior to a particular logic when they align in this manner.  Thus, 
this study may underestimate the extent to which a logic of appropriateness governs behavior 
since it examines instances where the logics call for differing action.  
 To help account for this observed norm contestation, this chapter will advance three 
possibilities.  These possibilities can serve as a springboard to launch further research on the 
extent to which lack of intersubjectivity on the distinction principle explains IHL violations.  
One reason is the ambiguity in the distinction method outlined in Chapters Four and Five, 
particularly around the phrase “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH).  IHL respondents 
acknowledge that DPH yields multiple interpretations of compliance among belligerents.  
However, Chapter 6 reveals this is also the case among IHL experts.  A second reason for norm 
contestation is problematic diffusion.  While the process of international norm diffusion has been 
well investigated, comparatively less is known about the domestic norm diffusion process.519  
                                                 
519 In addition to the works listed in FN 114 in Chapter 2, see the following for discussions on the domestic norm 
diffusion process, see Chayes and Chayes (1993); Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. 
Barsoom.1996. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,” International 
Organization 50:3; Koh, Harold.1997. “Why do Nations Obey International Law,” 106 Yale Law Journal 259. 
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The distinction method passed on through the international diffusion process might get modified 
or distorted as it continues its journey through the domestic diffusion process.  The result is that 
those near the end of the chain of diffusion possess a different understanding of the distinction 
principle than that advocated by norm proponents.  Lastly, for reasons provided below, the ICRC 
occasionally cannot diffuse IHL to belligerents.  Under such circumstances, belligerents 
implement their own understanding of a self-generated obligation to distinguish, shaped by local 
context. 
 The chapter then concludes with a discussion of some of the theoretical and policy 
implications of the findings in this study.  For instance, this study’s findings challenge scholars 
to revisit our understandings of how norms influence global political behavior.  Particular 
attention needs to be paid to how scholars think about norm compliance and norm violation 
when norms are ambiguous.  Policymakers need to rethink strategies designed to minimize IHL 
violations in an environment where norm implementers and norm proponents operate under 
different understandings of compliance, and when whole categories of actors are excluded from 
the norm generation and norm clarification processes. 
 
REASONS FOR CONTESTATION 
 
Ambiguity in IHL 
 Former belligerent narratives suggest that belligerents opted to target some civilians as 
opposed to others, alluding to their employment of some form of the distinction method.  The 
narratives also imply that in some cases, their use of the distinction principle led to intentional 
civilian deaths that did not advance some interest.   Rather than compliance, these deaths appear 
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as violations because the belligerent’s distinction method differs from that of norm proponents. 
One reason for this divergence in conceptualizations of the distinction method may be because 
current IHL and the Guidance are ambiguous. 
While several IHL respondents admitted to the lack of clarity and/or consensus in the 
current manifestation of IHL and the Guidance, some IHL respondents disagreed with this 
assessment.  In fact, one respondent was adamant that the guidelines on how distinction should 
be conducted are clear.520  If there is any confusion among IHL experts, it is because they did not 
read the Guidance carefully enough, or they do not possess adequate legal expertise to 
understand the document or the law.521  However, one participant to the Workshops admitted 
that the Guidance should have been more detailed.522  Even Dr. Nils Melzer, who convened the 
Workshops and wrote the Guidance, confessed that the Guidance was not exhaustive; it does not 
end the ambiguity of DPH, but begins the dialogue to clarify it.523  Thus if IHL experts, 
Workshop participants and the author of the Guidance agree that the matter of DPH is 
ambiguous, it does not seem far-fetched to envision belligerents would be confused about how to 
conduct distinction as well.   This confusion can manifest when belligerents try to interpret IHL 
on their own, or if trainers dispatched to train belligerents on their IHL obligations diffuse 
different interpretations of the distinction principle, and thus diffuse confusion.   
 
Problematic Diffusion 
 There can be problems even if IHL has been clearly diffused to military leaders, leading 
to contestation over distinction methods.  Belligerents may be trained to distinguish between 
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permissible and impermissible targets, but as in the children’s game Telephone, the message gets 
distorted during the transmission process from military commanders to foot soldiers.  This is 
likely more probable for very precise rules like the Guidance.    
The domestic norm implementation process might also color the way civilians are 
viewed.  A narrative from a former belligerent who fought for SWAPO in Namibia captures this 
point: 
 Interviewer:  Did your training include how to treat civilians during war times? 
Respondent:  Yes, civilians should be treated well and helped where possible.  We also 
learned that one must be very careful when dealing with civilians because they may be 
used by enemies.524 
 
This narrative implies that SWAPO training informed belligerents of civilians’ protected status 
while simultaneously warning belligerents to be suspicious of them.  It creates a contradictory 
image of civilians as needing protection but also potentially threatening.  Little wonder that this 
respondent goes on to say, 
Our enemies were the colored or black people, armed and in uniform, driving military 
vehicles.  Even those in connection to their dealings, some civilians.525 
 
Furthermore, there may also be problems with monitoring and enforcement.  Military 
commanders may be unable to ensure that those under their command comply with a particular 
distinction method.  This point is illustrated by a Zimbabwean soldier discussing the situation of 
his allies, 
Interviewer: What about the government forces, the DRC government forces, did they 
have a code of conduct? 
 
Respondent: I think it was supposed to be there but because somehow, administrative 
issues, I don’t think they were really up to date. There was no really follow up and 
something of that nature. Let me say a follow up and monitoring to see that…because 
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you can imagine a situation whereby soldiers can spend about six months, no pay or 
something like that. You see? I don’t really think there was…you know, anything, any 
measures being put in place to make sure they were behaving accordingly.526 
 
The narrative of a Namibian fighter makes the same point: 
 
You know, sometimes, if you have a large number of soldiers, you will, which you 
cannot control, more especially the troops themselves, they are very difficult to handle.  
You know sometimes they would do things beyond control, not that it is a command from 
the high top, they can do their own.527 
 
Lack of Diffusion 
The previous explanations for contestation assumed belligerents are cognizant of some 
form of institutionalized rules governing armed conflict.  However, not all belligerents may be 
aware of the version endorsed by the international community.  For instance, only one 
belligerent, who fought for a state actor, made a reference to the Geneva Conventions; none 
mentioned the APs.  The lack of diffusion of the IHL distinction method might contribute to lack 
of intersubjectivity on permissible targets.  As mentioned previously, one of the reasons why the 
monitoring, circulating and promoting of IHL primarily rests with the ICRC is to enhance 
consistency in the understanding and implementation of IHL among disperse actors.528  Yet 
regarding nonstate actors, the ICRC may not always be able to disseminate its understanding of 
IHL.  This is because fulfilling its mission entails meeting multiple objectives that can conflict 
with each other.  According to the ICRC, 
The raison d’être of the ICRC is to ensure respect, through its neutral and independent 
humanitarian work, for the lives, dignity and physical and mental well-being of victims 
of armed conflict and other situations of violence. All of the ICRC’s work is geared 
towards meeting this fundamental objective and strives to full this ideal.529 
 
                                                 
526 Interview 09052500 (Dukwi, 2009). 
527 Interview  09052702 (Dukwi, 2009). 
528 Finnemore (1993:593). 
529 International Committee for the Red Cross.2009. The ICRC: Its Mission and Work. Geneva: ICRC. 6. 
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Additionally, 
The ICRC’s work developed along two lines. The first of these is operational, i.e. helping 
victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence. The second involves 
developing and promoting international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles.530 
 
Trying to promote IHL through diffusion may undermine its ability to provide humanitarian aid 
to affected civilians.  Armed groups may condition ICRC access to victims on the ICRC not 
investigating their belligerents’ behavior in armed conflict or telling them how to conduct 
hostilities.  A belligerent respondent offers an example: 
 
Interviewer:  Would the Red Cross ask, how come so many people died? 
 
Respondent:  …Who do you ask… who… the situation will be tense, very tense that… 
even  yourself, to say let me go and talk to you… you won’t ...  That [it] is safe to be 
quiet rather than talking.531 
 
When such a clash occurs, the ICRC may prioritize aiding victims for a couple of 
reasons.  First, the ICRC is dependent on these groups for access to humanitarian victims.  This 
dependency is also the reason for the ICRC’s controversial confidentiality policy, as explained 
by ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger, 
Access to every person in every conflict zone who needs protection or help, everywhere 
in the world, is our raison d’être. One thing is clear: if parties to a conflict see us leaking 
what we know to the outside world, the chances of our operating effectively will shrink 
dramatically.532 
 
Thus, the ICRC may cease its IHL promotion activities if they threaten access to victims in more 
immediate need of humanitarian assistance. 
                                                 
530 International Committee for the Red Cross.2009. The ICRC: Its Mission and Work. Geneva: ICRC. 6. 
531 Interview 09052800 (Dukwi 2009). 
532 Bucher, Andreas. 2005 “Being Hard on Yourself.” FACTS. July 21. 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/kellenberger-interview-210705 (March 31, 2010). 
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A second reason why the ICRC may not diffuse IHL obligations to nonstate armed 
groups is because national authorities may object to its relations with these groups.533   State 
authorities object on the grounds that such ICRC engagements serve to legitimize groups that 
either do not deserve such recognition, or that such legitimacy may corrode their own power.534   
Much as is the case for nonstate actors, the ICRC depends on approval from state authorities to 
operate in a given territory.  As David Forsythe writes, the ICRC is 
conscious of its need for cooperation from public authorities and therefore [is] careful not 
to proceed beyond the realm of their consent… In reality, the ICRC has a foot in two 
worlds – the world of state approval and the world of civil society initiative. Because of 
the organization’s dual nature, there is a tension in ICRC actions between deferring to 
state views on military and political necessity, and pressing states in a timely fashion to 
do more for human dignity. Managing that tension wisely is the crux of humanitarian 
politics and diplomacy by the ICRC.535 
 
Thus, state preferences can affect the execution of ICRC’s mission with nonstate actors. 
Thirdly, diffusion may not occur out of concern for the safety of ICRC staff.  
Understandably, the ICRC prioritizes the wellbeing of its staff over all other concerns.  Security 
issues when engaging with nonstate actors stem from their lack of awareness of the ICRC and its 
role in the protection regime.536  Yet, even awareness of ICRC’s role does not always assure the 
safety of its staff.  If the ICRC feels engagement with a nonstate actor threatens staff security, it 
will opt to not engage with that actor. 
Regardless of the reason for lack of IHL diffusion, the results of this disengagement may 
thwart ICRC’s humanitarian objectives.  Civilians deemed to be protected by norm proponents 
may lose the protections of the civilian immunity norm because belligerents may be unaware that 
                                                 
533 Document on file with author. 
534 Document on file with author. 
535 Forsythe, David P. 2007. “The ICRC: a Unique Humanitarian Protagonist.” International Review of the Red 
Cross 89:865, 78.  http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-865-p63/$File/irrc-865-Forsythe.pdf 
(March 31, 2010). 
536 Document on file with author. 
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such targets are impermissible. The following narrative of a UNITA fighter illuminates this 
point: 
Respondent: …[the MPLA] didn’t learn about [IHL]. If they could have learned about it, 
they were not suppose to be killing like the way they were killing. 
 
Interviewer: So [you] think that if they received that training then they wouldn’t have 
killed civilians? 
 
Respondent: …if they could have learned, they were not going to kill the civilians.537 
 
Here the respondent claims that civilians, who he perceived as impermissible targets, were killed 
because belligerents did not receive training on who they can and cannot kill during armed 
conflict.  A SWAPO fighter’s narrative echoes these sentiments: 
Interviewer: Do you think the government soldiers knew about international law which 
doesn’t allow a fighter or soldier to kill a civilian? 
 
Respondent: I think they knew about it because they were sometimes not killing.538 
 
Finally, an example from a Zimbabwean soldier, 
Interviewer: How could we help those soldiers understand that they have to act a certain 
way… they shouldn’t victimize civilians? 
 
Respondent: Yes, I think will try to find some means to educate such kind people. Talk to 
governments, talk to the army people, ask them to have some talks. Conduct some talks 
with their people. I am sure governments do accept that.  If it is anything to do with codes 
of conduct, lawlessness, keeping the law and things like that, the responsibilities, yes the 
responsibilities of armies and so on and of governments. I think they should be able to, 
accept that anybody who intends to educate their personnel for a good cause is 
actually…should actually be welcomed. Yes, yes I think that will be good.  It will be a 
good thing to try and make sure because some armies, maybe don’t even realize that they 
should educate their soldiers sometimes. They just think as long as you are a soldier, as 
long as we have soldiers, that’s the end of it. If you are in a war, once you win the battle 
or the war, that is it, you see? Yes, but if we can have some people coming in, more 
organization visiting and making some programs to try and talk to the army personnel. 
Educate them, lessons, and so on, just about code of conduct as such and the Geneva 
                                                 
537 Interview  09060801 (Dukwi, 2009). 
538 Interview 09062901(Dukwi, 2009). 
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Conference thing.  Whatever the decisions.  The rules that came about after the Geneva 
Conference thing really should be stressed with all army personnel everywhere. Yes that 
will be very important. That will be very, very, very important.539 
 
That lack of diffusion plays a part in deliberate civilian targeting is not lost upon IHL 
respondents.  For instance, some respondents stated that belligerents deliberately kill protected 
civilians out of ignorance of the ICRC mandated distinction method.540   
 
Local Contexts 
Ambiguity in the IHL, problematic IHL diffusion, or lack of diffusion of the norm 
proponents’ version of the distinction principle all likely enable conflict dynamics to influence 
how belligerents determine permissible targets.  Essentially, the particular characteristics of each 
conflict can guide belligerents in their attempts to comply with the distinction principle they 
claim to espouse when IHL is unclear or has not been diffused to them.  That context drives 
belligerent consideration of targets was acknowledged by several IHL experts, although they did 
not attribute it to the reasons just stated.541 For instance, Dr. Melzer said at the 2009 American 
Society for International Law conference that DPH can vary by type of conflict.542  An IHL 
respondent expressed similar sentiments: “any culture has different understandings of 
civilian.”543  He explained that, in some conflicts, belligerents target entire ethnic groups because 
they consider them as part of the armed forces; in essence, their ethnic identity serves to indicate 
their legitimacy as targets.  Another respondent said that Nepal has five different ways of 
                                                 
539 Interview  09052500 (Dukwi, 2009). 
540 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
541 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
542Public statement made at ASIL conference (Washington D.C. 2008) 
543 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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expressing childhood, compared to a more monolithic conceptualization in other societies.544  
This reflects a more complex understanding of childhood, enabling some of the armed groups 
within Nepal to sanction the use of child soldiers. 
 Not only does the concept of civilian vary by geographic context, it varies by temporal 
context as well.545  Over time, the permissible target conceptualization may change, but not 
always in a linear fashion.  The changes in perception can shift back and forth, depending on 
how the conflict unfolds.  As one IHL respondent told me, the concept of Vietnamese 
permissible target changed over time for the U.S. military during the Vietnam War.546  A certain 
perception of who could be targeted influenced U.S. action prior to My Lai; it changed after the 
massacre became known to military officials.  
 Former belligerent respondent narratives provide some backing for the contention that 
distinction methods, particularly those that are self-generated, may be context driven.   Where 
child belligerents tended to be of a certain age, respondents considered children of that age 
suspicious, regardless of whether they were actually engaged in hostilities.  Children outside of 
that age range were seen with less suspicion.  Narratives described the assumption that men of a 
certain age and physical condition to be belligerents and were thus targeted.  Meanwhile, 
narratives recounted the sparing of women, even if females fought in the conflict.  This was the 
case as long as the women did not overtly conform to the image of a belligerent.  Pants, just like 
health, became gendered indicators for belligerency.     
 
 
 
                                                 
544 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
545 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
546 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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HINTS OF NORM CONTESTATION BEYOND THIS STUDY 
 
There are hints that norm contestation can be used to understand violations of the civilian 
immunity norm beyond this study.   One such hint can be found in a study conducted by 
researchers at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) employing the Uppsala One-Sided 
Violence Dataset.   Before delving into the findings of this study, a brief description of the 
dataset is in order. 
The researchers who compiled the Uppsala One-Sided Violence Dataset define civilians 
as “those who do not engage in armed conflict.”547  Intentionality is  
based on the stated intention of the parties (which is usually military). Exceptions to this 
rule are made in rare cases where the nature of the incident stretches the credulity of 
claims that the targets were military; such incidents are marked by a highly 
disproportionate ratio of military to civilian fatalities. When there is no stated intention, a 
judgment is made by a regional expert, based on a number of criteria, such as past 
behavior of the parties.548 
 
The dataset records these civilian deaths globally for the years 1989-2007.  The researchers 
compiled their data first through the use of VRA Technology to generate an automated data 
search of news reports from the Factiva news database.549  The parameters of the search were to 
retrieve all news reports containing information on individuals killed or injured.550  With their 
search results in hand, each report was then hand coded into an events dataset.551  Coders also 
assessed the independence and transparency of each news story, making attempts to trace reports 
                                                 
547 Email correspondence, Uppsala Conflict Dataset Project Leader (4/28/06). 
548 Email correspondence, Uppsala Conflict Dataset Project Leader (4/28/06). 
549 Kreutz, Joakim and Kristine Eck. 2005. “UCDP One Sided Violence Codebook: Version 1.0” 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/One-sided%20violence%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf, (April 4, 
2010). 
550 Ibid. 
551 Ibid. 
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back to their primary source when possible.552  News reports were also supplemented with case 
level data when it was available.553  The data was then organized into a matrix divided by 
country, actor, year and fatality figures. 
 What this description reveals is that the dataset tracks the number of civilians (at least 
how the UCDP defines them) intentionally killed by both nonstate and state actors on a global 
perspective.  While the dataset imposes a singular, UCDP derived definition of civilian when 
coding civilian deaths, that definition approximates the one utilized by the Guidance. 
 A study using this dataset found that nonstate actors generally tend to intentionally kill 
more civilians than state actors (see figure below554).555  It also found that in territorial conflicts, 
nonstate actors intentionally killed six times more civilians than state actors.556  Kristine Eck and 
Lisa Hultman suggest it could 
be the case that this violence has to do with group identity. In ethnic-based territorial 
conflicts (which the majority are), rebels may adopt an ethnic cleansing-like strategy of 
attacking civilians who belong to other ethnic groups in order to assert their dominance in 
the area.557 
                                                 
552 Ibid. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Eck and Hultman (2007:207) 
555 Eck and Hultman (2007: 239). 
556 Eck and Hultman (2007: 239). 
557 Id. 
 159 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Annual One Sided Fatalities by Actor, 1989-2004 
  
While that may be true, contestation may offer additional insights into why nonstate 
actors intentionally kill civilians more so than state actors.  As discussed above, there are several 
reasons why norm contestation might be more pronounced among nonstate belligerents than state 
belligerents.  If so, that these findings occur across time and space intimate that contestation may 
possess utility beyond the scope of this study. 
 
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study’s findings offer several contributions to theoretical and poly oriented discussion on 
civilian targeting.  Firstly, scholars need to pay more attention to the ways in which key actors 
understand their normative obligations, particularly its constitutive elements.  The lack of 
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intersubjectivity on permissible civilian targets between norm proponents and the belligerents 
creates a situation in which belligerents complying with their version of the distinction principle 
appear to norm proponents as violators of that very principle. Per norm contestation, civilian 
deaths do not always arise not from pursuing particular interests, but even in contradiction to 
those interests. Thus, considering how ambiguous norms can give rise to variations in normative 
obligations provides fresh insights into possible reasons why norms are not followed.  Viewing it 
from this lens paints a more complex picture of norm violation. 
Secondly, scholars should expend more of their analytical expertise on the process of 
domestic norm implementation.  While the process of international norm diffusion has been well 
investigated, comparatively less is known about the domestic norm diffusion process.558  Yet, 
this process plays a crucial part in international norm compliance.  Consequently, understanding 
its mechanics and challenges can also help to illuminate why norm violations occur.  
Thirdly, this study reveals how combat experience can shape how belligerents view non-
belligerents as well as what they consider as threatening behavior in the specific context of the 
civilian immunity norm.  For instance, age helps to define protective status and target legitimacy.  
These age-based impacts are not uniform across conflicts or even actors.  Children are a case in 
point.  Former belligerent narratives suggest that belligerent behavior toward children depends 
on whether they conceptualize them as threatening and non-threatening.  The determination 
stems from the role children have played in a belligerent’s conflict.  These views sometimes 
differ from how IHL experts consider children in the context of the civilian protection regime. 
                                                 
558 In addition to the works listed in FN 114 in Chapter 2, see the following for discussions on the domestic norm 
diffusion process, see Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes.1993. “On Compliance,” International 
Organization 47:2; Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom.1996. “Is the Good News About 
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,” International Organization 50:3; Koh, Harold.1997. “Why do 
Nations Obey International Law,” 106 Yale Law Journal 259. 
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And both sets of views differ from the ICRC’s guidelines on how to interpret permissible civilian 
targets under IHL. Ambiguity in the civilian immunity norm magnifies these variations. 
From a policy standpoint, the findings from this study indicate that norm proponents 
should undertake enhanced efforts to disseminate IHL to nonstate belligerents.  As Eck and 
Hultman’s study demonstrates, nonstate belligerents commit more frequent attacks on civilians 
than government forces.559  My study suggests that sometimes those attacks occur due to 
contestation.  That is, belligerents may attack protected civilians because they are considered 
permissible targets.  Belligerents who operate under this framework should be the focus of 
dissemination and training activities because their efforts to comply (even if erroneous) with the 
distinction principle indicate a willingness to comply with rules.  Thus, it is possible that by 
altering their understanding of what is considered compliance so that it approximates the norm 
proponents’ view, fewer protected civilians may be targeted.   
Furthermore, nonstate belligerents need to be included in the IHL decision-making process.  
For instance, no nonstate armed groups were represented in the ICRC Workshops on DPH.  This 
is surprising because it would seem any effort to strengthen compliance with IHL would include 
such actors. Firstly, many current conflicts include nonstate belligerents.  This fact alone should 
have warranted them an invitation to participate in these discussions.  Additionally, nonstate 
belligerents have been accused of some of the most heinous violations of IHL.  Therefore, giving 
nonstate belligerents a seat at the table enables norm proponents to glean why these violations 
occur, informing policies to prevent such violations. Furthermore, nonstate belligerents are 
beholden to any Workshop recommendations adopted by states that possess jurisdiction over 
them.  Thus, not only would it seem conducive to norm compliance to include those subject to 
the law to participate in discussions on how it should be implemented, but it might also increase 
                                                 
559 Eck and Hultman (2007) 
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the chances of these participants taking ownership of those rules, thus also possibly increasing 
compliance with those rules.    
States might strongly resist such moves, but norm proponents must overcome this 
resistance if they want to make IHL more effective.  Many current conflicts involve nonstate 
belligerents who commit IHL violations.  Some of these belligerents argue that they do not need 
to heed law they did not draft or follow interpretations that differ from their own.  Involving 
them in the drafting of new laws and interpretation of existing law removes this excuse.  It also 
increases the chance of belligerents being invested in the process of making IHL more effective.  
Engaging nonstate belligerents also enables norm enforcers to better understand why the 
distinction principle is violated. 
Norm enforcers also need to undertake a more bottom up approach to understanding 
deliberate civilian targeting, rather than the top down approach currently utilized.  As one IHL 
respondent told me,  
with the ICRC, it’s one way communication; we decide what’s relevant.  What sources, 
what data… we make up our own conclusion… we don’t really consider local context.560   
 
As argued here, local contexts can impact the constitution of permissible civilian targets.  Norm 
proponents must be cognizant of this effect.  They must customize their strategies to take into 
account each conflict’s particular dynamics.  As the same respondent advised, the ICRC should 
approach the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo differently than the conflict in 
Columbia.  Despite the realization of individual ICRC delegates that contexts shapes belligerent 
understandings of their IHL obligations, the ICRC as an organization fails to share this 
observation.  Instead of a bottom up approach that includes all belligerents, including nonstate 
belligerents, in the discussion, it opts for a top down approach.  While this may serve 
                                                 
560 Personal Interview (Geneva, November 2009). 
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efficiency’s needs, employing one standard approach to address IHL violations will not yield 
desired results as conflicts differ significantly.   
 Additionally, IHL needs to be further clarified.  ICRC’s efforts to clarify DPH are a step 
in the right direction, but need to be continued.  As indicated here, there is still disagreement 
among relevant parties on what specific acts fall under the umbrella of DPH, notably among IHL 
experts.  Since this phrase carries great significance to both civilians and belligerents, efforts to 
provide clarity on the matter must persist.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
All the former belligerents interviewed in this study claimed compliance with a distinction 
principle, albeit in forms that do not always follow norm proponent understandings.    
Consequently, despite their stated compliance with a particular version of the distinction 
principle, such behavior would appear as norm violations when norm proponents evaluate these 
actions against their own interpretation of the distinction principle.  Former belligerents were not 
the only ones who expressed a lack of consensus on who may be a permissible target.  IHL 
experts, including ICRC delegates, also failed to offer a unified articulation of the distinction 
principle; they varyingly identified a permissible civilian target.  This occurred even after the 
conclusion of ICRC Workshops to clarify the parameters of DPH.  This dissonance mirrors the 
lack of consensus at the close of these Workshops which the ICRC acknowledges in the 
Guidance:  “The Interpretive Guidance… does not necessarily reflect a unanimous view or 
majority opinion of the experts (emphasis added).”561  
                                                 
561 International Committee for the Red Cross. 2009. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
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The Guidance not only fails to reflect the majority of opinion of those in attendance in the 
ICRC workshops, it does not take into account the perspectives of some of the most relevant 
actors in armed conflict.  According to one participant, many of those present were drawn from 
the legal community and humanitarian experts.562  As discussed above, nonstate armed groups 
did not attend the ICRC workshops.  Furthermore, delegates representing different states’ air 
forces had a disproportionate presence compared to the other branches of state armed forces.   
In essence, similar problems that hindered the clarification of permissible targets during the 
AP I negotiating process appeared during the ICRC’s most recent attempts to settle this issue: all 
relevant parties did not participate in the deliberations and those that did participate could not 
reach a consensus on what constitutes a permissible civilian target.  What this discussion reveals 
is that despite the global community’s efforts to clarify this critical IHL concept, it failed to do 
so. 
Yet, scholars and practitioners fail to appreciate the significance that multiple interpretations 
of the distinction principle exert on IHL compliance. This is so even when IHL respondents 
acknowledge that various distinctions methods operate in conflict settings, as indicated by an 
ICRC delegate: 
Armed groups may define civilian in a way we don’t like… Palestinian groups would have 
considered Jewish settlers as legitimate targets… all people have an idea of what’s  fair in 
war… [These ideas] may not fly with the international system...563 
 
Rather, scholars and practitioners place a premium on other explanations for the violation of the 
distinction principle.  According to the ICRC, 
While ICRC delegates are certainly of the opinion that the distinction is often less than clear-
cut, they believe that violations of IHL are more often the result of a deliberate intention to 
attack the civilian population rather than of any objective difficulty in distinguishing the one 
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from the other.  The 2 problems need to be separated.  In certain cases, civilians are 
perceived as having forfeited their civilian status because, unwillingly or not, they are 
contributing to the enemy’s war effort.  The IHL distinction between civilians and 
combatants is then replaced by a distinction between guilty and innocent.564 
 
The number of people victimized by the scourge of warfare is far too high for the matters 
raised here to be overlooked. Millions of people have been intentionally killed in armed conflict.  
The consequences of these violations of international humanitarian law do not end at their 
deaths.  For the grieving families who lost loved ones, for dependent relatives who lost a source 
of support, for societies that lost a contributing member, the impacts are felt long after these 
victims have been put to rest. It is the unfortunate case that belligerents do intentionally target 
those they know are protected by international humanitarian law.  However, hopefully, it is also 
shown here that sometimes these deaths occur when belligerents comply with an interpretation of 
law that differs from the law’s enforcers.  In such cases, concerted international activity to 
address these differences in understanding might help reduce civilian casualties.  Such attention 
is worthwhile even if the number of civilians saved is small. 
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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
1. AP- 1977 Additional Protocol(s) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
2. CIA- Central Intelligence Agency 
3. DPH- direct participation in hostilities 
4. DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo 
5. Guidance- ICRC’s “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law 
6. HRW- Human Rights Watch 
7. IBC- Iraq Body Count 
8. ICRC- International Committee for the Red Cross 
9. IHL- International humanitarian law 
10. MPLA- Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 
11. QDAP- University of Pittsburgh’s Qualitative Data Analysis Program 
12. SADF- South African Defense Force 
13. SWAPO- South West Africa People's Organization 
14. UCDP- Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
15. UN- United Nations 
16. UNHCR-  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
17. UNICEF-   United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund   
18. UNITA- União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
19. UNOSRSG- United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General 
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APPENDIX II 
IMPORTANT LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE TERMS 
 
• Civilian immunity norm- a norm which governs belligerent behavior toward those 
whom it protects, conventionally designated as “civilians,” during armed conflict.  It 
contains three principles, of which the most relevant to this study is the distinction 
principle. 
• Constitutive effects of norms- inform actors on how to see others which then enable a 
norm to exert its regulative effects 
 
 
• Distinction principle- the principle which requires belligerents to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible targets during armed conflict.  It is one principle contained 
in the civilian immunity norm and is codified in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions.  
 
 
• Grounded theory- “the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from 
social science research” (Glaser and Strauss 2006:2) 
 
 
• Historiography- “the writing of history based on a selective, critical reading of sources 
that synthesizes particular bits of information into a narrative description or analysis of a 
subject” (Thies 2002: 351) 
 
 
• International humanitarian law- the body of law which regulates the conduct of 
hostilities 
• Intersubjectivity- shared understandings between actors in a regime as to what is 
considered appropriate behavior for those actors under conditions regulated by the regime 
 
 
• Logic of appropriateness- according to March and Olsen, a logic of appropriateness 
posits that actors act “in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, 
publicly known, anticipated, and accepted” (1998:952) 
• Logic of consequences- according to March and Olsen, a logic of consequences posits 
that “action by individuals, organizations, or states is driven by calculation of its 
consequences as measured against prior preferences” (1998:950) 
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• Norms- “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner 
1982: 185) 
 
• One sided violence- “The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a 
formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. 
Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded.”  Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of 
retrieval: 2010/07/30) UCDP Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University 
 
 
 
• Regimes- “principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue area” (Krasner 1982: 185)   
• Regulative effects of norms- provide actors guidance on how to act in a given situation 
and essentially constrain actors 
 
• Social facts- “things like money, sovereignty and rights, which have no material reality 
but exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 393)   
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APPENDIX III 
CODEBOOK 
 
1) Civilians~Protection – References to armies protecting civilians. This can include 
references to how “true” civilians are identified, how they are treated, as well as the 
rationale behind protecting them (e.g., winning over civilian support or future soldiers). 
 
2) Enemy Treatment – References to how “the enemy” is treated. Bear in mind that while 
the term “enemy” certainly applies to soldiers who are part of or associated with an 
opposing side and/or militia, it also can apply to villagers who support an opposing side, 
and people who spy (either as part of an opposing army or on behalf of an opposing 
army). Also, keep in mind that “treatment” includes actions other than killing. 
 
3) International Community – Any references to the International Community. This 
includes its involvement and response (or lack thereof) (to violence in general, violence 
against civilians in particular, the breaking of international law). This code also includes 
references to any influence the International Community might have (or not have) over 
the different parties engaged in warfare. Other ideas might include ways by which the 
International Community’s effectiveness might be strengthened, as well as any violence 
or retaliation directed against the International Community. Apply this code to references 
of peacekeepers and their peacekeeping attempts. 
 
4) Law – References to laws/mandates (international law, UN) that cover warfare and/or 
protection/treatment of civilians 
 
5) Personal information – References to the interviewee’s demographic information; e.g., 
age, family, rank, where he fought, how he came to fight, reasons for fighting, when he 
started/stopped fighting, the side for which he fought, etc.  NOTE: Be sure to add a 
comment naming the side for which the interviewee fought. 
 
6) Recruitment~Civilians – References to soldiers recruiting civilians for any reason 
 
7) Recruitment~Youth – Specific references to soldiers recruiting youth into the army. 
This can include references to their roles in the army once they've been recruited. 
 
8) Refraining from Engaging with Civilians – References to any reasons that belligerents 
might choose specifically not to engage in violence/hostilities/conflict with civilians. Be 
on the look-out for references to the international community, as it’s possible that various 
actors in the international community are able to influence belligerents to modify their 
targeting decisions. 
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9) Training – References to the interviewee's training, such as his trainers, duration of 
training, location of training, type/forms, and skills. Also includes references to how 
soldiers are trained to treat civilians and civil rights. NOTE: If the interviewee mentions 
having been trained by particular organizations such as the Red Cross or the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), be sure to add a comment naming the organization. 
 
10) Targets~Illegitimate –References to targets for lethal action that are considered to be 
illegitimate from the interviewee’s point of view. NOTE: If the target in question is 
identified as a civilian, be sure to add a comment indicating this. Targets include 
soldiers/fighters and non-soldiers/fighters, as well as enemies/non-enemies. 
 
11) Targets~Legitimate – References to targets for lethal action that are considered to be 
legitimate from the interviewee’s point of view. NOTE: If the target in question is 
identified as a civilian, be sure to add a comment indicating this. Targets include 
soldiers/fighters and non-soldiers/fighters, as well as enemies/non-enemies. 
 
12) Target Characteristics~Illegitimate – References to the characteristics of those targets 
for lethal action that are considered to be illegitimate from the interviewee’s point of 
view, as well as the reasons a target might be considered illegitimate (e.g., someone being 
caught in crossfire). NOTE: If the target in question is identified as a civilian, be sure to 
add a comment indicating this. Targets include soldiers/fighters and non-
soldiers/fighters, as well as enemies/non-enemies. 
 
13) Target Characteristics~Legitimate – References to the characteristics of those targets 
for lethal action that are considered to be legitimate from the interviewee’s point of view, 
as well as the reasons a target might be considered legitimate (e.g., someone identified as/ 
considered to be a spy). NOTE: If the target in question is identified as a civilian, be sure 
to add a comment indicating this. Targets include soldiers/fighters and non-
soldiers/fighters, as well as enemies/non-enemies. 
 
14) Treatment of Women – Specific references to the ways in which women/females are 
treated. This includes violence of any kind (physical, incl. kidnapping; sexual; 
psychological), as well as the roles to which women are subjugated once they are in 
captivity or “under control.” 
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APPENDIX IV 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR FORMER BELLIGERENTS 
 
I am doing a series of interviews on armed conflict and would like your help with that. This 
study aims to understand what is considered acceptable conduct in the course of an armed 
conflict.  The interview will take about 45 minutes.   
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you 
will remain confidential. You will not be identified or quoted by name in written documents that 
result from this work. Your identity will be kept confidential by assigning you a number, and 
only numbers rather than names will appear on transcripts.  
If you have questions about this study, please feel free to contact Betcy Jose-Thota at the 
University of Pittsburgh by email at betcyjt@gmail.com or by phone: 832-202-6692. 
Let me begin by asking you some questions about yourself to make sure that I am talking to all 
kinds of people. If you don’t want to answer, feel free to tell me so and we will move on to the 
next question. You can also stop the interview at any time. 
1. What is your age?  
2. How many years of school have you had?  
3. What is your current family situation (married, single, live together with someone in a 
permanent relationship, divorced or separated, spouse of missing person, widow(er)).  
4. Do you have children? If so, how many?  
5. How long have you been a fighter? 
6. For which side did you fight? 
7. Are there certain rules fighters must follow during armed conflict?  What are some of 
these rules? 
8. Who told you about these rules? 
9. Are there certain people fighters are not supposed to target in armed conflict?  Who are 
these people and why can’t they be targeted?  
10. Do fighters make in effort to follow this rule? 
11. Do fighters target those they are not supposed to?  Why? 
12. How can we make sure fighters follow the rules?  
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR IHL EXPERTS 
This research study aims to understand what is considered acceptable conduct in the course of an 
armed conflict.  For this reason, I am doing a series of interviews on armed conflict with 
humanitarian practitioners. The interview will take about 45 minutes. 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project, nor are there any direct benefits to 
you.  All responses will be kept under lock and key.  Any information that is obtained in 
connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential. You will 
not be identified or quoted by name in written documents that result from this work. Your 
identity will be kept confidential by assigning you a number, and only numbers rather than 
names will appear on transcripts.  
If you have questions about this study, please feel free to contact Betcy Jose-Thota at the 
University of Pittsburgh by email at betcyjt@gmail.com or by phone: 832-202-6692. 
Let me begin by asking you about some of the work that the ICRC does. If you don’t want to 
answer, feel free to tell me so and we will move on to the next question. You can also stop the 
interview at any time. 
1. One of the ICRC’s responsibilities is to disseminate international humanitarian law.  Can 
you tell me how the ICRC does this with regards to belligerents? 
2. What are some problems ICRC faces when conducting these activities?  How could they 
be improved? 
3. Does the ICRC conduct these activities with both state and non-state belligerents?  Does 
the ICRC conduct them similarly when working with these groups? 
4. International humanitarian law regulates the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict.  
Yet, often there are many violations of international humanitarian law, such as the 
targeting of protected people.  Who is considered a legitimate civilian target?     
5. Do you think the various types of belligerents share this understanding of legitimate 
targets?  Why or why not? 
6. Why do you think that civilians continue to be targeted?  
7. How can the deliberate targeting of civilians be stopped?  
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APPENDIX V 
DATA SUMMARY- NORM FRAMEWORKS 
 
 
 
  
  09052500 
09052500’s 
Opponent 09061100 
09061100’s 
Opponent 
09061502’s 
opponent 09061101 09062901 09052800 09060803 
Group Zimbabwe Army rebels 
ZAPO/ 
ZANF 
Rhodesian 
Army 
Rhodesian 
Army 
ZAPO/ 
ZANU ZAPO 
Rhodesian 
Army SADF 
Conflict 
Location 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Namibia 
Nationality Zimbabwe  Angola   Zimbabwe Zimbabwe  Namibia 
Contestation      x  x x 
Diffusion  x x x x x x x x 
Violation x x x x x  x x  
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 09062400 09060300’s opponent 09060400 
09060400’s 
opponent 09060202 
09060202’s 
opponent 09060801 09052702 
09052702’s 
opponent 009062401 
Group Angola MPLA UNITA MPLA UNITA MPLA UNITA SADF SWAPO UNITA 
Conflict 
Location UNITA Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola 
Nationality Angola  Angola  Angola  Angola Namibia  Angola 
Contestation x x x X  x x x  x 
Diffusion x x x X x x x x x  
Violation    X x    x  
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Appendix VI 
Kappa Scores 
 
All current quotations (362). Quotation-Filter: All 
______________________________________________________________________ 
HU: Jose-Thota_Rounds 1-4_Merge_031710 (older codes removed) 
File:  [T:ThotaRounds...Thota_Rounds 1-4_Merge_031710 (older codes removed).hpr6] 
Edited by: David 
Date/Time: 03/17/2010 04:38:36 PM 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Code Elana Taichi Exact 
Match 
Overlap Kappa Kappa 
(inc. 
Overlap) 
Civilians~Protection 5 6 3 2 0.38 0.75 
Enemy Treatment 50 54 17 21 0.20 0.55 
Identification of 
Enemies 
52 47 13 20 0.15 0.49 
International 
Community 
23 16 10 11 0.34 0.93 
Law 4 5 3 1 0.50 0.67 
Other 5 9 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Personal 
information 
23 25 10 12 0.26 0.63 
Recruitment 22 12 3 9 0.10 0.42 
Refraining from 
Engaging with 
Civilians 
20 13 6 2 0.22 0.30 
Targets~Illegitimate 5 8 1 1 0.08 0.17 
Targets~Legitimate 58 55 27 25 0.31 0.67 
Treatment of 
Women 
12 9 3 8 0.17 0.78 
Totals 279 259 96 112 0.23 0.53 
  
 176 
 
 
All current quotations (183). Quotation-Filter: All 
______________________________________________________________________ 
HU: Jose-Thota_Round 5_Merge_022610 
File:  [T:Thota55 AnalysisThota_Round 5_Merge_022610.hpr6] 
Edited by: David 
Date/Time: 02/26/2010 03:24:17 PM 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Code Elana Taichi Exact 
Match 
Overlap Kappa Kappa 
(inc. 
Overlap) 
Civilians~Protection 3 2 2 0 0.67 0.67 
Enemy Treatment 20 23 6 8 0.16 0.43 
Identification of 
Enemies 
28 21 9 10 0.23 0.55 
International 
Community 
17 13 5 9 0.20 0.76 
Law 13 16 8 4 0.38 0.62 
Other 1 5 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Personal 
information 
11 7 5 2 0.38 0.62 
Recruitment 5 8 2 2 0.18 0.45 
Refraining from 
Engaging with 
Civilians 
12 5 1 3 0.06 0.31 
Targets~Illegitimate 8 7 2 4 0.15 0.54 
Targets~Legitimate 24 32 7 18 0.14 0.71 
Treatment of 
Women 
3 5 1 4 0.14 1.14 
Totals 145 144 48 64 0.23 0.57 
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All current quotations (153). Quotation-Filter: All 
______________________________________________________________________ 
HU: Jose-Thota_Round 6_Merge_030510 
File:  [T:Thota66 AnalysisThota_Round 6_Merge_030510.hpr6] 
Edited by: David 
Date/Time: 03/05/2010 04:24:44 PM 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Code Elana Taichi Exact 
Match 
Overlap Kappa Kappa 
(inc. 
Overlap) 
Civilians~Protection 6 9 4 2 0.36 0.64 
Enemy Treatment 17 36 10 9 0.23 0.56 
Identification of 
Enemies 
16 33 7 18 0.17 0.90 
International 
Community 
7 11 1 10 0.06 1.00 
Law 3 3 0 3 0.00 1.00 
Other 0 4 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Personal 
information 
5 5 3 2 0.43 0.71 
Recruitment 6 10 2 3 0.14 0.43 
Refraining from 
Engaging with 
Civilians 
10 4 3 0 0.27 0.27 
Targets~Illegitimate 2 2 0 2 0.00 0.75 
Targets~Legitimate 17 25 8 12 0.24 0.76 
Treatment of 
Women 
3 7 0 5 0.00 0.80 
Totals 92 149 38 66 0.16 0.65 
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